State Bd. of Assessors v. State
| Decision Date | 29 May 1886 |
| Citation | 8 A. 724,48 N.J.L. 146 |
| Parties | STATE BOARD OF ASSESSORS v. STATE. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
I have reached a conclusion in harmony with the opinion of the court, and therefore shall set forth the reasons for so doing but briefly on the record. Nor would I consider it at all necessary, if such reasons were similar precisely to those formulated in the judgment to be rendered. I think, besides, from the gravity of the matters involved in the determination of the case, that these views should be expressed by more than a mere signification of assent. This is why I propose to add something to what has been said, though not required to sustain or strengthen the decision about to be given.
Until 35 years ago, state revenue was raised in New Jersey by assessments imposed on land and certainties, so-called; that is, gold and silver coin, and other property of a visible and tangible nature. This system had the merit of simplicity, but public sentiment, after a century and a half of practice, demanded a change because the burden of taxation was distributed unequally and unjustly. So, to remedy this, another species of property, invisible, incorporeal, and intangible, was brought under the reach of the assessor. But under the new departure, though intended to remove the dissatisfaction existing previously, complaints of injustice were none the less frequent than before; and, while the essential features were preserved, the plan was subject to constant modification. Equal taxation, like other abstract propositions, was easy to lay down in words, but to carry out in practice hic labor, hoc opus erat. Finally, after a quarter of a century of experimental economy, constitutional restriction, to which the legislative authority had not been subjected previously, interposed, and declared that property should be assessed for taxes under general laws and by uniform rules, according to its true value. The words are imposing and equitable in sound, but, like all similar declarations of a general nature, when submitted to the touchstone of human ingenuity, sharpened by legal acumen, are capable of various interpretations when sought to be applied to a practical result. The case now under consideration is an illustration in point. Difficulties arise at once in establishing any principle of impost on property for purposes of state revenue. Note here how learned legal critics differ as to the meaning of state tax. "While that phraseology may be, and for ordinary and distinctive purposes is, distinguished from what, for similar convenience, are recognized as local or municipal assessments, still, when considered as a system or science, no tax can be regarded as other than an impost of the state, because no other authority can lay a custom levy. It is in such a character and connection only that a judicial tribunal can contemplate the word "taxes" in a constitutional aspect. As matter of fact, any ordinary state tax, whenever laid, is collected through municipal instrumentality. Any argument drawn from a specious distinction between state and local taxation must be outside of constitutional intent, and therefore fallacious, and should be disregarded in arriving at a final determination of this controversy.
Then, too, the single and simple word "property," the very first in the amendment restricting legislative power in this particular, has elicited vigorous judicial criticism, as well as sharp and spicy legal sparring. Who would suppose so little a phrase would involve such a wide variation as shown in the argument; that so much could have been said, so many learned words uttered, in attempting to prove the meaning of the classical little logos as used in the constitutional sentence? Property was to be assessed for taxes; nothing else could be. There is a popular definition of the word, in which those who have none are not concerned, and those who have generally try to keep but little on hand during the summer months. The word would seem to have but one signification for practical purposes. It is something seen and handled,—touched,—of which there is a visible, fixed sign. All agree to that. But it is said "property," as used in the amendment, implies totality; and, if it does not, then some only, and not all, is assessed. In opposition to this, it is claimed that whatever property is assessed is a totality,—is all that is required by the constitution. Here a difficulty is started that must be settled by a judicial tribunal. What meaning is contemplated by the use of the word? "Property" is the single logos. It is in the beginning of the sentence, single and simple, not qualified by any limitations. It must signify all or only some. The constitution does not declare that the whole or part only of property should be assessed for taxes. What is the natural construction of the word in connection with practice and contemporary exposition? Legislative power had been the sole arbiter in matters of financial economy for nearly two centuries in the history of the commonwealth prior to the restrictions of 1875, and the latter in this respect did not limit the discretion of that power. The same rule has obtained since as was followed before the amendment was adopted. There have been 10 years of practice under the new dispensation, and that should go far towards determining the construction of the term. "Property" here is a totality, and "all property" could be no more, for the reason that both would mean whatever property was assessed in the exercise of legislative discretion. The construction that seems to me to be natural and proper is that whatever property the legislature should determine to assess, whether all or a part, must be taxed after a certain mode and manner. That body, untrammeled and sovereign as to this, might select whatever it chose to bear the burden of custom, tithe, and tribute, and that would be a totality because it would be all the property made subject to taxation. In my judgment there was error in the opinion of the supreme court in this respect.
This leads to the consideration of the constitutionality of the law, which is the only action a...
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