State Bd. of Educ. v. Houghton Lake Community Schools

• Citation: 47 Ed. Law Rep. 703,425 N.W.2d 80,430 Mich. 658
• Decision Date: 27 June 1988
• Docket Number: Docket No. 80686
• Parties: STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Attorney General of the State of Michigan, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOUGHTON LAKE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants-Appellees. 430 Mich. 658, 425 N.W.2d 80, 47 Ed. Law Rep. 703
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 80

425 N.W.2d 80

STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff-Appellant and Attorney General of the State of Michigan, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOUGHTON LAKE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, et al Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 80686.

430 Mich. 658, 425 N.W.2d 80, 47 Ed. Law Rep. 703

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 9, 1988.

Decided June 27, 1988.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Counsel of Record, Lansing, Patrick J. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-appellant.

Gerald F. Young, Paul J. Zimmer, Asst. Attys. Gen., Lansing, for intervening plaintiff-appellant Office of the Attorney General.

Thrun, Maatsch and Nordberg, P.C., Thomas J. Norberg, Beverly J. Bonning, for defendants-appellees.

Linda L. Bruin, Michigan Association of School Boards, Lansing, for amicus curiae.

Opinion

Before the entire Bench.

BOYLE, Justice.

In this case we are asked to decide whether the State Board of Education may, by court order, compel a local board of education to provide 180 days of instruction in a school year.

The Attorney General, as intervening plaintiff-appellant, appeals from the January 21, 1987, decision ¹ of the Court of Appeals, upholding the order of the Roscommon Circuit Court denying the State Board of Education's request for a writ of mandamus compelling the defendants, Houghton Lake Community Schools and Houghton Lake Board of Education, to provide 180 days of instruction in the 1985-86 school year. The Court of Appeals reasoned that there was no clear legal duty on the part of the Houghton school board to provide any additional days of instruction, since the Houghton school board had complied with the 180-day rule as interpreted in the regulations of the State Board of Education. See 1979 AC, R 340.10 and 340.11. ² The Court of Appeals further reasoned that a subsequent amendment of the State School Aid Act, 1986 P.A. 212, Sec. 101(3), ³ which conflicts with the method of calculating days of instruction under the regulations of the Michigan State Board of Education, is void under Const.1963, art. 8, Sec. 3. ⁴

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, although on different grounds. In doing so, we do not reach the constitutional issue addressed by the Court of Appeals, nor do we approve of the Court of Appeals resolution of this issue, but we instead adopt a statutory analysis similar to that of the circuit court. ⁵

I Facts

It is undisputed that Houghton Lake Community Schools is a fourth-class district organized under the Michigan School Code of 1976, M.C.L. Sec. 380.1 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 15.4001 et seq. Houghton Lake received "minimal" state financial assistance in the 1985-86 school year, totaling approximately $11,000, or sixty dollars per day for the entire district. The Houghton Lake board adopted a calendar for the school year which provided for 180 days of instruction. The last scheduled day of school was to be June 9, 1986.

Severe weather during the 1985-86 calendar year forced a closing of Houghton Lake Community schools for six scheduled days of instruction. As it had in previous years, the Houghton Lake board decided not to make up the "snow days." The Houghton Lake board's decision was entered as a resolution dated March 10, 1986.

On April 21, 1986, the State Board of Education filed a complaint for mandamus in the Roscommon Circuit Court. The state board's complaint noted that the defendant, Houghton Lake board, had resolved not to make up the six snow days and alleged that the defendant was thereby not in compliance with state law ⁶ requiring 180 days of instruction.

The Houghton Lake board filed an answer on April 30, 1986. The defendant denied that it was under a legal duty to provide 180 days of instruction and requested dismissal of the state board's complaint with prejudice.

A show cause hearing was held in circuit court on May 5, 1986. The defendant, Houghton Lake board, argued that it had no clear legal duty to provide 180 days of instruction, hence an order of mandamus should not be issued for four reasons. First, according to defendant, it was in compliance with the 180-day rule as construed in 1979 AC, R 340.11, promulgated by the state board, and that a subsequent amendment of the school aid act ⁷ in conflict with this regulation unconstitutionally usurped the authority of the state board under Const.1963, art. 8, Sec. 3. ⁸ Second, the defendant argued that state law does not mandate 180 days of instruction, but merely conditions the receipt of state financing upon compliance with the 180-day requirement. Thus, according to the defendant, the state board's sole remedy for noncompliance was to withhold state financing on a per diem basis for the lost days of instruction. Third, the defendant argued that, if state law mandates 180 days of instruction, the statutes involved ⁹ are void under the Title-Object Clause of Const.1963, art. 4, Sec. 24 in that this title refers only to financing or appropriations and not to the administration of local districts. Fourth, the defendant argued that, if state law mandates 180 days of instruction, the statutes involved are in violation of the Headlee Amendment, Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 29, in that they impose a new activity or service upon a local unit of government without an appropriation by the state. ¹⁰

On the same day, May 5, 1986, the circuit court issued an order denying a writ of mandamus to the state board. The circuit court reasoned that state law does not mandate 180 days of instruction, but merely conditions the receipt of state financing upon completion of the required days of instruction. According to the circuit court, the Houghton Lake board was empowered to offer less than 180 days of instruction under financial penalty and without further interference from the state board. The circuit court did not reach the constitutional issues raised by the defendant.

The state board appealed the circuit court's decision, arguing that the 180-day statutory requirement is mandatory, that the administrative rule upon which the defendant relied for compliance was rescinded by subsequent amendments of the school aid act, and that those amendments violate neither the Title-Object Clause nor the Headlee Amendment of Const.1963. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court's order denying a writ of mandamus. However, the Court of Appeals reasoned that there was no clear legal duty because the defendant properly relied upon 1979 AC, R 340.11. ¹¹ Citing the authority of the state board under Const.1963, art. 8, Sec. 3, the Court of Appeals concluded that the subsequent amendment of the school aid act upon which the state board relied was ineffective to rescind 1979 AC, R 340.11. The Court of Appeals explained:

"Clearly, requirements governing the number of days of instruction to be provided must also come from the state board. While we believe that imposition of financial penalties for failure to hold 180 days of instruction is within the province of the legislative duty to 'maintain and support a system of free public ... schools,' we conclude that the Legislature has no constitutional power to mandate the number of days of instruction which a district must provide. That power lies exclusively with the board of education. Welling [v. Livonia Bd. of Ed., 382 Mich. 620, 623, 171 N.W.2d 545 (1969) ]." 157 Mich.App. 396, 399-400, 403 N.W.2d 561 (1987).

Thus, although the Court of Appeals ruled against the state board, its reasoning that the state board's own administrative rule precluded the imposition of a clear legal duty by legislative enactment ¹² provided an expanded interpretation of the state board's authority.

The Attorney General filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision, nominally representing the state board, arguing that the subsequent amendments of the school aid act upon which the school board had relied were valid and rescinded 1979 AC, R 340.11. Not surprisingly, in view of the support of board authority provided by the opinion, the state board responded with its own brief in opposition to the motion. The state board argued that the Court of Appeals had correctly ruled that the constitutional power to mandate the number of days of school instruction is reposed in the state board rather than the Legislature. ¹³ The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in an order dated April 2, 1987.

The Attorney General subsequently sought leave to appeal in this Court. The application was opposed by the state board as well as the Houghton Lake Board of Education. We granted leave to appeal in an order dated October 6, 1987. ¹⁴

II Analysis

The circuit court order from which the state board, and later the Attorney General, appealed denied a writ of mandamus requiring the Houghton Lake board to reschedule or make up a number of snow days in its 1985-86 school year. As we have held on numerous occasions, to obtain a writ of mandamus, the plaintiff must have a clear legal right to the performance of the specific duty sought to be compelled and the defendants must have a clear legal duty to perform the same. Pillon v. Attorney General, 345 Mich. 536, 539, 77 N.W.2d 257 (1956); Janigian v. Dearborn, 336 Mich. 261, 264, 57 N.W.2d 876 (1953). Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which may lie to compel the exercise of discretion, but not to compel its exercise in a particular manner. Teasel v. Dep't of Mental Health, 419 Mich. 390, 409-410, 355 N.W.2d 75 (1984). The primary purpose of the writ of mandamus is to enforce duties created by law, Kosiba v. Wayne Co Bd of Auditors, 320 Mich. 322, 326, 31 N.W.2d 68 (1948), where the law has established no specific remedy and where, in justice and good government, there should be one. Lenz v. Mayor of Detroit, 338 Mich. 383, 395, 61 N.W.2d 587 (1953).

Here, the state board has premised the alleged legal duty of the Houghton Lake board on a section of the School Code of 1976, 1976 P.A. 451, M.C.L. Sec....