State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Com'n

• Decision Date: 14 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 15565,15565
• Citation: 244 Conn. 487,709 A.2d 1129
• Parties: STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al. STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 1129

709 A.2d 1129

244 Conn. 487

STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 15565.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 15, 1998.

Decided April 14, 1998.

Victor R. Perpetua, Appellate Counsel, with whom, on the brief, were Mitchell W. Pearlman, General Counsel, and Justine C. Rakich-Kelly and Joan M. Andrews, Commission Counsel, for appellant (Freedom of Information Commission).

Laurie Adler, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Jaye Bailey Zanta, Jason W. Cohen and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, Charles A. Overend, Assistant Attorney General, and Joseph M. Celentano, for appellees (State Board of Labor Relations, State Board of Mediation and Arbitration, and AFSCME, Council 4, AFL-CIO).

Before BORDEN, BERDON, KATZ, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The sole issue to be decided in this certified appeal is whether grievance arbitration proceedings before the plaintiff state board of mediation and arbitration (mediation board) ¹ are excluded from the definition of "meeting" set forth in General Statutes § 1-18a (b) ² of the Freedom of Information Act (act); General Statutes § 1-7 et seq.; either because they involve strategy or negotiation with respect to collective bargaining, or because the confidentiality requirement of General Statutes § 31-100 ³ precludes the proceedings from being open to the public. The defendant, M. Jeffrey Spahr, deputy corporation counsel for the city of Norwalk, a party to a grievance arbitration pending before the mediation board, sought permission to tape-record the arbitration proceedings. When the mediation board denied him permission, Spahr requested, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-176, ⁴ that the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), ⁵ issue an advisory opinion regarding the legality of the mediation board's policy prohibiting the tape-recording of grievance arbitration proceedings. The commission issued an advisory opinion on February 26, 1991, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-176(e), ⁶ concluding that the mediation board's policy constituted a violation of the act. The mediation board, and the intervening plaintiff, the state board of labor relations (labor relations board), appealed from the decision reached by the commission in its advisory opinion to the trial court in two separate appeals pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4-176(h), 4-183, and 1-21i(d). The trial court sustained the appeals, and rendered judgments ordering that the advisory opinion be set aside, vacated and rescinded. The commission appealed from the trial court judgments to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgments. State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 43 Conn.App. 133, 682 A.2d 1068 (1996). Thereafter, we granted the commission's petitions for certification limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that grievance arbitration proceedings before the state board of mediation and arbitration are not 'meetings' within the meaning of General Statutes § 1-18a (b)?" State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 239 Conn. 940, 684 A.2d 712 (1996). ⁷ We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history. "On January 28, 1991, M. Jeffrey Spahr, deputy corporation counsel for the city of Norwalk (city), requested an advisory opinion ... from the [commission] regarding the propriety of the mediation board's policy of refusing to permit the parties to an arbitration proceeding to tape-record such proceedings. Spahr's request was precipitated by the ruling of an arbitrator who presided over a grievance arbitration proceeding between the city and the police union, and would not permit Spahr to tape-record the proceedings.

"In his letter to the [commission], Spahr contended that, because the mediation board was a public agency within the meaning of § 1-18a (a), ⁸ and because arbitration hearings are public meetings within the meaning of General Statutes § 1-21(a), ⁹ the 'clear and unambiguous provisions' of [General Statutes] § 1-21a (a) ¹⁰ apply to grievance arbitration hearings and thereby render illegal the [mediation] board's policy of refusing to permit the parties to a mediation board hearing to tape-record the proceedings. The [commission] granted Spahr's request and conducted a hearing on July 30, 1991. At the hearing, the [labor relations board] appeared and was granted permission by the [commission] to intervene as an interested party. Both boards contended that grievance arbitration proceedings are not subject to the recording provisions of the [act], General Statutes § 1-15 et seq.

"Subsequently, on February 19, 1992, the [commission] issued a ruling in which it concluded that 'arbitration hearings are neither strategy nor negotiation sessions' with respect to collective bargaining and that 'the [mediation board's] policies prohibiting the tape recording of its arbitration hearings violate, and are superseded by, the provisions of the [act].' The [commission] also concluded that, although arbitration hearings are public meetings within the meaning of the act, the [mediation] board 'may certainly convene in executive session in those instances permitted under [the act].' The [commission] decided that the request for an advisory opinion did not necessitate a finding as to 'whether a tape recording of an arbitration hearing, kept by the [mediation board], is subject to public disclosure under [the act].'

"Although the mediation board and the [labor relations board] appealed separately to the Superior Court, the trial court consolidated the appeals because they involved the same administrative proceeding. On January 6, 1995, the court issued separate memoranda of decision sustaining [their] appeals. In the mediation board's appeal, the court concluded, inter alia, that 'arbitration hearings are not meetings within the purview of § 1-18a (b)' and ordered the [commission's] advisory opinion 'set aside, vacated and rescinded.' The trial court sustained the appeal of the [labor relations board] 'for the reasons recited' in the related appeal." State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 43 Conn.App. at 135-36, 682 A.2d 1068.

In its appeals to this court, the commission claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that grievance arbitration proceedings conducted by the mediation board pursuant to General Statutes § 31-91 et seq. are not public meetings within the meaning of § 1-18a (b) ¹¹ and, therefore, are not governed by the recording provisions of the act. Specifically, the commission argues that grievance arbitration proceedings are not excluded from the definition of a meeting pursuant to § 1-18a (b) as strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining. Conversely, the mediation board and the labor relations board contend that grievance arbitration proceedings are labor disputes that necessarily involve negotiations and strategy discussions related to the collective bargaining process and, as such, are excluded from the definition of meetings under § 1-18a (b).

Further, the mediation board and the labor relations board contend that alternate grounds exist upon which the Appellate Court judgment may be affirmed. In that regard, they argue that even if grievance arbitration proceedings do not involve strategy or negotiation so as to exclude them from the definition of meetings under § 1-18a (b), such proceedings in any event are not meetings because § 31-100 ¹² exempts them from the open meeting requirements of the act. The commission concluded, in its advisory opinion, however, that § 31-100 does not exempt grievance arbitration proceedings from the open meeting requirements of the act. Neither the trial court nor the Appellate Court addressed whether and to what extent § 31-100 bears upon the issue in this case. We conclude that § 31-100 exempts grievance arbitration proceedings from the open meeting requirements of the act, and that as a result such proceedings are not meetings within the meaning of § 1-18a (b). Therefore, we do not address the commission's first argument.

The standard of review in appeals from the decisions of administrative agencies is clearly delineated. "Judicial review of [an administrative agency's] action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (General Statutes, c. 54, §§ 4-166 through 4-189) and the scope of that review is very restricted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 773, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988). "With regard to questions of fact, it is neither the function of the trial court nor of this court 'to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.' " Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 496, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 781, 93 L.Ed.2d 819 (1986). "Judicial review of the conclusions of law reached administratively is also limited. The court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "Although the interpretation of statutes is ultimately a question of law ... it is the well established practice of this court to accord great deference to the construction given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts."...