State Bd. of Tax Com'rs v. South Shore Marina

• Citation: 422 N.E.2d 723
• Decision Date: 30 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. 3-1180A340,3-1180A340
• Parties: STATE BOARD OF TAX COMMISSIONERS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. SOUTH SHORE MARINA, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

Page 723

422 N.E.2d 723

STATE BOARD OF TAX COMMISSIONERS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. SOUTH SHORE MARINA, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 3-1180A340.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.

June 30, 1981.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Joel Schiff, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellant.

Gerald K. Hrebec, Fred M. Cuppy, and George W. Carberry, Thomas, Burke, Dyerly & Cuppy, Merrillville, for appellee.

STATON, Judge.

The State Board of Tax Commissioners (Board) rendered a final assessment decision for the business property of South Shore Marina (Marina). The assessment included fifty boats located on Marina's property on March 1, 1977. Upon an appeal by Marina from the Board's assessment, the trial court vacated the assessment and ordered the Board to re-assess Marina's property excluding the fifty boats. We reverse the trial court, vacate its judgment, and reinstate the Board's final assessment. In so doing, we will examine the following: ¹

(1) Whether the assessment was arbitrary or capricious;

(2) Whether there was any substantial evidence to support the assessment; and,

(3) Whether the assessment violated any constitutional, statutory or legal principles.

Under the property tax statutes, Ind.Code §§ 6-1.1-1 to -37 (1976 & Supp.1980), almost all tangible property within the state on March 1 of each year is subject to assessment and taxation for that year. IC 6-1.1-1-2 & -2-1. The following is a brief summary of the administrative organization and appeal process underlying the final assessment of that tax:

"The State Board of Tax Commissioners is responsible for the assessment of property values on both real and personal property. The board is authorized by statute to construe the property tax laws of the state and instruct the various taxing officials in their duties with respect to taxation and assessment (See IC 6-1.1-30-14)."

"Tax rates. Each school corporation and civil taxing unit imposes its own tax rate. (IC 6-1.1-17-5) Property within a given taxing district is often subject to a variety of rates, including those imposed by a county, city, or school corporation. The tax is the product of assessed valuation times the tax rate per $100 of assessed valuation (IC 6-1.1-2-3). The assessed value is set at one-third of its true cash value (IC 6-1.1-1-3)."

"Assessments are made in accordance with regulations issued by the board. The initial assessment of real property is made by the township assessor or trustee-assessor (See IC 6-1.1-4-1 to -30). Such assessments are subject to change by a county board of review on its own initiative or on appeal by the property owner. (IC 6-1.1-13-1 to -12). Either the assessing official or the property owner may appeal the county board's action directly to the State Board of Tax Commissioners (IC 6-1.1-15-3).

"The initial assessment of personal property is made by the property owner (See IC 6-1.1-3-1 to -21). Any subsequent changes made by local assessing officials may be appealed in the same manner as for real property adjustments."

"All administrative actions of the State Board of Tax Commissioners are final. The board's action, however, can be set aside or subject to redetermination if suit is instituted and a court so orders (IC 6-1.1-15-5)."

Weinstein, Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana, Forward: Indiana Taxation, 13 Ind.L.Rev. 1, 34-36 (1980). Central to the dispute here on appeal is IC 6-1.1-2-4 which lists those taxpayers liable for the property tax:

"(a) The owner of any tangible property on the assessment date of a year is liable for the taxes imposed for that year on the property.

"(b) A person holding, possessing, controlling, or occupying any tangible property on the assessment date of a year is liable for the taxes imposed for that year on the property unless he establishes that the property is being assessed and taxed in the name of the owner. When a person other than the owner pays any property taxes as required by this section, that person may recover the amount paid from the owner unless the parties have agreed to other terms in a contract." (emphasis added)

On March 1, 1977, approximately fifty boats were located on Marina's property. Marina has consistently asserted throughout these proceedings and still insists upon appeal that the boats were merely stored upon Marina's property. Marina's position is that it rents space to boat owners who may store boats or their equipment upon such space. As evidence of this fact, Marina presented the trial court with a blank copy of a "Winter Storage Agreement" allegedly used by Marina regarding all of the boats located on Marina's property. Among the terms of this blank agreement include clear pronouncements that Marina merely rents space and that the boat owners retain possession and control of the boats. In addition to this blank agreement, Peter Zakutansky, president of Marina, testified that Marina did not hold, possess or control the boats on Marina's property. Marina merely rented space to the boat owners.

Though the record is not clear on the specific procedures, apparently the Board assessed the value of the boats on Marina's property as Marina's personal business property; and, Marina protested this assessment. The following facts, however, are clear from the record.

On August 12, 1977, the Board issued a notice to Marina of a scheduled hearing. The notice required Marina to make available to the Board at the hearing on the pertinent books and records regarding the tax assessment. At that hearing, on August 25, 1977, the Board again requested Marina to produce a list of the stored boats. Marina did not produce the list. On December 29, 1977 in response to a letter from Zakutansky the Board in a letter again requested a list of the stored boats and the names of the owners of the boats. This letter clearly explained that the Board needed this information to insure the boats were assessed to the owners of the boats. Marina still did not supply the list. On April 27, 1978, the Board issued a subpoena duces tecum ordering Marina to supply the Board with a list of the boats and their owners at the next scheduled hearing. At that hearing, on May 11, 1978, the Board again requested the list of boats and owners. Still, Marina refused the subpoena and the request. There were other meetings and contacts between the Board and Marina. At no time throughout these entire proceedings did Marina offer a list of the boats assessed, the owners of such boats, or any proof of the actual owners of the boats. On August 31, 1978, the Board assessed the value of the fifty boats to Marina and issued its "Final Assessment Determination."

Thereafter, Marina appealed the Board's assessment to the county superior court. See IC 6-1.1-15-1 to -13 (1976 & Supp.1980). At the trial to the court, Marina introduced three letters two from Marina to the Board and one from the Board to Marina and the testimony of Zakutansky. The Board merely cross-examined Zakutansky. This trial evidence makes the position of Marina and Zakutansky perfectly clear. That position can be briefly summarized as follows: Under Zakutansky's interpretation of IC 6-1.1-2-4, Marina did not hold, possess or control the boats on March 1, 1977; under this interpretation Marina was not liable for the property taxes on the boats; and therefore, Marina need not supply any information regarding the boats to the Board. The cross-examination of Zakutansky established that he could get in contact with the boat owners and could, if he so desired, compile a list of the owners of the boats. We also note the blank storage agreement would confirm this fact. Each agreement contains a space for the name of the owner, the address of the owner including city, state and zip code and the owner's phone number. The agreement also includes blanks for information regarding the boat including make, type, number, length, beam, year, and the name of the boat.

The trial court entered judgment for Marina and vacated the Board's assessment. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law which state, essentially, Marina did not hold, possess, or control the boats on March 1, 1977 and that the assessment of the Board was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law.

We first note the trial court erred in its standard of review. Judicial review of an administrative decision is limited to whether the agency possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter, and whether the agency's decision was made pursuant to proper procedures, was based upon substantial evidence, was not arbitrary or capricious, and was not in violation of any constitutional, statutory or legal principle. ² Department of Financial Institutions v. State Bank of Lizton (1969), 253 Ind. 172, 252 N.E.2d 248; State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Boone Circuit Court (1957), 236 Ind. 202, 138 N.E.2d 4; Brinson v. Sheriff's Merit Board of Jefferson County (1979), Ind.App. 395 N.E.2d 267; Department of Financial Institutions v. Colonial Bank & Trust Co. (1978), Ind.App., 375 N.E.2d 285, cert. den., 439 U.S. 1116, 99 S.Ct. 1022, 59 L.Ed.2d 75; Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Holthouse Realty Corp. (1976), 170 Ind.App. 232, 352 N.E.2d 535; Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Pappas (1973), 158 Ind.App. 327, 302 N.E.2d 858.

Marina based its appeal from the Board's final assessment to the trial court upon the assumption the Board had erroneously interpreted IC 6-1.1-2-4. It was, however, this assumption of Marina which was erroneous. The action of the Board was, in fact, the imposition of the tax on the fifty boats upon the person apparently owning, holding, possessing or controlling the boats. The Board throughout the entire proceedings prior to its rendering of the final assessment attempted to discover the owners of the boats. That attempt was impeded, frustrated and, to this date, prevented by Marina. The issues which should have been addressed by the trial...