State, By and Through Christopulos v. Husky Oil Co. of Delaware

Decision Date17 February 1978
Docket NumberNo. 4780,4780
Citation575 P.2d 262
PartiesThe STATE of Wyoming, By and Through George CHRISTOPULOS, State Engineer of the State of Wyoming, and Robert Sundin, Director of the Department of Environmental Quality, Appellants (Defendants below), and Albert Glassburn, Calvin Fogg, John Bauman, K. D. Knauss, Marvin McNally, Dean Fogg, Henry Miller and Darrell Naffziger, Appellants (Intervenors below), v. HUSKY OIL COMPANY OF DELAWARE, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

V. Frank Mendicino, Atty. Gen., Jack D. Palma, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellants-defendants.

Stanley K. Hathaway, Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Cheyenne, for appellants-intervenors.

James R. Learned, Cheyenne, and Arthur H. Nielsen, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellee.

Nick Kalokathis, Lathrop & Uchner, Cheyenne, for amicus curiae City of Cheyenne by and through its Board of Public Utilities.

Before GUTHRIE, C. J., and McCLINTOCK, RAPER, THOMAS and ROSE, JJ.

McCLINTOCK, Justice.

George Christopulos, state engineer of the state of Wyoming (hereinafter referred to as the state engineer) and Robert Sundin, director of the department of environmental quality (DEQ) appeal from the decision of the district court of Laramie County, Wyoming granting summary judgment in favor of Husky Oil Company of Delaware (Husky), declaring that that company's plan to impound and recycle effluent water, being the water remaining after use in its refinery process of water which it purchases from the city of Cheyenne, Wyoming, is not subject to the jurisdiction and control of the state engineer and the Wyoming state board of control (board). The summary judgment also declared that the proposed use did not infringe upon any rights of downstream water appropriators (intervenors) who had been permitted to intervene in the action, file answer and appear as active litigants. The city of Cheyenne, the original appropriator of the water sold to Husky, was not made a party to the action and no other party has sought its joinder. The city, acting through its board of public utilities (city), did not seek to intervene but claimed interest in the outcome and was granted leave to file a brief in the lower court as amicus curiae, which same privilege was extended to it in this court. Upon careful consideration of the briefs and arguments upon the motions for summary judgment, a majority of the court are of the opinion that both the state board of control and the city of Cheyenne are necessary and indispensable parties to the action if the issues asserted are to be adjudicated and that the cause should not proceed without their joinder. We are also of the opinion that after their joinder there should be a full factual trial upon the claims of all parties, including the intervenors, before a final judgment is entered in the matter.

We take as a factual basis for the views herein expressed the following: The city has legally adjudicated water rights (1) to take, store and use virtually all the water developing in the Crow Creek drainage, a stream having its source in the area west of Cheyenne and flowing through that city on down to lands which are owned and irrigated by the intervenors; (2) to take, store and use water produced through wells drilled in an area lying to the west of the city; and (3) to take, store and use a quantity of water diverted from another watershed a considerable distance from the city. 1 All of these waters are commingled in the city municipal system, treated, and then distributed to various users within and near the city. For many years Husky has purchased from the city large amounts of water which it uses in its refinery operations conducted at Cheyenne. 2 That part of the water which is used but not consumed in the refinery operations and which has to some extent been polluted by the refining process has throughout all this period of time been returned to Crow Creek and such amount as continues down that stream to lands of the intervenors has been used by them under adjudicated rights as early as 1888 and as late as 1970. 3 A permit issued by the DEQ pursuant to federal and state authority is subject to the limitation that polluted water shall not be discharged into the stream after July 1, 1977. The downstream rights in part involve the direct flow of the stream but it is also claimed by intervenors that diminution of the flow of Crow Creek will have a direct and injurious effect upon ground water irrigation wells of some of the intervenors drilled in the so-called Carpenter Groundwater Control Area. At the argument hearing upon the motion for summary judgment the parties orally stipulated that for purposes of the argument only it could be considered that discontinuance of the discharge from the refinery would result in injury to the intervenors.

Husky's principal contention is that the waters in question are not "unappropriated water subject to control and jurisdiction of the State Engineer of the State of Wyoming." Its amended complaint raised the question that the state engineer was improperly asserting jurisdiction under the provisions of § 41-26, W.S.1957, requiring anyone seeking to impound the unappropriated waters of the state to apply for a permit from the state engineer. By their joint answer the state engineer and DEQ contend that Husky's plan to impound waters which historically have been returned to Crow Creek "is a change and expansion of use, involving the storage of a direct flow water right which is within the jurisdiction and control of the State Engineer and the State Board of Control under Wyoming law." 4 (Emphasis added) The intervenors allege that they have vested rights in that portion of the effluent waters historically discharged into Crow Creek by the city of Cheyenne and by Husky. They also allege that Husky's plan to impound rather than return the water is a change and expansion of use and storage of a direct-flow right under the jurisdiction of the state engineer and board of control. They ask that effectuation of such plan be enjoined and that Husky be ordered to treat and purify its effluent to comply with state standards and continue to discharge it to the stream.

From the foregoing we conclude that the issue involved in the case is whether the waters so diverted, impounded, treated and distributed by the city, including the portion sold to Husky, remain "waters of the State" or "unappropriated waters of the State," 5 subject to the jurisdiction and control of the state engineer and the board of control, acting in their respective fields of authority. 6 The further issue is whether the intervenors have acquired such vested rights in the effluent discharge after Husky's use that the plan to store proposed by Husky (presumably with the approval of the city) represents a change of use in derogation of intervenors' rights.

Husky moved for summary judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue of fact and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, submitting only an affidavit of its manager concerning the purchase and use of water by Husky. The state engineer and DEQ joined to file a cross-motion for summary judgment in their favor against both Husky and the intervenors. 7 The motion was accompanied by affidavits that there were other adjudicated rights from Crow Creek below the point of discharge of Husky's effluent, that the DEQ order did not require total impoundment as proposed by Husky, and such a system is acceptable to DEQ only if it "is legally available under all the statutes," the legality of the plan to be determined by the discharger.

The city took no part in the proceedings until after the argument upon the motions for summary judgment. The following day the city, through its board of public utilities, asked permission to appear as amicus curiae, for the purpose of responding to questions as to whether the board was a necessary party to the action, to what extent the state engineer had jurisdiction over the municipal use of water, and whether customers of the board had absolute control of water sold to them unless and until the water was released into the natural channel of Crow Creek. In its brief the city generally supported the position of Husky that the state engineer was without jurisdiction, claiming that the use by Husky was a proper municipal use, that the water supplied to Husky came from a source foreign to Crow Creek in which intervenors had no priority, that there was no change in use and that the city was not a necessary party. Its comments in this last respect are significant because the city takes the position that it is not a necessary party if the case is disposed of on the grounds just mentioned but if "the Court should be inclined to hold that either 41-4.1 8 or 41-29.1 9 apply, then the Board would be a necessary party to this action." 10

After argument and consideration of briefs submitted by all the parties, as well as the amicus brief submitted in behalf of the city, the court sustained Husky's motion for the reason that its plan

" * * * to impound or recycle the effluent water which the Plaintiff purchases from the City of Cheyenne and uses in its refinery process is not subject to control and jurisdiction of the State Engineer of the State of Wyoming or the State Board of Control and does not infringe upon any rights of the Interveners." (Emphasis added)

Section 1-1052, W.S.1957 permits an interested person whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute to have determined any question of construction or validity of the statute. This necessarily includes determination of the applicability of a particular statute to a particular set of facts. No one appears to question the applicability of the statute or its availability to Husky but § 1-1061, W.S.1957 contains the pertinent direction that:

"When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be...

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  • General Adjudication of All Rights to use Water in Big Horn River System, In re, s. 91-83
    • United States
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    • 5 Junio 1992
    ...engineer under Wyo. Const. art. 8, § 5, were not intended to give unlimited and uncontrolled authority. State By and Through Christopulos v. Husky Oil, 575 P.2d 262, 264 n. 6 (Wyo.1978). Justice Macy argues that to allow the Tribal Water Resources Agency to administer water useage on the re......
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    ...to safeguarding the interests of the parties, the provision furthers See also, State, by and through Christopulos v. Husky Oil Company of Delaware, Wyo., 575 P.2d 262 (1978). trial convenience by granting the court discretion to sever multiple issues that technically may be joined in one ac......
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