State, By and Through Welfare Div. of Dept. of Human Resources v. Vine, s. 13727
| Citation | 662 P.2d 295,99 Nev. 278 |
| Decision Date | 21 April 1983 |
| Docket Number | 14264,Nos. 13727,s. 13727 |
| Parties | STATE of Nevada, by and through the WELFARE DIVISION OF the DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES and Martha Vine, Appellants, v. John M. VINE, Respondent. WELFARE DIVISION OF the STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Appellant, v. John Michael VINE and Martha Jo Vine, Respondents. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Nevada |
In these cases the State of Nevada seeks to establish that an order terminating parental rights does not by operation of law also terminate a parent's obligation of child support. In light of the interlocking nature of parental rights and responsibilities, and the intention of the Legislature as evidenced by the legislative scheme, we construe the term "parental rights" to include both parental rights and parental obligations. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court in both Case No. 13727 and Case No. 14264.
John M. Vine and Martha Jo Vine were granted a decree of divorce in Clark County on August 26, 1974. Martha Jo Vine was awarded custody of their year-old daughter, Amanda Leigh Vine, and John Vine was ordered to pay $50.00 per month for child support.
On July 15, 1975, Judge Addeliar D. Guy issued an order terminating all parental rights of John Vine with respect to his daughter, on the basis of Vine's complete failure to provide her with support or attention. The judge decreed that "all parental rights of John Michael Vine, with respect to Amanda Leigh Vine, be, and they are hereby terminated and said child is declared free from any and all custody and control of said John Michael Vine." Martha Jo Vine received sole parental rights over her daughter.
John Vine entered an appearance in the divorce and parental rights termination proceedings, but did not contest the actions of the court. He states that he consented to the termination of his parental rights on the express representation of Mrs. Vine's attorney that the termination order would cut off his support obligation.
On June 12, 1981, the State of Nevada filed an action against John Vine under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, seeking both reimbursement for past welfare assistance payments and future support for Amanda Vine. In defense, John Vine produced the July 15, 1975 order terminating his parental rights. Judge Legakes dismissed the State's petition. The appeal in Case No. 13727 followed.
While the above appeal was pending, John Vine moved to correct the 1975 parental rights termination order nunc pro tunc, asserting that it was the intention and understanding of all the parties that the order terminated his parental duties as well as his parental rights. Judge Guy granted the motion on April 19, 1982, amending the order to provide that "all parental rights and duties of John Michael Vine ... are ... terminated ...." (Emphasis added.)
On May 21, 1982, the State of Nevada moved to intervene in the above action and obtain relief from, or a stay of, the amended order. The State argued that the nunc pro tunc amendment improperly altered the substance as well as the form of the prior order. The State also suggested that if the parental rights termination order cut off Amanda Vine's right to support, the failure to provide her with a guardian ad litem, notice, and a hearing in that proceeding violated her due process rights.
Judge Guy denied the State's motion to intervene. He specifically found that, at the time the order terminating parental rights was entered, all parties and the court understood and intended that the order would terminate in all respects the parental relationship between John Vine and Amanda Vine, including the former's obligation of support. The appeal in Case No. 14264 followed, and was eventually consolidated with Case No. 13727.
Appellants' central argument is that the Legislature was aware of the difference between rights on the one hand and responsibilities or obligations on the other, and the absence of the latter terms from NRS 128.110 1 indicates the Legislature's intention that parental responsibilities such as child support should continue despite a termination of parental rights. Appellants note that NRS 127.160 expressly provides that entry of a final decree of adoption relieves the natural parents of all parental responsibilities for, as well as rights over, the adopted child. 2 They also point out that while NRS 128.015 defines "parent and child relationship" to include both rights and obligations, 3 NRS 128.110 does not state that an order terminating parental rights shall sever the parent and child relationship. Appellants conclude that only a final decree of adoption operates to terminate both the rights and responsibilities of a parent.
We must disagree. In Roelfs v. Sam P. Wallingford, Inc., 207 Kan. 804, 486 P.2d 1371 (Kan.1971), the Kansas Supreme Court construed a statute much like NRS 128.110. The statute provided that when the court adjudged a parent or parents to be unfit, it could "make an order permanently depriving such parents, or parent, of parental rights" and commit the child to an appropriate person or institution. On the basis of the strong language of the statute, the general tenor and purpose of the act, and the reciprocal nature of the rights and duties arising from the parent-child relationship, the court determined that an order terminating parental rights under the statute also cut off all parental obligations, including the obligation of support. See In Interest of Ingold, 4 Kan.App.2d 692, 610 P.2d 130 (Kan.App.1980); In Interest of Wheeler, 3 Kan.App.2d 701, 601 P.2d 15 (Kan.App.1979). We find the reasoning in Roelfs persuasive.
This Court has already stated its awareness "of the seriousness and of the terrible finality of a decree terminating parental rights." Carson v. Lowe, 76 Nev. 446, 451, 357 P.2d 591, 594 (1960). See Chapman v. Chapman, 96 Nev. 290, 295, 607 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1980) (). We note that in 1981 the Legislature enacted NRS 128.120, 4 demonstrating the legislative intention to make termination orders binding and irrevocable as to both child and parents.
The general purpose of Chapter 128 is to provide a method for ending the parent-child relationship, where doing so is necessary to further the best interests of the child. See NRS 128.005(2)(c); NRS 128.090. In NRS 128.005(2)(a), the Legislature found and declared that "[s]everance of the parent and child relationship is a matter of such importance in order to safeguard the rights of parent and child as to require judicial determination." As noted above, NRS 128.015 defines "parent and child relationship" to include obligations as well as rights. Moreover, NRS 424.080 refers to the termination of both "parental rights and duties" by order of a court of competent jurisdiction. 5
We believe that these various statutory provisions adequately demonstrate the legislative intention to have an order terminating parental rights completely sever the parent-child relationship, terminating all rights and obligations of both parent and child. Complete severance of the relationship removes all connections which may otherwise engender feelings of continuing attachment or right, and gives the child an unrestrained opportunity to prepare for a new home environment. We therefore adopt the position of the court in Anguis v. Superior Court, 6 Ariz.App. 68, 429 P.2d 702 (Ariz.App.1967), as follows:
[W]e construe the term "parental rights" in the broader term as the sum total of the rights of the parent or parents in and to the child as well as the rights of the child in and to the parent or parents. In other words, we construe parental rights to include both parental rights and parental obligations.
Id. 429 P.2d at 705. See Sernaker v. Ehrlich, 86 Nev. 277, 281, 468 P.2d 5, 7 (1970) (dicta) ("within parental 'rights' there are parental 'duties', few of which [the father] performed ....").
The purpose of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA) is to improve and extend the enforcement of existing duties of support against persons presently legally liable for such support. Moffat v. Moffat, 27 Cal.3d 645, 165 Cal.Rptr. 877, 612 P.2d 967, 975 (Cal.1980). See State ex rel. Welfare Div. v. Hudson, 97 Nev. 386, 389, 632 P.2d 1148, 1149 (1981). See also NRS 130.030;...
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