State by Humphrey v. Baillon Co., C2-93-47
| Court | Court of Appeals of Minnesota |
| Writing for the Court | PETERSON |
| Citation | 503 N.W.2d 799 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, by Hubert H. HUMPHREY, III, its Attorney General, Petitioner, Respondent, v. BAILLON COMPANY, et al., Appellants. |
| Docket Number | No. C2-93-47,C2-93-47 |
| Decision Date | 20 July 1993 |
Page 799
General, Petitioner, Respondent,
v.
BAILLON COMPANY, et al., Appellants.
Page 800
1. The Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act applies to an appeal from an
Page 801
award of the commissioners in an eminent domain proceeding.2. On these facts, appellant is not a prevailing party.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., John C. Jeppson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.
Eric J. Magnuson, Stephan K. Warch, Minneapolis, for appellants.
Considered and decided by SCHUMACHER, P.J., and FORSBERG and PETERSON, JJ.
PETERSON, Judge.
In May 1983, as part of a highway development project, respondent State of Minnesota used the "quick take" provision of the eminent domain statute, Minn.Stat. Sec. 117.042 (1982), to acquire title to real estate owned by appellant Baillon Company. The taking deprived Baillon's remaining land of direct highway access. The state offered Baillon $1300 for the taking. In March 1985, the condemnation commissioners awarded Baillon $2530 for the lost land and $302,400 for lost highway access. Both parties appealed to district court and a jury awarded Baillon $270,000. In August 1992, Baillon moved for attorney fees under the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act. The district court rejected the state's argument that the Act did not apply to eminent domain proceedings but ruled Baillon failed to meet the Act's requirements. We affirm.
In 1974 Baillon purchased undeveloped real estate adjacent to a highway with the intent to develop it. In May 1983, the state, pursuant to its construction plans for Interstate Highway 94, acquired title to part of Baillon's property under the "quick take" provisions of the eminent domain statute. Minn.Stat. Sec. 117.042 (1982). As a result of the construction of I-94, the remaining portion of Baillon's property lost direct access to the highway. The state's appraiser estimated the value of the condemned land to be $1300 with no allowance for lost highway access.
In March 1985, condemnation commissioners awarded Baillon $2530 for the condemned land and an additional $302,400 for lost highway access. Both parties appealed the award to district court. At trial, two expert witnesses testified for the state; one estimated Baillon's damages at $1300 and the other at $96,000. Baillon's two experts alleged damages were $506,150 and $680,000. The jury awarded Baillon a total of $270,000, but did not apportion the amount between land loss damages and damages for lost highway access.
Baillon later moved for attorney fees under Minn.Stat. Sec. 549.21 (1992), alleging the state's litigation was in bad faith. Baillon also requested attorney fees under the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act (MEAJA or Act) which allows a business to recover attorney fees from the state if the business prevails in litigation against the state and shows that the state's position was not "substantially justified." Minn.Stat. Sec. 3.761-.765 (1992). After a September 1992 hearing, the district court ruled the state's litigation was not in bad faith and denied Baillon's request for attorney fees under Minn.Stat. Sec. 549.21. The district court also concluded that even though a condemnation proceeding is a "special proceeding," it is also a "civil action" to which the MEAJA applies. The district court then ruled that Baillon failed to show the state's position was not "substantially justified" under the Act and denied Baillon's motion for attorney fees. Baillon challenges the district court's denial of attorney fees under the MEAJA and the state alleges the MEAJA does not apply to condemnation proceedings.
1. Does the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act apply to condemnation proceedings?
2. Is Baillon a "prevailing party" under the Act?
Page 802
ANALYSIS
Minn.Stat. Sec. 3.762(a) (1992) provides:
If a prevailing party other than the state, in a civil action or contested case proceeding other than a tort action, brought by or against the state, shows that the position of the state was not substantially justified, the court or administrative law judge shall award fees and other expenses to the party unless special circumstances make an award unjust.
I.
Whether the MEAJA applies to eminent domain proceedings is a question of statutory construction subject to de novo review on appeal. Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn.1990). Because "the MEAJA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, courts should strictly construe its language." Donovan Contracting v. Minnesota Dep't of Transp., 469 N.W.2d 718, 719 (Minn.App.1991), pet for rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 2, 1991).
A. Chapter 117
The state argues Baillon cannot recover attorney fees under the MEAJA because the attorney fee provisions of chapter 117 are the exclusive method of recovering attorney fees in eminent domain proceedings. The statutory provisions cited by the state, however, do not indicate they are the exclusive method of recovering attorney fees in eminent domain proceedings. See Minn.Stat. Secs. 117.045; 117.105, subd. 2; 117.195, subd. 2 (1992). Also, while the cases cited by the state indicate recovery of attorney fees in eminent domain proceedings is "strictly statutory," they do not state that the only statutes that may be invoked to recover attorney fees in eminent domain proceedings are those in chapter 117. See County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 294 N.W.2d 851, 852 (Minn.1980); City of Minnetonka v. Carlson, 265 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Minn.1978); State by Spannaus v. Carter, 300 Minn. 495, 497, 221 N.W.2d 106, 107 (1974); In re Minneapolis Community Dev. Agency, 447 N.W.2d 891, 894 (Minn.App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990); Finally, the MEAJA was not enacted until 1986; 1986 Minn.Laws ch. 377, Secs. 1-7, and Minneapolis Community Dev. Agency, the only case cited by the state that does not predate the MEAJA, does not mention the Act. The state has not demonstrated the attorney fee provisions of chapter 117 are the exclusive method to recover attorney fees in eminent domain proceedings.
B. MEAJA
The state also alleges the MEAJA is inapplicable to eminent domain proceedings because eminent domain proceedings are "special proceedings" rather than the "civil actions" or "contested case proceedings"...
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