State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 28 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. B235258.,B235258.
• Citation: 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3540,204 Cal.App.4th 766,139 Cal.Rptr.3d 215,2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4049,77 Cal. Comp. Cases 307
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and Rigoberto Garcia, Respondents.

12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3540

139 Cal.Rptr.3d 215

2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4049

204 Cal.App.4th 766

77 Cal. Comp. Cases 307

STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Petitioner,

v.WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and Rigoberto Garcia, Respondents.

No. B235258.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6, California.

March 28, 2012.

Charles S. Bentley, Chief Counsel, Patricia A. Brown, Deputy Chief Counsel, Alan R. Canfield, Appellate Counsel, for Petitioner.

David G. Schumaker, Finestone, Schumaker and Associates, Ventura, for RespondentRigoberto Garcia.

No appearance for Respondent Workers' Compensation Appeals Board.GILBERT, P.J.

Rigoberto Garcia worked at Cole Ranch for approximately two months.While picking avocados from a high tree, he fell from a 24–foot ladder and suffered traumatic head injury.He filed a workers' compensation claim for psychiatric injury.

Labor Code section 3208.3, subdivision (d) generally bars claims of psychiatric injury if the applicant was employed less than six months.¹This bar does not apply if the psychiatric injury is caused by a “sudden and extraordinary employment condition.”( Ibid.)

Garcia's fall was sudden, but it was not extraordinary within the meaning of section 3208.3, subdivision (d).It was an occupational hazard of picking avocados while standing on a ladder, and thus was not uncommon, unusual or unexpected.We therefore annul the decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board(WCAB) and remand with instructions to deny Garcia's claim for psychiatric injury.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts are not disputed.In May 2010, Cole Ranch employed Garcia as an avocado picker/high tree worker.Approximately two months later, Garcia fell from the top of a 24–foot ladder while picking avocados from a high tree.He suffered a serious and obvious head injury and sought workers' compensation benefits for industrial injury to his teeth, psyche, neck and back.Cole Ranch's insurer, State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF), admitted liability for the industrial physical injury, but denied the psychiatric injury because Garcia had not worked for Cole Ranch for at least six months, as required by section 3208.3, subdivision (d).

The sole question submitted for trial was whether Garcia's psychiatric injury qualified as a “sudden and extraordinary employment condition” under section 3208.3, subdivision (d) for purposes of avoiding the six-month employment requirement.All other issues were deferred.SCIF did not dispute the fall was sudden.The issue was whether it was extraordinary.Garcia was the only witness at trial.

Born in 1975, Garcia began picking fruit at age 17.He picked both avocados and lemons “[i]n the past,” but had worked in construction for about 10 years before joining Cole Ranch.Garcia testified that between 1992 and the date of his injury, he had never fallen off a ladder.He stated he and the other Cole Ranch pickers used ladders daily.At the time of his fall, Garcia was standing on top of a 24–foot ladder picking avocados from a 35–foot tree in an avocado grove.He testified that no one at Cole Ranch ever advised him of the risk of falling from a ladder and that “as far as he knew,” no other Cole Ranch picker had fallen from a ladder.Upon questioning by the workers' compensation judge (WCJ), Garcia stated Cole Ranch did not hold any safety meetings or provide him with a safety harness.SCIF presented no evidence.

The WCJ ruled that Garcia's testimony established his injury was the result of a sudden and extraordinary employment condition.The WCJ observed the injury was significant and that safety regulations were not followed.SCIF petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration, contending that Garcia's injury was not the result of an extraordinary employment condition, but rather an ordinary occupational hazard of picking fruit while standing on a ladder.Garcia did not answer the petition.The WCJ recommended denial.

In a split decision, the WCAB denied reconsideration.The majority emphasized SCIF's failure to introduce any evidence that Garcia's injury was not extraordinary.The majority commented, “While not particularly strong evidence on extraordinariness, [Garcia's] testimony was the only evidence.It was uncontradicted and unimpeached.[Citations.]If [SCIF] had presented any documentary evidence or testimony as to the frequency of falls from ladders for avocado pickers or how the rates for insuring them reflect[ ] the ‘common’ risk of falls from ladders, then the decision on this issue might have been different.”

The dissenting member of the WCAB reached the opposite conclusion, observing that “[t]he hazards of picking avocados while standing on a ladder are not mysterious or unknown, and this accident cannot reasonably be viewed, therefore, as unusual or totally unexpected.”In the absence of persuasive evidence that such falls are rare, the dissent determined Garcia's psychiatric injury claim is barred under section 3208.3, subdivision (d).We granted SCIF's petition for writ of review.

DISCUSSION

Interpretation of governing statutes or application of law to undisputed facts is a question of law that we decide de novo.( California Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.(2008)163 Cal.App.4th 853, 861, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 868.)Although we give great weight to the WCAB's interpretation of a statute, the WCAB's erroneous interpretation or application of law is a basis for annulment of its decision.( Matea v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.(2006)144 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1444, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 314( Matea ).)

In interpreting a statute, we must first “ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.”( Dyna–Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com.(1987)43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386, 241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323.)Legislative intent generally is gleaned “from the plain or ordinary meaning of the statutory language, unless the language or intent is uncertain.”( Rea v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.(2005)127 Cal.App.4th 625, 641, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 828.)The language “must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.[Citations.]Where uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation.[Citation.]Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent.”( Dyna–Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra,43 Cal.3d at p. 1387, 241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323.)All workers' compensation statutes must be construed liberally in favor of the applicant.(§ 3202;Claxton v. Waters(2004)34 Cal.4th 367, 373, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 246, 96 P.3d 496.)

Section 3208.3 outlines the specific statutory conditions that must be met before an applicant may recover for a psychiatric injury.This section“was ... passed in ‘response to increased public concern about the high cost of workers' compensation coverage, limited benefits for injured workers, suspected fraud and widespread abuses in the system, and particularly the proliferation of workers' compensation cases with claims of psychiatric injuries.’[Citation.]As a result, ‘[t]he Legislature's expressed intent in enacting Labor Code section 3208.3 was to establish a new and higher threshold of compensability for psychiatric injury.’[Citations.]”( City of Oakland v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.(2002)99 Cal.App.4th 261, 265, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 873.)

Section 3208.3, subdivision (d) provides that “no compensation shall be paid ... for a psychiatric injury related to a claim against an employer unless the employee has been employed by that employer for at least six months....This subdivision shall not apply if the psychiatric injury is caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition.”

This six-month limitation pertains to all claims for psychiatric injury, not only stress claims.( Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.(2003)112 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1441, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 822( Wal–Mart );Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.(2002)96 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1246–1247, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 865.)“Although it is true that a claim for psychiatric injury which rests on an objective physical injury may be somewhat less likely to be fraudulent than one based on ‘stress,’ there remains a substantial potential for the fraudulent inflation of a claim by adding alleged psychic injuries; thus, including such claims to meet the six-month standard is by no means unreasonable.”( Wal–Mart,at p. 1441, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 822.)

Consequently, when an alleged psychiatric injury occurs within the first six months of employment, as it did here, the applicant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a sudden and extraordinary employment condition caused the injury.( Matea, supra,144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1449, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 314.)SCIF contends that Garcia failed to meet this burden.We agree.

The sudden and extraordinary employment condition exception in section 3208.3, subdivision (d) encompasses “the type of events that would naturally be expected to cause psychic disturbances even in a diligent and honest employee.”( Wal–Mart, supra,112 Cal.App.4th at p. 1441, fn. 9, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 822;Matea, supra,144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1448, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 314.)Wal–Mart suggested, in dicta, that this definition excludes accidental injuries and applies only to extremely unusual events, such as gas main explosions or workplace violence.( Wal–Mart,p. 1441, fn. 9, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 822.)The court remarked: “If the argument were made that an accidental injury constitutes a ‘sudden and extraordinary employment condition,’we would reject it.For one thing, such an interpretation would mean that psychological injuries resulting from...