La. State Conference of the Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Louisiana, CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-479-JWD-SDJ

• Decision Date: 19 October 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-479-JWD-SDJ
• Citation: 495 F.Supp.3d 400
• Parties: LOUISIANA STATE CONFERENCE OF the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, et al. v. State of LOUISIANA, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

495 F.Supp.3d 400

LOUISIANA STATE CONFERENCE OF the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, et al.

v.State of LOUISIANA, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-479-JWD-SDJ

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

Signed October 19, 2020

Arthur Ray Thomas, Arthur Thomas & Associates, Baton Rouge, LA, Adam L. Shaw, Pro Hac Vice, Alec W. Farr, Pro Hac Vice, Jason Semmes, Pro Hac Vice, Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, Washington, DC, Meryl Macklin, Pro Hac Vice, Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Anthony Allen, Stephanie Anthony.

Arthur Ray Thomas, Arthur Thomas & Associates, Baton Rouge, LA, Adam L. Shaw, Pro Hac Vice, Alec W. Farr, Pro Hac Vice, Jason Semmes, Pro Hac Vice, Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, Brendan Downes, Pro Hac Vice, Ezra D. Rosenberg, Pro Hac Vice, Jennifer Nwachukwu, Pro Hac Vice, Jon M. Greenbaum, Pro Hac Vice, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, DC, Meryl Macklin, Pro Hac Vice, Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Louisiana State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Elizabeth Baker Murrill, Louisiana's Office of the Attorney General, Angelique Duhon Freel, Carey T. Jones, Jeffrey Michael Wale, Louisiana Department of Justice, Baton Rouge, LA, Jason B. Torchinsky, Pro Hac Vice, Phillip Michael Gordon, Pro Hac Vice, Holtzman Vogel Josefiak Torchinsky, PLLC, Haymarket, VA, for State of Louisiana.

Celia R. Cangelosi, Celia R. Cangelosi, Attorney at Law, Baton Rouge, LA, Jason B. Torchinsky, Holtzman Vogel Josefiak Torchinsky, PLLC, Haymarket, VA, for R. Kyle Ardoin.

RULING AND ORDER

JOHN W. deGRAVELLES, JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on the Joint Motion for Certification of Order for Interlocutory Appeal (the "Motion for Interlocutory Appeal ") (Doc. 51) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) filed by Defendants, the State of Louisiana and the Secretary of State of Louisiana (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiffs, the Louisiana State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), Anthony Allen, and Stephanie Allen (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), oppose the motion. (Doc. 54.) Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. 56.) Oral argument is not necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs brought suit under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 et seq. (Doc. 1.) In the Complaint , Plaintiffs discuss, inter alia, Chisom v. Roemer , 501 U.S. 380, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 115 L. Ed. 2d 348 (1991), where minority plaintiffs challenged the original electoral process for the Louisiana Supreme Court, which consisted of six judicial districts, five single-member districts and one multi-member district which encompassed Orleans Parish and which elected two justices. (Compl. ¶¶ 23–24, Doc. 1 at 6–7.) In 1986, several plaintiffs brought suit alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Chisom v. Edwards , 659 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. La. 1987) ; see also Chisom v. Jindal , 890 F. Supp. 2d 696, 702 (E.D. La. 2012). After a number of appeals to the Fifth Circuit, see, e.g., Chisom v. Edwards , 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), and a decision by the United States Supreme Court, Chisom v. Roemer , 501 U.S. 380, 111 S.Ct. 2354, a Consent Decree was entered on August 21, 1992 ("Consent Decree"). (See Ex. A, Doc. 27-3). The Consent Judgment begins with the following Preamble:

The current apportionment of the Louisiana Supreme Court is governed by La. Const. Art. V, Section 4 and La. Rev. Stat. Section 13:101. Under Section 13:101, Orleans Parish is contained within the multimember First Supreme Court district along with Jefferson, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes.

The Chisom plaintiffs and the United States claim that the multimember district system for electing justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court in the First Supreme Court District [first district] dilutes black voting strength in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1973 [ Section 2 ], because black citizens have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and elect justices of their choice. In June 1992, the Louisiana Legislature passed and the Governor signed Act No. 512 (S.B. 1255) (1992), which provides, inter alia, for a change in the method of electing the Louisiana Supreme Court; for the assignment of the judge elected to the newly-created position from the first district (Orleans Parish) of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court; and for the assigned judge to participate and share equally in the cases and duties of the justices of the Supreme Court during this period of assignment. The Chisom plaintiffs and the United States contend that the provisions contained in Act No. 512 (1992) and in this Consent Judgment are necessary to bring the system for electing the Louisiana Supreme Court into compliance with Section 2. While the defendants do not agree with this contention and only enter into this compromise agreement to resolve extensive and costly litigation, they believe that the relief contained in this consent judgment will ensure that the system for electing the Louisiana Supreme Court is in compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Accordingly, the parties to this litigation desire to [a]ffect a settlement of the issues raised by the complaint and subsequent proceedings without the necessity of further litigation, and therefore consent to entry of the following final and binding judgment as dispositive of all issues raised in this case[.]

(Ex. A, Doc. 27-3 at 2–3.) It was thus ordered, inter alia , that: "The relief contained in this consent judgment will ensure that the system for electing the Louisiana Supreme Court is in compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act." (Ex. A, Doc. 27-3 at 4.)

The Consent Judgment then describes how, "[c]onsistent with Louisiana Act No. 512 (1992) and the remedial objectives of the Voting Rights Act, the defendants shall take the following actions[.]" (Ex. A, Doc. 27-3 at 4.) The defendants agreed to create "a Supreme Court district comprised solely of Orleans Parish, for the purpose of electing a Supreme Court justice from that district when and if a vacancy occur[ed]" in District 1 before January 1, 2000. (Id. ) The defendants also agreed to create "one new Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal judicial position" and this judge would be "elected from the first district of the Fourth Circuit, which is comprised of Orleans Parish." (Id. ) The new additional judge elected from the first district of the Fourth Circuit would then be immediately assigned to serve on the Louisiana Supreme Court. (Id. at 4–5.) "The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal judge assigned to serve on the Supreme Court shall receive the same compensation, benefits, expenses, and emoluments of offices as now or hereafter are provided by law for a justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court." (Id. at 5.) The Consent Judgment goes on to give the Fourth Circuit judge an equal share in the "cases, duties, and powers of the Louisiana Supreme Court" and put an expiration on the position at the date the justice elected takes office. (Id. ) The Consent Judgment also describes what happens if the Fourth Circuit seat becomes vacant before the prescribed election. (Id. at 6–7.)

Chisom v. Roemer held that "elections for appellate judges could not unlawfully dilute minority votes under the Voting Rights Act." (Compl. ¶ 24, Doc. 1 at 7 (citing Chisom v. Roemer , 501 U.S. 380, 111 S.Ct. 2354 ).) Following Chisom , the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 512 in 1992, "which created a temporary eighth Supreme Court seat for the sub-district of Orleans." (Compl. ¶ 25, Doc. 1 at 7 (citing 1992 La. Acts No. 512, § 1).) The 1992 Consent Decree effectively memorialized Act 512. Chisom v. Jindal , 890 F. Supp. 2d at 703–05 (quoting Perschall v. State , 697 So. 2d 240, 245–47 (La. 1997) ).

The 1992 Consent Decree mandated, inter alia , that:

Legislation will be enacted ... which provides for the reapportionment of the seven districts of the Louisiana Supreme Court in a manner that complies with ... federal voting law, taking into account the most recent census data available. The reapportionment will provide for a single-member district that is majority black in voting age population that includes Orleans Parish in its entirety.... [F ]uture Supreme Court elections after the effective date shall take place in the newly reapportioned districts.

(Ex. A, Doc. 27-3 at 8 (emphasis added).)

The Consent Judgment also provides that:

E. Defendants agree that, in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and in order to ensure black voters in the Parish of Orleans have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice, the Chisom plaintiffs and the United States are to be considered the prevailing parties in this litigation ....

F. This judgment is a restructuring of the Supreme Court of Louisiana by federal court order within the meaning of Act No. 1063 of 1991 ( R.S. 11:558(A) (5) ), and the benefits of R.S. 11:558(A) (5) (a) (ii) shall be available to the current members of the Court.

G. The Chisom plaintiffs’ constitutional claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as their statutory claim alleging that the present electoral system violates Section 2 because it was intentionally enacted or maintained for discriminatory reasons, are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

(Ex. A, Doc. 27-3 at 8.) The Consent Judgment was deemed a final judgment in the action and was "binding on all parties and their successors in office." (Id. ) Further, "[t]he parties agr...