State, Dept. of Citrus v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 22 July 1970
• Docket Number: No. 38814,38814
• Citation: 239 So.2d 577
• Parties: STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, Appellant, v. C. V. GRIFFIN, Sr., and C. V. Griffin Groves, a Florida corporation, Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 577

239 So.2d 577

STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, Appellant, v. C. V. GRIFFIN, Sr., and C. V. Griffin Groves, a Florida corporation, Appellees.

No. 38814.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 22, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1970.

Monterey Campbell, of Tomasello, Campbell, Dunlap & Norris, Bartow, for appellant.

Charles E. Davis, of Fishback, Davis, Dominick & Salfi, Orlando, and Robert M. Ervin, of Ervin, Pennington, Varn & Jacobs, Tallahassee, for appellees.

Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Tampa, Willard Ayres, of Greene, Ayres, Swigert, Cluster & Tucker, Ocala, and Counts Johnson, Tampa, for Florida Citrus Mutual and Indian River Citrus League and amici curiae.

CARLTON, Justice.

Appellees, members of the Citrus industry, brought suit for declaratory judgment in Circuit Court, Lake County, to test the validity of Fla.Stat. § 601.154, F.S.A., '(The) Orange Stabilization Act of Florida,' and of Marketing Order 105--3.01 enacted pursuant to provisions of the Act. The Circuit Court adjudged that Fla.Stat. § 601.154(5), (f), (g) and (h), and § 601.154(12), F.S.A., were unconstitutional, and that the Marketing Order was invalid. This decision is reported in 32 Fla.Supp. 139. Appellant, charged with administration of the Act, has brought a direct appeal to this Court. It is our judgment that the Circuit Court must be reversed.

The Orange Stabilization Act is a legislative response to two great problems which have chronically plagued the citrus industry since its earliest days: first, the problem of meeting market demand after supply is curtailed through occurrence of natural catastrophes such as hurricanes, freezes and droughts; second, the problem of adequately stimulating market demands when supply is overabundant. That the Legislature has the inherent power to address itself to these problems cannot be doubted. It has long been held that this industry is of such vital import to the welfare and economy of this State that police power measures may be taken to safeguard the industry. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 35 S.Ct. 501, 59 L.Ed. 835 (1915); Fla. Citrus Comm. v. Golden Gift, Inc., Fla., 91 So.2d 657 (1956); Mayo v. Polk Co., 124 Fla. 534, 169 So. 41 (1936); L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121 (1931); Johnson v. State, 99 Fla. 1311, 128 So. 853 (1930).

The specific purposes sought to be achieved by the Act are enumerated in Fla. Stat. § 601.154(1), F.S.A. These purposes include legislative desires: to more effectively correlate the supply of oranges to the demand for them; to establish and maintain orderly marketing for the development of new and larger markets; to eliminate economic waste; to restore and maintain adequate purchasing power for orange producers; and to stabilize the production and marketing of oranges.

These purposes are to be achieved through the medium of marketing orders which must be approved by referendum of the industry after public hearings. While ultimate control over all approved orders is retained by the Commission, a committee composed of members of the industry assists in the administration of each order. Permissible subject matter for the marketing orders is restricted by the Act, and no order can be promulgated which fails to safeguard certain stated interests of the industry.

Any order can be suspended or terminated upon application by a majority of the members of the industry who were responsible for the bulk of the previous season's crop. Also, the Commission itself can terminate or suspend any order if it determines that the order does not tend to effectuate the declared purposes of the Act. Administration of approved orders, and the programs detailed thereunder, are to be funded through the levying of assessments against all standard packed boxes of oranges placed in the primary channels of trade. The aggregate of all marketing order assessments cannot exceed ten cents per box per season.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the Commission held a public hearing on the need for, and feasibility of, selling surplus processed orange juice to the federal government for use in the school lunch programs. Evidence adduced at the hearing supported the following findings: (1) that the industry was on the verge of a great increase in orange productivity due to the current proportion of young trees, soon to bear heavily, to old trees now supplying the bulk of oranges on the market; (2) that this expected increase in productivity would probably outstrip expected demand and, therefore, create a surplus which could be described as potentially disasterous; (3) and that the school lunch program presented a new avenue of distribution which would contribute heavily to utilization of the anticipated surplus, and which would also present an opportunity to inculcate a vast number of young people with an appreciation of, and a desire for, orange juice.

In response to the hearing, the Commission promulgated Marketing Order 105--3.01 which detailed the above findings and which set up an administrative committee for the purpose of preparing and operating programs aimed at securing a part of the federal lunch program market. Section 'C' of the order, entitled 'Powers and Duties', empowered the committee, subject to the concurrence of the Commission, to 'underwrite or subsidize the development or expansion of packaging, dispensing, distributing and marketing techniques and materials best suited to the sale or distribution' of Florida orange products to schools for use by all grade levels. The committee was similarly empowered to underwrite or subsidize the development or expansion of the sale of surplus juices for distribution to schools; underwriting or subsidizing for this purpose was strictly limited by supplementary portions of the order requiring that these activities be geared to the response of the federal government. Section 'C' also provided that these activities were to be funded through an assessment of 5cents per box of oranges delivered into primary channels of trade.

This Order was overwhelmingly approved in a referendum participated in by the affected members of the industry. The producers of more than 86% Of the oranges produced in Florida in the preceding shipping season voted for it, as did processors of more than 85% Of the Florida oranges processed in the preceding shipping season.

Appellees, members of the industry, felt aggrieved by the assessment and by the scope of the marketing order approved in the referendum. They filed suit for declaratory judgment in which a multitude of questions concerning the legality of the Act and the order were raised. The ultimate holding of the Circuit Court is contained in the following extract from its opinion, 32 Fla.Supp. at 141:

'(I)t is the opinion of this court that the powers attempted to be delegated to the commission in § 601.154(5) subsections (f), (g), and (h), cannot be delegated without more definite and valid guidelines, limitations and restrictions, because the same leave for determination of the commission the decision as to what the law shall be in the attempted delegation contained therein.

'The order which is the subject of this proceeding in the section entitled C. 'Powers and Duties' undertakes to set out a program of underwriting and subsidizing the development or expansion of packaging, dispensing, distributing, marketing techniques, materials and the sale of and purchase of processed Florida orange products. Such powers can neither be assumed by the administrative agency, the Florida Citrus Commission, nor delegated by the legislature in the vague and undefined terms contained in the statute and the order. Such would leave to the unbridled discretion of the commission the power to make determinations which are exclusively vested in the legislature by the Constitution of the State of Florida.'

Additionally, the Circuit Court held that Fla.Stat. § 601.154(12), F.S.A., providing for assessments not to exceed 10cents per box per season in the aggregate, was void as an unlimited delegation of power.

Two separate issues confront us in this appeal: first, whether the statutory provisions in question are constitutional; second, whether Marketing Order 105--3.01 exceeded the limits of the authority granted the Commission under the Act.

Few questions are raised with more fervent consistency in constitutional litigation involving administrative agencies than the first question put to us today: Has there been an invalid delegation of legislative power? In the earliest cases on this point, the issue was simply whether or not the Legislature could make any transfer of authority at all. See, e.g., Railroad Commissioners v. P. & A.R.R. Co., 24 Fla. 417, 5 So. 129 (1888). Soon, however, the issue broadened to include the question whether the enactment involved was sufficiently complete in itself. The test then became twofold: first, was a transfer of authority possible; second, if so, was it sufficiently restrictive? We quote from Bailey v. Van Pelt, 78 Fla. 337, 82 So. 789 (1919):

'In order to justify the courts in declaring invalid as a delegation of legislative power a statute conferring particular duties or authority upon administrative officers it must clearly appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the duty or authority so conferred is a Power that appertains Exclusively to the legislative department, and the conferring of it is not warranted by the provisions of the Constitution.

'The Legislature may not delegate the power to enact a law, or to declare what the law shall be, or to exercise an unrestricted discretion in applying a law; but it may enact a law complete in itself, designed to accomplish a general...