State, Dept. of Labor and Employment Sec. v. Lindquist, s. 97-01091

• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: 698 So.2d 299
• Parties: 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1784 STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Appellant, v. Harold LINDQUIST, Appellee. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Appellant, v. Eric LINDQUIST, Appellee.
• Docket Number: Nos. 97-01091,97-01071,s. 97-01091
• Decision Date: 23 July 1997

Page 299

698 So.2d 299 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1784 STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Appellant,
v.
Harold LINDQUIST, Appellee.
STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Appellant,
v.
Eric LINDQUIST, Appellee. Nos. 97-01091, 97-01071. District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Second District. July 23, 1997.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 27, 1997.

Page 300

Edward A. Dion, General Counsel, and Laura E. Taylor, Senior Attorney, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Donald P. Day of Berry & Day, P.A., Naples, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, State of Florida, Department of Labor and Employment Security (the Department), challenges nonfinal orders denying its motions for change of venue to Leon County, the location of its headquarters. ¹ We affirm in both cases because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that venue was proper in Lee County, the place where the Department allegedly violated appellees' constitutional rights.

In 1994, the electorate of the State of Florida voted to amend the Florida Constitution to provide limits on marine net fishing. The reason for this amendment was "to protect saltwater finfish, shellfish, and other marine animals from unnecessary killing, overfishing, and waste." Art. X, § 16(a), Fla. Const. The amendment prohibits the use of gill nets and entangling nets in the Florida waters, and disallows the use of nets containing more than 500 square feet of mesh area in nearshore and inshore Florida waters. See Art. X, § 16(b)(1)-(2), Fla. Const. In response to the adoption of section 16, article X, of the Florida Constitution, the Legislature enacted a "net ban assistance program" to provide economic assistance to commercial saltwater products licensees suffering losses as a result of the amendment limiting marine net fishing. § 370.0805, Fla. Stat. (1995).

One such assistance program established under section 370.0805 is the "net buy-back program" (the Program) which provides economic assistance to compensate commercial saltwater products licensees for "nets rendered illegal or useless by the constitutional limitation of marine net fishing." § 370.0805(5). Generally, economic assistance under the Program is calculated based on the length of the net and the amount of mesh. See § 307.0805(5)(a). The Program provides that "[s]uch assistance shall be in nonnegotiable amounts not intended to reflect the actual value of the nets," and that "[a]ny net for which a licensee receives payment shall become the property of the department and shall be destroyed or disposed of in a manner that is not harmful to Florida's environment." § 307.0805(5)(e).

Appellees sent "net buy-back applications" to the Department. The applications represented that each appellee intended to sell sixteen nets to the Department. Thereafter, on August 2, 1995, the Department sent a letter to each appellee scheduling a "net buy-back appointment" to occur in August 1995, at the parking lot of the Fishers of Men Lutheran Church, in Pine Island, Florida. Pine Island is in Lee County. The letters

Page 301

indicated that based on the information available to the Department, appellees were eligible to receive compensation for sixteen nets, and stated, "If you do not agree with this preliminary determination of your eligibility to sell back a certain number of nets, you may request a reconsideration in writing within 15 days of the date of this notice." The letters concluded by stating "Upon delivering the nets to the site location listed above, you will receive a voucher for the amount of money that will be sent to your home address."

Each appellee received two "net recovery vouchers." Each voucher was signed by the applicant and a representative of the Department. Appellee Harold Linquist's vouchers are as follows: The first is dated August 16, 1995, and lists a total value of $18,313.78 for 8,694 yards of net recovered by the Department; the second, dated August 28, 1995, lists a total value of $5,278.87 for 905 yards of net recovered by the Department. Appellee Eric Linquist's vouchers are as follows: the first is dated August 18, 1995, and lists a total value of $12,512.52 for 4,339 yards of net recovered by the Department; the second, dated September 6, 1995, lists a total value of $30,687.41 for 5,261 yards of net recovered by the Department.

Thereafter, the Department sent each appellee a letter which determined that they were not eligible for the full amount of assistance listed in their net recovery vouchers. According to the letters, Harold Linquist received a State of Florida warrant in the amount of $18,313.78 for the nets recovered, and Eric Linquist received a State of Florida warrant in the amount of $11,265.03 for the nets recovered. The letters further apprised each appellee of his right to file a written appeal within twenty-one days from the date of receipt of the letter.

In October 1995, appellees served the Department with their petitions for "formal proceedings." In response, the Department sent each appellee a letter stating that it was prohibited from taking any action on his petition because of an order in a separate class action case which enjoined the Department from distributing any money to applicants of the Program. On April 26, 1996, the injunction was dissolved as a result of a settlement in the class action. Subsequently, the First District decided that the injunction in the class action case did not justify the Department's refusal to take action on an administrative appeal. See Stiller v. Florida Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 677 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

On November 15, 1996, appellees filed complaints against the Department seeking relief for breach of contract, conversion, and "COUNT III: TAKING WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION AND DUE PROCESS." The complaints allege that the Department "established a procedure whereby the State of Florida would travel to a fisherman's home county and enter into a contractual relationship for the purchase of the nets." The third count of each complaint alleges that the Department "unilaterally refused to pay the contract amount and offered a payment in an amount substantially less than the agreed upon amount, and substantially less than fair market value." The complaints further allege that the Department "destroyed the property without notification to the [appellee], or an offer to compensate the [appellee] for the fair market value of the property taken and destroyed."

Thereafter, the Department filed motions in each case to transfer venue to Leon County, the site of its headquarters. On February 19, 1997, the trial court entered its orders denying the motions to transfer venue. In these interlocutory appeals, the Department argues that the trial court erred in rejecting its privilege to control the venue in a civil lawsuit brought against a state agency. For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we conclude that the trial court's decision to hear this case in Lee County was not an abuse of discretion. See Graham v. Edwards, 472 So.2d 803 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (holding that state has burden of demonstrating on appeal that trial court abused its discretion in refusing to transfer venue to location of its headquarters), review denied, 482 So.2d 348 (Fla.1986).

It is well recognized in Florida that venue in civil actions brought against the...