STATE EX REL. ACC

Citation44 P.3d 708,2002 UT 22
Decision Date05 March 2002
Docket NumberNo. 20000596.,20000596.
PartiesSTATE of Utah in the interest of A.C.C., a person under eighteen years of age.
CourtSupreme Court of Utah

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christine F. Soltis, Asst. Att'y Gen., Byron F. Burmester, Salt Lake City, for the State of Utah.

Robert L. Donohoe, Salt Lake City, for A.C.C.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

DURRANT, Justice.

¶ 1 Acting pursuant to a probation order that subjected A.C.C., a minor, to random searches, a probation officer searched A.C.C.'s backpack and seized a device used to inhale marijuana. Based on this seizure, the officer filed a delinquency charge against A.C.C. in juvenile court; A.C.C. then filed a motion to suppress the drug paraphernalia, arguing that the officer's search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The juvenile court denied this motion, reasoning that A.C.C. lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his backpack because of the terms of his probation. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and held that the Fourth Amendment required a "reasonable suspicion" on the part of the probation officer before conducting a warrantless search of A.C.C.'s belongings.

¶ 2 On certiorari, the State initially contends that the appellate court erred in applying the exclusionary rule developed with respect to the Fourth Amendment to A.C.C.'s juvenile court delinquency proceeding. It further contends that, even if the exclusionary rule applies to A.C.C.'s delinquency proceeding, the court of appeals erred in concluding that A.C.C. had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the contraband in his backpack. We conclude that in light of the express terms of his probation, A.C.C. had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the seized contraband and could not suppress it. We therefore reverse the court of appeals.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On November 10, 1997, a juvenile court placed A.C.C. on probation for unlawfully possessing marijuana. The court's probation order subjected A.C.C. to two special conditions. First, the court ordered "[t]hat [A.C.C.] submit to search and seizure from law enforcement for detection of drugs, weapons or other illegally possessed items." Second, the court ordered "[t]hat [A.C.C.] submit to chemical testing for controlled substances ...."

¶ 4 In a chemical test administered on August 24, 1998, A.C.C. tested positive for marijuana. Approximately three weeks later, he submitted to a another drug test. This second test rendered inconclusive results, but the law enforcement officer administering it, Probation Officer Stanworth, concluded that A.C.C. had tested clean because traces of marijuana might have lingered in his system from his prior drug use.

¶ 5 On September 17, 1998, A.C.C.'s mother called Stanworth and asked him to conduct a search of A.C.C.'s car. She made this request because she suspected A.C.C. had been using marijuana and believed he was concealing it in his vehicle. On September 21, 1998, Stanworth arrived at A.C.C.'s residence and spotted A.C.C.'s car sitting in the driveway. After exiting his own vehicle, Stanworth noticed a black backpack inside A.C.C.'s car. Stanworth recognized this backpack as belonging to A.C.C. because he had searched it on an earlier occasion.

¶ 6 Thereafter, Stanworth entered A.C.C.'s residence and visited with A.C.C. and his mother. Near the end of this conversation, Stanworth informed A.C.C. that he wanted to search A.C.C.'s room and car. Upon learning the reason for Stanworth's visit, A.C.C. claimed that he felt ill but nonetheless accompanied his mother and Stanworth outside to his vehicle.

¶ 7 Opening the door of A.C.C.'s car, Stanworth immediately detected a strong odor of marijuana. He then asked A.C.C. what he had been smoking; A.C.C. replied that he had been using cigarettes to stay off marijuana. Unpersuaded by this response, Stanworth conducted a brief search of A.C.C.'s car, which revealed that the pungent odor was emanating from A.C.C.'s backpack. Stanworth subsequently seized this backpack and transported it inside.

¶ 8 Once inside A.C.C.'s mother's home, Stanworth asked A.C.C. whether he would find any illegal substances in the backpack. A.C.C. answered "no." Despite receiving this assurance, Stanworth unzipped the backpack and discovered an eight-inch bong that showed signs of recent use.1

¶ 9 Based on this discovery, Stanworth filed both delinquency and probation violation charges against A.C.C. On December 2, 1998, A.C.C. filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the drug paraphernalia seized by Stanworth could not be introduced in the delinquency proceeding because it had been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The juvenile court denied this motion, reasoning that A.C.C. did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because of the terms of his probation. The court then found A.C.C. guilty of unlawfully possessing drug paraphernalia pursuant to subsection 58-37a-5(1) of the Utah Code and committed him to a secure facility within the Division of Youth Corrections for ten days.

¶ 10 A.C.C. subsequently appealed the juvenile court's ruling, and the Utah Court of Appeals reversed. In so doing, the court of appeals held that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applied to juvenile court delinquency proceedings and that A.C.C. had a reasonable expectation of privacy, which required Probation Officer Stanworth to have a "reasonable suspicion" that A.C.C. had committed a probation violation or a crime before searching his property without a warrant. The court of appeals further held that additional factual findings were necessary to determine whether Stanworth possessed such a "reasonable suspicion" before searching A.C.C.'s backpack and remanded the case to the juvenile court to make that determination.

¶ 11 We granted the State's certiorari petition. Before us, the State contends that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply to juvenile court delinquency proceedings. Alternatively, the State claims that, even if the exclusionary rule applies to delinquency proceedings, A.C.C., as a juvenile probationer, lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy. A.C.C. counters that the exclusionary rules of both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution apply to juvenile court delinquency proceedings. A.C.C. further asserts that he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the seized property that required Probation Officer Stanworth to have a "reasonable suspicion" that he committed a probation violation or a crime before searching his belongings.

ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12 Whether a juvenile probationer's expectation of privacy is reasonable notwithstanding a probation condition authorizing random searches is the only issue we resolve. Because this is a legal issue, we review it for correctness. See State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 321 (Utah Ct.App.1998)

. Further, where that review requires us to examine statutory language, we look first to the plain meaning of the statute. See State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ¶ 7, 31 P.3d 528.

II. A.C.C. LACKED A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

¶ 13 On certiorari, the State proffers two arguments. First, the State asserts that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply to juvenile court delinquency hearings. Second, the State contends that A.C.C. had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his property due to the terms of his probation. We do not reach the question of whether the exclusionary rule applies to juvenile court delinquency proceedings, however, because we conclude that, even assuming it does, the evidence at issue was properly admitted.2 As discussed below, the evidence was admissible because A.C.C. had no reasonable expectation of privacy relative to it.

¶ 14 Operating under our assumption that the exclusionary rule applies, we assess whether A.C.C. had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the contraband hidden in his backpack. A.C.C. had the burden of establishing such an expectation and must prove that "his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). In other words, A.C.C., as the proponent of a motion to suppress, must prove that he possessed a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the property seized by the government. Id. at 143, 99 S.Ct. 421.

A. Subjective intent

¶ 15 The test for determining whether A.C.C. had a reasonable expectation of privacy requires two inquiries on our part. Id. at 143 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421. First, we must ascertain whether A.C.C. manifested a subjective expectation of privacy. Id. In answering this question, the juvenile court found that A.C.C. harbored a subjective expectation of privacy, noting that "he hid the contraband in his backpack ... and not in his room [where] his mother . . . frequently [conducted] searches." The juvenile court added that it was A.C.C.'s "last wish . . . to have the contraband discovered by his probation officer or his parent." The court of appeals noted this finding in affirming the juvenile court's conclusion. We also agree with the juvenile court, concluding that A.C.C. manifested a subjective expectation of privacy because he hid the contraband in a private location. Cf. In re Tyrell, 8 Cal.4th 68, 83, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519 (Cal.1994)

(holding that a juvenile's attempt to hide illegal contraband demonstrated a subjective intent to maintain his privacy as to the object).

B. Reasonableness

¶ 16 Although we agree that A.C.C. manifested a subjective expectation of privacy, "the Fourth Amendment does not protect subjective expectations of privacy that are unreasonable or otherwise illegitimate."...

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