State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler

Decision Date28 June 1972
Docket NumberNo. 71-776,71-776
Citation30 Ohio St.2d 326,59 O.O.2d 387,285 N.E.2d 22
Parties, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3179, 69 Lab.Cas. P 52,880, 59 O.O.2d 387 The STATE ex rel. ADAMS et al., Appellants, v. GUSWEILER et al., Judges, Appellees.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where an arbitration agreement provides that a decision by the arbitrator 'shall be final and binding upon the parties,' R.C. 2711.04 does not confer jurisdiction upon a Court of Common Pleas to appoint another arbitrator to conduct a second or appellate arbitration of the same issues tried by the arbitrator selected by the parties pursuant to the agreement, notwithstanding the agreement provides that 'either party may appeal' such arbitrator's decision 'without prejudice' within 15 days thereof.

2. Where there is a total want of jurisdiction on the part of a court, a writ of prohibition will be allowed to arrest the continuing effect of an order issued by such court, even though the order was entered on the journal of the court prior to the application for the writ of prohibition. (The second sentence of the third paragraph of the syllabus of State ex rel. Frasch v. Miller (1933), 126 Ohio, St. 287, 185 N.E. 193; the second paragraph of the syllabus of Marsh v. Goldthorpe (1930), 123 Ohio St. 103, 174 N.E. 246; and the fifth paragraph of the syllabus of State ex rel. Brickell v. Roach (1930), 122 Ohio St. 117, 170 N.E. 866 distinguished.)

Appellants were employees of the Progress Lithographing Co., one of the appellees herein. They were laid off. Under a union collective bargaining agreement, that action was subject to arbitration. The arbitration was had and the arbitrator rendered his opinion and award in favor of the employees and adverse to the company.

The Agreement provides that 'either party may appeal an Arbitrator's decision without prejudice' within 'fifteen (15) days following receipt of the decision.' Pursuant to that provision, the company filed a 'Notice of Appeal' with the American Arbitration Association and simultaneously filed an 'Application for Appointment of Arbitrator' in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County based on R.C. 2711.04. * The following day, Judge Gusweiler of that court appointed an 'arbitrator' to hear the 'appeal.'

Three days later, appellants commenced this action in the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition to set aside the appointment of the second or appellate arbitrator. That court sustained appellees' motion to dismiss.

Taft, Luken & Boyd and David J. Boyd, Cincinnati, for appellants.

Goodman & Goodman and Benjamin Gettler, Cincinnati, for appellees.

SCHNEIDER, Justice.

The arbitration award which is at the root of this litigation was the result of a detailed selection process involving a panel submitted by the American Arbitration Association. The arbitrator selected was required within 30 days to accept his selection and schedule a hearing. Provision is made in the Agreement in the event he did not accept, as well as for fees and expenses. The arbitrator had 'no authority to add to, subtract from or in any way modify the terms of' the Agreement. Finally, 'the decision rendered by such arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties.'

Following these detailed provisions, language appears to the effect that either party may appeal an arbitrator's decision without prejudice within 15 days. No procedure for appeal or to whom such appeal is to be made is designated. There is no provision whatever for any second or appellate arbitration nor are the provisions applicable to arbitration made applicable to a second or appellate arbitration.

It is arguable that the language as to an appeal, if not wholly meaningless, contemplates an action in a Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 2711.01 et seq. and specifically pursuant to R.C. 2711.10 (authorizing that court to vacate the award) and R.C. 2711.11 (authorizing that court to modify an award). On the other hand, a review by the same arbitrator or a review of of the award by a subsequent arbitrator, as the company contends, may be contemplated. If the latter meaning is the true one, unlimited successive arbitrations without any finality might be involved.

However, the parties do not urge us to construe the Agreement, nor is it necessary to our dicision to construe it. We are convinced that whetever may be the reach of R.C. 2711.04, it falls short of authorizing the Court of Common Pleas in this case to appoint a second or appellate arbitrator to conduct a second or appellate arbitration of the same issues which were already tried by an arbitrator whose decision is 'final and binding upon the parties.' Therefore, the Court of Common Pleas was manifestly without jurisdiction to appoint a second arbitrator and the Court of Appeals was in error dismissing the action 'because relators have an adequate remedy at law.'

If an inferior court is without jurisdiction whatsoever to act, the availability or adequacy of a remedy of appeal to prevent the resulting injustice is immaterial to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction by a superior court to prevent usurpation of jurisdiction by the inferior court. See State ex rel. Northern Ohio Telephone Co. v. Winter (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 6, 260 N.E.2d 827. See, also, Hall v. American Brake Shoe Co. (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 11, 13, 233 N.E.2d 582.

It should be clearly understood that where language seemingly to the contrary appears in our prior decisions, the inferior court had at least basic statutory jurisidcation to proceed in the case. See, for example, State ex rel. Dickison v. Court of Common Pleas (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 179, 277...

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