State ex rel. Allied Sys. Holdings, Inc. v. Donders
| Decision Date | 11 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11AP-960,11AP-960 |
| Citation | 2012 Ohio 5855 |
| Parties | State ex rel. Allied Systems Holdings, Inc., Relator, v. Joseph L. Donders, Honeywell International, Inc., and Industrial Commission of Ohio, Respondents. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
DECISION
Scott, Scriven & Wahoff, LLP, William J. Wahoff, Richard
Goldberg, and Nelva J. Smith, for relator.
Agee, Clymer, Mitchell & Laret, Katherine E. Ivan, Eric B.
Cameron, Robert M. Robinson, and C. Russell Canestraro,
for respondent Joseph L. Donders.
Reminger Co., L.P.A., Mick L. Proxmire, and Melvin Davis
for respondent Honeywell International, Inc.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Cheryl J. Nester, for
respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
IN MANDAMUS
ON OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Allied Systems Holdings, Inc., commenced this original action requesting a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio("commission") to vacate its order exercising R.C. 4123.52 continuing jurisdiction over a 1999 claim involving one of relator's employees, Joseph L. Donders ("claimant"), and granting the motion of respondent Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honeywell") to establish relator as the proper employer responsible for claimant's claim.
{¶ 2} This matter was referred to a court-appointed magistrate pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued the appended decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therein, the magistrate concluded: (1) the commission did not abuse its discretion by exercising its continuing jurisdiction and granting Honeywell's motion to designate relator as the proper employer in claimant's claim; and (2) the commission did not abuse its discretion by finding the doctrine of laches inapplicable to this matter. Accordingly, the magistrate determined that this court should deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus.
{¶ 3} Relator has filed the following six objections to the magistrate's decision:
{¶ 4} In its first objection, relator challenges finding of fact No. 5, wherein the magistrate states that: "It is also undisputed that 20003261-2, the policy number Mr. Figures listed on claimant's FROI-1, is actually the correct policy number for Allied Signal, Inc. ("Allied Signal") and that Honeywell is the parent company of Allied Signal." (Appendix at ¶ 24.) Relator argues that the magistrate erred by finding that it is"undisputed" that it was Mr. Figures who listed the incorrect policy number on the FROI-1 form. Relator maintains that the stipulated evidence does not definitively establish that Mr. Figures provided the incorrect policy number on the FROI-1 form. The commission responds that relator misconstrues the magistrate's finding, arguing that it simply states that all parties agreed that the policy number listed on the FROI-1 form was for that of Allied Signal. Because the stipulated evidence does not definitively establish the source of the policy number error on the FROI-1 form, and because the magistrate's finding arguably can be read as interpreted by relator, we sustain relator's first objection and delete the reference to Mr. Figures in finding of fact No. 5.
{¶ 5} Relator's second and third objections are interrelated and thus will be considered jointly. In these objections, relator challenges the magistrate's conclusion that the commission did not abuse its discretion by exercising continuing jurisdiction to assign relator as the proper employer in claimant's claim.
{¶ 6} Pursuant to R.C. 4123.52, "[t]he jurisdiction of the industrial commission and the authority of the administrator of workers' compensation over each case is continuing, and the commission may make such modification or change with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is justified." "The commission's power to reconsider a previous decision derives from its general grant of continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52." State ex rel. Gobich v. Indus. Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 585, 2004-Ohio-5990, ¶ 14. The commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction is subject to abuse-of-discretion review. See State ex rel. Akron Paint & Varnish, Inc. v. Gullotta, 131 Ohio St.3d 231, 2012-Ohio-542. An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶ 7} Continuing jurisdiction has both substantive and time restrictions. Substantively, "[c]ontinuing jurisdiction can be invoked only where one of these preconditions exists: (1) new or changed circumstances, (2) fraud, (3) clear mistake of fact, (4) clear mistake of law, or (5) error by an inferior tribunal." Gobich at ¶ 15. As to timeliness, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated, "[a]ssuming arguendo that one of the preliminary conditions for continuing jurisdiction exists, the commission abuses its discretion when it fails to exercise its continuing jurisdiction within a reasonable time.* * * Reasonableness depends on the circumstances of each case." State ex rel. Gordon v. Indus. Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 469, 471 (1992).
{¶ 8} Relator does not dispute that one of the preliminary conditions for continuing jurisdiction—a clear mistake of fact—exists in this case. Indeed, relator concedes that the claimant was at all relevant times its employee and that Honeywell was mistakenly identified as the employer responsible for the claimant's 1999 claim. However, relator argues that even where a clear mistake of fact exists, the commission must exercise its continuing jurisdiction within a reasonable time, and that the commission did not do so here. Relator contends that the commission's decision does not comply with State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio St.3d 203 (1991), because the commission did not adequately explain why its exercise of continuing jurisdiction was made within a reasonable time. Relator also contends the commission abused its discretion by exercising its continuing jurisdiction in this matter.
{¶ 9} Contrary to relator's first contention, the commission did not justify its invocation of continuing jurisdiction solely on the substantive ground that a mistake of fact occurred. Rather, the record in this case establishes that the commission adequately explained why its exercise of continuing jurisdiction was made within a reasonable time. The commission expressly rejected relator's argument that continuing jurisdiction was precluded by the length of time Honeywell failed to discover the error. In so doing, the commission pointed out that Supreme Court of Ohio cases addressing the commission's continuing jurisdiction do not specify a precise time period beyond which invocation of continuing jurisdiction is clearly barred; rather, those cases establish only that invocation must be within a "reasonable" period of time. In addressing the reasonableness of the timing, the commission's district hearing officer noted that relator initially certified the claim in 1999 and failed in its duty over the next ten years to properly manage and monitor the claim. The commission's staff hearing officer determined that the ten-year delay was not unreasonable because records pertaining to the claim are likely available through Honeywell's third-party administrator, and relator would be at no more of a disadvantage than the claimant in re-addressing issues related to claimant's claim. Because the commission adequately explained why its exercise of continuing jurisdiction was made within a reasonable time, its decision complies with Noll.
{¶ 10} We further disagree with relator's second argument, that due to the ten-year delay between the misidentification of Honeywell as the employer and Honeywell's motion to reassign the claim to relator, the commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. The factual circumstances of this case place the commission's decision within the range of its discretion. It is undisputed that relator is the claimant's employer and that...
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