State ex rel. Amer. Eagle v. St. Louis Cty

• Citation: 272 S.W.3d 336
• Decision Date: 21 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. ED 91677.,ED 91677.
• Parties: STATE of Missouri ex rel. AMERICAN EAGLE WASTE INDUSTRIES, et al., Appellants, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Missouri, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

272 S.W.3d 336

STATE of Missouri ex rel. AMERICAN EAGLE WASTE INDUSTRIES, et al., Appellants, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Missouri, et al., Respondents.

No. ED 91677.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Five.

October 21, 2008.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied December 9, 2008.

Application for Transfer Denied January 27, 2009.

Jane E. Dueker, John R. Phillips, Tricia A. Workman, St. Louis, MO for appellants.

Patricia Redington, Robert H. Grant, Clayton, MO, for respondents.

KENNETH M. ROMINES, Judge.

Introduction

A group of private trash and waste collectors ("Haulers") operating businesses in St. Louis County appeal the judgment of the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, the Honorable Steven H. Goldman, presiding, dismissing their claim against St. Louis County ("the County") for a writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment. Haulers claimed the County improperly commenced waste collection throughout St. Louis County without providing notice to Haulers, in violation of section 260.247, RSMo. (Supp.2007), and the County argued it had constitutional authority to take precedence over the statute due to its status as a charter county with home rule. Because we find that the trial court improperly dismissed Haulers' case for failure to state a claim, we reverse and remand.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from the court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, and therefore we take all facts alleged in the petition as true. Rosenfeld v. Thoele, 28 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Mo.App. E.D.2000). The facts set out in Haulers' petition are as follows.

In December 2006, St. Louis County, a charter county under Missouri Constitution article VI, section 18, changed its code to enable the County to establish trash collection districts and commence trash collection responsibilities. At the time, private hauling companies, including Haulers, provided waste collection services throughout St. Louis County. After the change took effect, the County requested bids to contract with trash collection companies for each newly-established trash district. In April 2008, the County awarded a contract to Veolia ES Solid Waste Management, LLC ("Veolia"), for waste collection services in one of the trash districts, to begin 1 July 2008. The County invited bids in the following months for the remaining districts. The County was set to begin trash collection in those districts, through its contractors, on 1 October 2008.

In June 2007, after the County had changed its code but before it had accepted any bids, the Missouri General Assembly approved an amendment to section 260.247, RSMo. (2000). That section formerly provided that, in the event a city commences solid waste collection, the city must give companies currently providing collection services notice before doing so. Additionally, the statute provided a two-year waiting period once the city gave notice before it could commence trash collection services, unless the city chose to contract with the private companies providing collection services at the time. Section 260.247.2. The 2007 amendment expanded the reach of the statute to "[a]ny city or political subdivision" intending to enter into waste collection. Section 260.247.2 (Supp.2007). The amendment became effective on 1 January 2008, before the County accepted any bid proposals.

Haulers filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County on 29 May 2008, asking the court to order the County to abide by section 260.247's notice requirement because the County was a "political subdivision" under the statute. The trial court denied Haulers' writ petition that same day. Haulers' petition contained an alternative count for declaratory judgment, and on 12 June 2008, the County filed a motion to dismiss proffering two grounds: 1) failure to state a claim, arguing that the County's status as a charter county meant Section 260.247 did not apply to the County, and 2) failure to join indispensable parties. Both parties filed memoranda of law,¹ and the trial court entered a judgment granting the County's motion to dismiss on 25 June 2008. In that judgment, the court analyzed whether Section 260.247 applied to the County's actions, determined it did not, and held that Haulers had failed to state a claim. Haulers appeal.

Jurisdiction

Writ of Mandamus

The parties dispute the threshold question of whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the denial of Haulers' petition for a writ of mandamus.

The general rule is that no appeal lies from the dismissal or the denial of a petition for writ of mandamus. See Harkins v. Mitchell, 911 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Mo. App. E.D.1995) (holding no appeal permitted from dismissal of writ petition); State ex rel. Ashby Road Partners, LLC v. State Tax Comm'n, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2008 WL 2491956 (Mo.App. W.D. June 24, 2008) (same regarding denial of petition for alternative writ), cause ordered transferred (30 Sept. 2008). The remedy in such a case is a direct petition for writ of mandamus in a higher court. Id. Conversely, if an alternative (or preliminary) writ issues and subsequently the court quashes it and denies the peremptory (or permanent) writ, we may review that decision. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stoecker v. Director of Revenue, 734 S.W.2d 263 (Mo.App. E.D. 1997).

Nevertheless, appellate courts have reviewed dismissals of alternative writ petitions when the trial court actually ruled on the merits—where, for example, the respondent answered the petition on the merits, and the trial court considered the merits in dismissing the petition, Jones v. Jackson County Circuit Court, 162 S.W.3d 53, 57-58 (Mo.App. W.D.2005); where the respondent answered and the trial court decided the legal question regarding the sufficiency of the allegations, State ex rel. Schaefer v. Cleveland, 847 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Mo.App. E.D.1992); and, in at least one instance, a court treated a dismissal as though a preliminary writ had been granted and quashed when the respondent answered on the merits and the trial court addressed a question of law, Wheat v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 932 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Mo.App. W.D.1996).

Haulers contend their case is the exception because the trial court's 25 June judgment answered a question of law. Haulers' focus on the court's legal analysis in its 25 June judgment, however, ignores that the court denied the preliminary writ much earlier on 29 May, without answer from the County and in an order containing no merits ruling.² The law is clear that we cannot review the trial court's denial of Haulers' petition for a preliminary writ of mandamus absent such exceptional circumstances.³

Declaratory Judgment

That leaves the trial court's dismissal of Haulers' request for declaratory judgment. Before we proceed, we must examine our jurisdiction over this count as well. See Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Elyria Foundry Co., 955 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 1997) (a reviewing court has a duty to determine its jurisdiction sua sponte).

Where, as here, the trial court does not specify in its judgment whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice, we deem it without prejudice. Rule 67.03. Ordinarily, a dismissal without prejudice is not a final judgment and thus not appealable. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 955 S.W.2d at 3. Nevertheless, when the effect of the order is to dismiss the plaintiff's action and not merely the pleading—effectively constituting an adjudication on the merits— then the judgment entered is final and appealable. Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Mo. banc 1991).

Here, the trial court framed the issue as "whether, with the purpose to create a new trash collection system, St. Louis County through its charter may enact ordinances which take precedence over a state statute with the same purpose." The court then interpreted section 260.247 in conjunction with article VI, section 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution, and concluded that the former did not apply to St. Louis County. This amounted to an adjudication on the merits, and thus the court's dismissal, albeit without prejudice, is appealable.

Standard of Review

The standard of review for a judgment of dismissal is de novo. Dodson v. City of Wentzville, 133 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Mo.App. E.D.2004). To sufficiently state a claim for declaratory judgment, the petition need only allege facts that invoke substantive legal principles which entitle the petitioner to relief. City of Creve Coeur v. Creve Coeur Fire Pro. Dist., 355 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Mo.1962). "[T]he question ... is not whether the petition shows that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaratory relief he seeks in accordance with the theory he states, but rather it is whether under the averments of the petition he is entitled to a declaration of rights at all." Washington University v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 801 S.W.2d 458, 463 (Mo.App. E.D.1990).

Discussion

Procedure

We first take up the ground relied upon by the trial court: failure to state a claim. The trial court's sole question to consider was whether the petition alleges facts which entitle Haulers to a declaration of their rights. Haulers need not prove they will prevail under their interpretation of the statutory scheme, or even that their interpretation is correct; they simply must show they are entitled to an interpretation at all. Haulers made this showing, which is not only clear from their petition, but also implicit in the trial court's judgment in that the court went on to expound an interpretation of section 260.247.

Therein lies the trial court's error: "[I]t is not the function of the trial court on a motion to dismiss or of this court on appeal from a judgment of dismissal to make an analysis of the law under which the rights are claimed or to construe the statutes in question or to determine on the merits whether plaintiff is entitled to the declaratory relief he seeks in accordance with the theory...