State ex rel. American United Life Ins. Co. v. Howell

• Decision Date: 04 May 1943
• Citation: State ex rel. American United Life Ins. Co. v. Howell, 152 Fla. 866, 13 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1943)
• Parties: STATE ex rel. AMERICAN UNITED LIFE INS. CO. v. HOWELL et al., County Com'rs, et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

13 So.2d 214

152 Fla. 866

STATE ex rel. AMERICAN UNITED LIFE INS. CO. v. HOWELL et al., County Com'rs, et al.

Florida Supreme Court

May 4, 1943

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sarasota County; W. T Harrison, judge.

D. C. Hull and Hull, Landis, Graham & French, all of De Land, for appellant.

Winder H Surrency, of Sarasota, for appellees.

ADAMS, Justice.

Appellant proceeded by mandamus to coerce the County Cimmissioners of Sarasota County to levy ad valorem tax to pay interest and principal on certain road bonds. To the Commissioners' return relator demurred. The demurrer was overruled and from final judgment entered on the latter order, this appeal was taken.

The decision here turns upon whether the return was sufficient, the substance of which is: That in March, 1942, the statutory Board of Administration passed a resolution declaring that in the event proposed Section 16 to Article IX of the Constitution see Acts 1941, p. 2816, was adopted at the general election of 1942, it would be unnecessary for an ad valorem levy to be made to the Governor, as president of such Board, also recommended that no levy be made because the State Board had resolved to exercise its authority under Chapter 20946, Acts 1941, by using sinking funds of other counties to purchase bonds maturing if and when county funds were insufficient. The return showed available funds to the credit of other counties which might be so utilized. The return alleged that none of the principal or interest of the bonds was in default. It appeared that both the County Board and the Board of Administration were cognizant of their bond requirements that substantial funds were on hand and other funds would be coming in from excise tax which could be used for bond purposes.

The demurrer admitted the facts well plead in the return. It, therefore appears that there were substantial facts upon which the trial judge could have exercised his discretion in denying the relief. The relator complains that the alleged defense does not constitute an allocation of funds which could be reached by judicial process to satify his bonds, and also should the maturing bonds be purchased they would still be outstanding and unpaid.

It is quite true that the action of the statutory Board of Administration, as it then existed and as it now exists (the proposed Section 16, Article IX, having been adopted), did not amount to an allocation of funds to the extent that they might be reached by judicial process. We are dealing, however, with a Board of the highest dignity in the State whose only object and purpose is to serve both the bondholder and the taxpayer. To better serve both in the long run, it must endeavor to meet...