State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs
| Decision Date | 16 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2019-P-0015,2019-P-0015 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio EX REL. Brian M. AMES, Relator-Appellant, v. PORTAGE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Brian M. Ames, pro se, 2632 Ranfield Road, Mogadore, OH 44260 (Relator-Appellant).
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Timothy J. Piero, Assistant Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Respondent-Appellee).
{¶1} Appellant, Brian Ames ("Mr. Ames"), appeals the judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, the Portage County Board of Commissioners (the "Board"), and denying him summary judgment in his civil action against the Board alleging multiple violations of Ohio's Open Meetings Act (the "OMA"). Mr. Ames also assigns as error the trial court's granting of the Board's motion for a protective order regarding his discovery requests.
{¶2} After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find: (1) the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Board on Count LXXV of Mr. Ames' complaint because it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2) the trial court incorrectly interpreted R.C. 121.22(G)(1) and thus erred in granting summary judgment to the Board on the remaining counts of Mr. Ames' complaint; (3) the trial court properly denied Mr. Ames' motion summary judgment because he failed to meet his burden under Civ.R. 56(C) to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, i.e., whether the Board reasonably intended to discuss all of the permissible purposes listed in the meeting minutes; and (4) Mr. Ames did not affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Board's motion for a protective order.
{¶3} More specifically, the trial court erred in holding that the Board necessarily stated an acceptable purpose under R.C. 121.22(G)(1) by reading the entire list of permissible purposes verbatim. The statute mandates that the Board specifically state in its motions and votes the particular permitted purpose or purposes that the Board reasonably intends to discuss during executive session.
{¶4} We understand that given the litigation history between Mr. Ames and the Board, the Board, in good faith, sought to insulate itself from more litigation by erring on the side of inclusiveness, but for future meetings the Board must be more precise.
{¶5} For example, if the purpose is to discuss a complaint about a public employee, the Board should state that it is going into executive session to consider investigation of charges or complaints against a public employee and to consider dismissal, discipline, or demotion of that public employee, who has not requested a public hearing.
{¶6} Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{¶7} On May 1, 2017, Mr. Ames, pro se, filed a verified complaint in the Portage County Court of Common Pleas (Case No. 2017 CV 00415) alleging the Board violated the OMA on multiple occasions.1
{¶8} Specifically, Mr. Ames alleged that on 75 separate occasions from July 19, 2016 through April 4, 2017 (Counts I through LXXIV) and on November 4, 2015 (Count LXXV), prior to entering executive sessions to consider personnel matters, the Board read from R.C. 121.22(G)(1) and stated all permissible purposes set forth in the statute without specifying which of those permissible purposes would be discussed. Mr. Ames further alleged that the Board's practice constituted a "threat" to violate the OMA (Count LXXVI).
{¶9} Mr. Ames sought: (1) a declaratory judgment that the Board violated the OMA, (2) an order to "permanently enjoin" the Board "to comply" with the OMA, (3) a $500 civil forfeiture for each violation, (4) an order that the Board annotate the meeting minutes to reflect the approved purposes for each executive session, and (5) court costs and reasonable attorney fees.
{¶10} The Board filed an answer generally denying Mr. Ames' allegations and raised the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel, among others.
{¶11} Mr. Ames served discovery requests on the Board consisting of requests for admission, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents. In response, the Board filed a motion for a protective order and objection to discovery. Mr. Ames filed a brief in opposition to the Board's motion and a motion for sanctions against the Board's counsel for alleged frivolous conduct, which the Board opposed.
{¶12} Following a hearing regarding, among other things, the availability of videos of Board meetings, the trial court issued a judgment entry indicating that the Board would confirm its contention that it did not retain copies of such videos.
{¶13} Following an additional hearing, the trial court issued a journal entry directing the Board to make available to Mr. Ames a flash drive containing videos of the Board's meetings for fiscal year 2016.
{¶14} The trial court also issued a judgment entry granting the Board's motion for a protective order, staying Mr. Ames' motion for sanctions, and granting the parties leave to file dispositive motions and responses.
{¶15} Following an additional hearing, the trial court issued a judgment entry purporting to reflect the parties' agreement that the Board would file the minutes for the meetings referenced in Mr. Ames' complaint.
{¶16} The Board subsequently filed a notice of submission of evidence that contained an affidavit from the Board's clerk certifying and attaching the Board's minutes for meetings held on July 19, 2016 through April 4, 2017. These meetings relate to Counts I through LXXIV of Mr. Ames' complaint. It appears the Board did not file the minutes for the meeting held on November 4, 2015, which relates to Count LXXV.
{¶17} The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
{¶18} Mr. Ames argued that the Board's practice of "merely reiterat[ing] the laundry list of possible matters from R.C. 121.22(G)(1) without specifying which of those purposes [will] be discussed in executive session" did not comply with R.C. 121.22(G)(1) based on the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in State ex rel. Long v. Cardington Village Council , 92 Ohio St.3d 54, 748 N.E.2d 58 (2001). Mr. Ames argued he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on "each violation" set forth in his complaint.
{¶19} The Board admitted in its briefing it held numerous public meetings as indicated in Mr. Ames' complaint, it entered into executive session during those meetings pursuant to R.C. 121.22(G)(1), and the minutes reflect it "read the exact verbatim language in R.C. 121.22(G)(1)." The Board argued this practice complied with the OMA.
{¶20} The Board also argued that Mr. Ames' claim for relief involving its meeting on November 4, 2015 (Count LXXV) was barred by the doctrine of res judicata as a result of this court's decision in State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 11th Dist. Portage No. 2016-P-0057, 2017-Ohio-4237, 2017 WL 2560970 (" Ames I ").
{¶21} The trial court issued a judgment entry granting the Board's motion for summary judgment and denying Mr. Ames' motion for summary judgment. The trial court stated as follows:
{¶22} " R.C. 121.22(G)(1) is one of eight such matters for which a public body may enter executive session. There are no sub-sections or sub-parts to R.C. 121.22(G)(1). R.C. 121.22(G) is one paragraph that constitutes one of eight appropriate grounds for entering executive session under R.C. 121.22. [The Board] has used R.C. 121.22(G)(1) including its stated purposes.
{¶23}
{¶24} The trial court concluded the Board committed no violations of the OMA and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
{¶25} Mr. Ames now appeals and presents the following assignments of error for our review:
{¶26} "[1.] The Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Board and in denying summary judgment to Ames on cases 2016CV00582 and 2017CV00415 by disregarding the opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio and substituting its own reading of R.C. 121.22(G)(1).
{¶27}
{¶28} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Ames argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the Board.
{¶29} We review de novo a trial court's order granting summary judgment. (Citation omitted.)
Sabo v. Zimmerman , 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2012-A-0005, 2012-Ohio-4763, 2012 WL 4862366, ¶9. "A reviewing court will apply the same standard a trial court is required to apply, which is to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Citations omitted.) Id.
{¶30} ...
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