State ex rel. Area 25 Trial Office v. Clayton
| Decision Date | 03 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 37064,SD 37064 |
| Citation | 628 S.W.3d 263 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE EX REL. AREA 25 TRIAL OFFICE, and, Missouri State Public Defender, Relators-Appellants, v. Honorable Kenneth G. CLAYTON, Associate Circuit Judge, Respondent-Respondent. |
J. GREGORY MERMELSTEIN, Columbia, Mo, for Relators.
KEVIN S. HILLMAN, Waynesville, Mo, for Respondent.
The Missouri State Public Defender and its Area 25 Trial Office ("Relators") seek a permanent writ of prohibition against the Honorable Kenneth G. Clayton, Associate Circuit Judge of the 25th Judicial Circuit ("Respondent") to prevent Respondent from enforcing an order ("the sanctions order") that directed the Area 25 Trial Office to pay $762.68 as sanctions after an attorney assigned to that office traveled internationally to Mexico the week before he was scheduled to try a jury case before Respondent. Respondent, sua sponte , continued the trial on the ground that he would not expose court personnel and a jury panel to a potential COVID-19 risk. The sanction amount was equal to the prosecutor's mileage reimbursement paid to the complaining witness in the case.
Because Respondent did not find that Relators had acted in bad faith in, respectively, approving and then engaging in that international travel, and no evidence in the record indicates that Relators acted in bad faith, we now make permanent our preliminary writ of prohibition.
Andrew Russek ("Mr. Russek"), an Assistant Public Defender in the Area 25 Trial Office, was assigned to represent Charles Allee in his criminal case. Mr. Russek filed a motion asserting his client's right to a speedy trial, and the trial was scheduled for January 21, 2021.
In December 2020, with the approval of his supervisor, District Defender Matthew Crowell ("Mr. Crowell"), Mr. Russek planned to vacation in Mexico from January 10, 2021, to January 18, 2021. The prosecutor for the State, Kevin Hillman ("Mr. Hillman"), was aware that Mr. Russek was going to Mexico and would be returning shortly before trial. The parties had scheduled depositions for Tuesday, January 19, 2021, two days before the trial was scheduled to begin.
When a legal dispute arose with respect to those depositions, Mr. Hillman contacted Respondent on Friday, January 15th, and asked him if he would have time to conduct a Webex hearing on the parties’ dispute. Mr. Hillman noted that Mr. Russek was in Mexico on vacation but would return soon. Respondent replied by email to Mr. Hillman and Mr. Russek on Monday, January 18th, writing:
Mr. Hillman responded that day by informing Respondent and Mr. Russek that his complaining witness, the victim in the case, had already traveled to Missouri from Maryland for the trial.
The court held a Webex hearing on the Covid issue on Tuesday, January 19th. During the hearing, Mr. Russek informed Respondent that he had returned from Mexico the previous day. Mr. Russek said that he had not been tested for COVID, and he had not quarantined. He said his understanding was that the CDC guidelines requiring those who had traveled to Mexico to quarantine for at least 7 days upon return did not go into effect until January 25th, a date after the trial would be over.
Even though Mr. Hillman and Mr. Russek announced that they were ready to try the case as scheduled, Respondent cancelled the trial setting, stating that he was "not gonna have a trial under these circumstances." He suggested to Mr. Hillman that he could request other relief, and the parties could have a separate hearing on that request.
Mr. Hillman then filed a motion seeking sanctions ("Motion for Sanctions") that alleged the State was fully prepared to go to trial, and that Mr. Russek had "[a] week before trial, ... announced that he was travel[ ]ing to Cancun, Mexico for a vacation from January 15-19, 2021." The Motion for Sanctions claimed that Administrative Order 2020-01 of the 25th Judicial Circuit had been in place since March 2020, and it prohibited anyone who had traveled to a foreign country within the last 14 days from entering into a courthouse in that circuit. It also claimed that CDC guidelines recommended that anyone traveling internationally by air get tested for COVID-19 and quarantine for at least 7 days upon their return. The Motion for Sanctions stated that the complaining witness had traveled by car, 982 miles one way, in order to be present for trial. The Motion requested that "[t]he Office of the Public Defender" be ordered to pay the victim's mileage at the rate of $0.37 per mile, which totaled $726.68.
Respondent granted the Motion for Sanctions and ordered that the amount requested be "deposited with the Pulaski County Circuit Clerk by the Missouri State Public Defender, Area 25 Trial Office within 30 days of this Order."
We review a trial court's decision to invoke its inherent powers to sanction for an abuse of discretion. Rea v. Moore, 74 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002). The trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling "is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." Id. "[I]f reasonable persons can differ about the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that [it] abused its discretion." Anglim v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 832 S.W.2d 298, 303 (Mo. banc 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. See id.
Hale v. Cottrell, Inc. , 456 S.W.3d 481, 488 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014).
While we are skeptical that a particular branch office of the Missouri Public Defender is an appropriate entity to sanction, we need not decide that question. Relators’ first point claims that Respondent abused his discretion in imposing sanctions as "there was no finding or evidence in the record of ‘bad faith’ by [Mr. Russek], [Mr. Crowell,] or the Area 25 Trial Office." That assertion has merit, and it is dispositive of Relators’ request for a permanent writ prohibiting Respondent's imposition of sanctions.
A trial court may use its inherent powers to impose sanctions only when parties act in bad faith. Davis v. Wieland , 557 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018).1
While trial courts have inherent powers to sanction parties who act in bad faith, courts are encouraged to do so "sparingly, wisely, temperately, and with judicial self-restraint." A.J.H. ex rel. M.J.H. v. M.A.H.S. , 364 S.W.3d 680, 682 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012). A court should rarely invoke this inherent power because "[i]t is only one short step from the assertion of inherent power to the assumption of absolute power." Id. (quoting McPherson v. U.S. Physicians Mutual Risk Retention Group , 99 S.W.3d 462, 477 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) ).
Woodson v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 602 S.W.3d 316, 326 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020).
"Bad faith" does not have a concrete definition, but it requires something more than bad judgment or negligence; bad faith Davis , 557 S.W.3d at 350 (quoting A.J.H. , 364 S.W.3d at 683 ).
Relators argue that, while the sanctions order calls Mr. Russek's conduct "irresponsible[,]" it makes no finding of bad faith, and there is no evidence in the record to support a finding of a dishonest purpose, conscious wrongdoing, fraud, or actual intent to mislead or deceive. Respondent now argues that Relators’ conduct evidenced bad faith in that it exhibited "disregard for the safety of the jurors, court staff, and opposing counsel during a global pandemic [which] is the breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will[.]" Respondent does not identify the alleged ulterior motive or ill will harbored by Relators.
The sanctions order, in its entirety, reads as follows:
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