State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Crandall
| Decision Date | 09 February 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 62509,62509 |
| Citation | 627 S.W.2d 284 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri ex rel. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, et al., Relators, v. Honorable William H. CRANDALL, Jr., Judge, Circuit Court, St. Louis County, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Nancy Kelley Baker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for relators.
Robert S. Adler, Rothman & Sokol, Clayton, for respondent.
Russell Thurman was charged with a state misdemeanor by information filed by the prosecuting attorney in the Associate Circuit Court of St. Louis County.
In the absence of a demand for jury trial by either party, the usual procedure is that the cause would proceed to trial before the judge without a jury. The prosecutor, however, demanded a jury trial and the cause was therefore certified by the associate circuit judge for assignment to be tried on the record in the same manner as provided in civil cases in § 517.520, RSMo 1978. § 543.200, RSMo 1978. 1
Section 517.520 provides, among other things, that the subsequent trial shall be in accordance with procedures applicable to trial before circuit judges with no right to trial de novo. The second sentence in § 543.200 was adopted as part of H.B. 1634 in 1978 as implementing amendments to Article 5 (Judicial Article), Constitution of Missouri, adopted in 1976. 1978 Laws of Mo. 698.
The presiding judge assigned the case to the Honorable William H. Crandall, Jr., circuit judge. Thurman filed a motion waiving jury trial which, under Mo.Const. art. 1, § 22(a), 2 requires the assent of the court to be effective. The prosecutor, under § 543.200, filed a demand for jury trial. The circuit court assented to Thurman's jury trial waiver and placed the case on his nonjury docket.
It was the position of relator in the circuit court, and is in this Court, that § 543.200 gave the relator prosecuting attorney an absolute right to a jury trial and therefore respondent was without power to proceed without a jury.
It is the position of respondent that the right of a defendant in a criminal case to waive jury trial, provided the court assents thereto, under art. 1, § 22(a) is superior to the provisions of the statute-s 543.200-and the circuit court, having assented to the jury trial waiver filed by the defendant, has the power to proceed with this as a nonjury case. The respondent was faced with apparently conflicting provisions of law as between Art. 1, § 22(a) and § 543.200, and in this situation found § 543.200 to be unconstitutional.
The issue in this prohibition action is whether the circuit judge, respondent, did not have the power to assent to defendant's jury trial waiver under art. 1, § 22(a) when relator demanded a jury under § 543.200, and therefore must be prohibited from proceeding with the trial without a jury.
Mo.Const. art. 1, § 18(a) grants the accused in all criminal prosecutions, inter alia, the right to jury trial. Art. 1, § 22(a), provides in part, "in every criminal case any defendant may, with the assent of the court, waive a jury trial and submit the trial of such case to the court ...." As indicated above, § 543.200 grants a statutory right to the state in a misdemeanor case to demand a jury.
Does the statutory right to demand a jury under § 543.200 take precedence over the constitutional right of a defendant, which if the court assents, entitles a defendant to a nonjury trial?
To ask the question is to answer it. The constitutional rights prevail over the statutory rights. Here, the court assented to the defendant's request for jury waiver. That means the trial will be without a jury and the prosecuting attorney's statutory demands under § 543.200 must give way to the rights guaranteed by our constitution. There is no necessity for deciding whether § 543.200 is constitutional or not. It is sufficient to this case to recognize that, in this context, the constitutional rights prevail.
The preliminary writ of prohibition is quashed.
I would quash the writ for reasons quite different from those expressed by the majority, and would direct respondent, to reconsider his prior order denying the State's request for a jury. Because the majority's description of the procedural stance of the underlying case makes it difficult to identify the critical issue, it is necessary to discuss the facts in some detail and review the chronology of events in the trial court.
By this original action relators seek to prohibit respondent, The Honorable William H. Crandall, from proceeding to trial on a misdemeanor in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County until he had considered the merits of the State's motion requesting a jury. The State filed its motion requesting a jury as permitted under § 543.200, RSMo 1978. 1 Refusing to consider that request, respondent declared it a nullity, and in so doing, refused to exercise any discretion on the fallacious assumption of the unconstitutionality of § 543.200. By its order summarily refusing to consider or rule the State's motion the trial court held:
It is the judgment of this Court that insofar as 543.200 R.S.Mo. (1978) gives a right to a jury trial to any party other than defendant is unconstitutional as being in conflict with Article I § 22a (of the Missouri Constitution),
concluding that the State's "request (for a jury) was a nullity." 2 To relators' petition for prohibition, we issued our preliminary writ preventing respondent from proceeding in the underlying action until due consideration could be given the merits of the State's motion requesting a jury.
Prohibition is appropriate when it appears a party's right to trial by jury has been denied, XLNT Corp. v. Municipal Court of Kansas City, 546 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Mo. banc 1976); Martin v. Municipal Court of Kansas City, 546 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Mo. banc 1976), and may lie in a criminal case to review interlocutory orders entered against the State which, because of its narrowly circumscribed right of appeal, has no adequate relief except by way of extraordinary legal remedy. State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Mo. banc 1980), vacated on other grounds, Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981).
The questioned statute, § 543.200, RSMo 1978, affords the prosecuting attorney (as well as the defendant and the prosecuting witness) in misdemeanor cases the right to request a jury. As noted above, respondent, denying the request, believed that this section conflicted with Art. I, § 22(a), Mo.Const., which grants defendants the opportunity to request a waiver of trial by jury, 3 and for that reason the State's request for jury was summarily denied.
In State v. McClinton, 418 S.W.2d 55, 60 (Mo. banc 1967), the Court, reviewing the historical background of the referenced constitutional provision, as well as the then current statutes (RSMo 1959) and court rules controlling an accused misdemeanant's right to demand or waive a jury, concluded:
"Therefore, since 1870 at least, the defendant in a misdemeanor case has had a statutory right to a trial by jury (§ 546.040) (now § 546.050, RSMo 1978) which could be waived (§ 546.050) (now § 546.040, RSMo 1978) and the case could be tried by the magistrate if a jury was not demanded (§ 543.200) (now § 543.200, RSMo 1978)."
This latter statute, which also established authority for the State to "demand a jury", first appeared in 1870 and similar statutes providing such authority have been repeatedly enacted by subsequent legislatures both before and following adoption of the 1945 Missouri Constitution. On the other hand, prior to the adoption of Art. I, § 22(a) in 1945, one charged with a felony could not waive a jury and stand trial, on his plea of not guilty, before the court. See, State v. Talken, 316 Mo. 596, 292 S.W. 32, 33 (1927). Thus, because a defendant in a misdemeanor case had, for many year prior to 1945, the right to request or waive a jury, it does not appear that Art. I, § 22(a), supra, substantially changed or conferred new rights on one charged with a misdemeanor. Instead that section for the first time in Missouri conferred on one charged with a felony the right to waive a jury trial.
In this challenge to the statute's validity several familiar principles of constitutional law must be considered. Our state constitution is generally regarded not as a grant, but rather a limitation of legislative power and, except as thereby restricted, the power of the legislature remains broad and complete. Kansas City v. Fishman, 241 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Mo.1951). Accordingly, acts of our General Assembly are presumed constitutional and will be declared void only when manifestly infringing a constitutional provision. State ex inf. Danforth ex rel. Farmers' Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. State Environmental Improvement Authority, 518 S.W.2d 68, 72 (Mo. banc 1975); State v. Hamey, 168 Mo. 167, 67 S.W. 620, 628 (1902). Further, a statute fairly susceptible of construction in harmony with our Constitution will be so construed and, unless clearly repugnant, upheld. State ex rel. Barrett v. May, 290 Mo. 302, 235 S.W. 124, 126 (banc 1921). 4 The majority overlooking time honored canons of construction makes no effort to harmonize the statute with the Constitution; and instead, construes the statute and the Constitution in a manner to assure their disharmony. Having so done, the majority announces that the constitutional provision prevails and effectively nullifies the statute. In sum, the majority invalidates the statute (§ 543.200), declaring, "the constitutional rights prevail over the statutory rights." The majority having thus effectively struck down the statute, then...
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