State ex rel. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Mortensen

• Decision Date: 06 April 1937
• Parties: STATE ex rel. ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY CORPORATION v. MORTENSEN.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

224 Wis. 398

272 N.W. 457

STATE ex rel. ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY CORPORATION

v.MORTENSEN.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

April 6, 1937.

Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County; Alvin C. Reis, Judge.

Mandamus by the State, on the relation of the Associated Indemnity Corporation, against H. J. Mortensen, commissioner of insurance of Wisconsin. From an order denying motion to quash and granting a peremptory writ, defendant appeals.-[By Editorial Staff.]

Order affirmed.

An alternative writ of mandamus having issued out of the circuit court for Dane county upon the petition of relator, Associated Indemnity Corporation, directed to H. J. Mortensen, commissioner of insurance for the State of Wisconsin, commanding the latter to issue a license to relator to transact insurance business within the State of Wisconsin or to show cause to the contrary, the respondent moved to quash the alternative writ for the reason that the petition did not state facts showing relator to be entitled to the writ. The trial court on October 20, 1936, denied the motion to quash and ordered that a peremptory writ of mandamus be issued commanding respondents to issue relator a license in accordance with its application. The material facts will be stated in the opinion.

FAIRCHILD and FRITZ, JJ., dissenting.

Orland S. Loomis, Atty. Gen., and Warren H. Resh, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

La Follette, Rogers & Roberts and W. Wade Boardman, all of Madison, for respondent.

WICKHEM, Justice.

This appeal presents a narrow and simple question of statutory construction. Petitioner is a stock insurance company organized under the laws of California, having a paid-in capital of $500,000, and a surplus of $1,176,000. Petitioner was authorized to do business in Wisconsin on August 1, 1931, and its license was renewed each year thereafter until May 1, 1935, when the company voluntarily withdrew from the State. On August 22, 1936, it again applied for a license to transact business of several types in this State. This application was denied by the insurance commissioner upon the ground that under the provisions of section 201.11 (1), Stats., as amended by chapter 120 and chapter 489, Laws of 1933, and chapter 478, Laws 1935, its capital was insufficient to entitle it to a license. Section 201.11 (1), St.1935, reads as follows:

“(1) No stock insurance company shall transact business unless it has capital, in cash or invested as provided by law, of at least two hundred thousand dollars for the insurance specified in any one subsection of section 201.04; with an additional one hundred thousand dollars for the insurance mentioned in any other subsection which may be transacted by such company, provided that no such company shall be subject to higher capital requirements than those in effect when it began to transact the business of insurance in this state. No additional capital shall be required for the insurance specified in subsection (17) of section 201.04.”

It is conceded that unless the proviso exempts petitioner, its capital is insufficient to meet the requirements of section 201.11 (1). The sole issue presented upon this appeal is whether petitioner lost the benefit of this exemption by withdrawing from the State in 1935. The trial court held that it did not, and we think that this conclusion was correct. The controversy turns upon the meaning of “no such company” and “began to transact the business of insurance in this state.”

[1] A number of rules of construction are proposed by the appellant and are sustained by the authorities. It is conceded that, where a statute is plain and unambiguous, no interpretation is necessary. McGarvey v. Independent O. & G. Co., 156 Wis. 580, 146 N.W. 895;State ex rel. U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Smith, 184 Wis. 309, 199 N.W. 954. It is contended, however, that there is room for judicial construction of the statute even though it is plain and unambiguous in its letter, where to give it a literal meaning would produce absurd results or involve the legislative purpose in obscurity. Pfingsten v. Pfingsten, 164 Wis. 308, 159 N.W. 921;Jordan Land Co. v. Freeborn, 149 Wis. 159, 135 N.W. 751;State ex rel. Husting v. Board of State Canvassers, 159 Wis. 216, 150 N.W. 542, Ann.Cas.1916D, 159.

[2][3][4] We deem it unnecessary to enter into an elaborate discussion of these rules of construction. The statute is literally unambiguous. There can be no possible question that the term “such company” refers merely to stock insurance companies, and there can be no question as to the literal meaning of the phrase “when it...