State ex rel. Associated Land & Inv. Corp. v. City of Lyndhurst

Decision Date26 November 1958
Docket NumberNo. 35492,35492
Citation154 N.E.2d 435,168 Ohio St. 289,7 O.O.2d 1
Parties, 7 O.O.2d 1 The STATE ex rel. ASSOCIATED LAND & INVESTMENT CORP., Appellee, v. CITY OF LYNDHURST et al., Appellants.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A determination by a legislative body of a municipal corporation that traffic conditions therein warrant the inclusion of provisions requiring off-street parking in a comprehensive zoning ordinance and the resultant passage of such ordinance constitute a proper exercise of municipal authority.

2. A provision in a comprehensive municipal zoning ordinance, which requires that buildings, other than dwellings, churches, theatres, assembly halls, retail stores and shops, thereafter erected or remodeled or altered shall have 'parking space reasonably adequate for commercial vehicles necessary to carry on the business of the occupants of the premises and for the normal volume of car parking by persons coming to the premises on matters incidental to the uses thereof,' does not contain sufficient criteria or standards to guide the administrative officer or tribunal in the exercise of the discretion vested in it and is unconstitutional and invalid. (Paragraph one of the syllabus in State ex rel. Selected Properties, Inc. v. Gottfried, 163 Ohio St. 469, 127 N.E.2d 371, approved and followed.)

This is an action in mandamus instituted originally in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. The parties herein will be referred to as they appeared in that court.

The relator, Associated Land & Investment Corporation, is an Ohio corporation. The respondent city of Lyndhurst is a municipal corporation located in Cuyahoga County, and respondent Walter L. Bookman is the building inspector of Lyndhurst.

The petition of the relator alleges that it is the owner of real estate located at 5470 Mayfield Road, Lyndhurst, having a frontage of 144.28 feet of Mayfield Road and 110 feet along Sunview Road, which premises are improved with a one-story building and basement, approximately 69 feet by 35 feet, of brick construction.

The relator alleges that it filed an application with the respondent building inspector for a permit to add a second story to the building, submitting plans and specifications with the application; that the entire building, including both stories and basement, is to be used for offices; and that said property is located in a 'local retail district' according to the zoning ordinance of the city.

The petition recites also that respondent building inspector denied the application on the ground that the proposed off-street parking facilities were not sufficient to comply with Section 1(a)-(f), Article IV of such ordinance; that thereafter relator appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals of the city, which body recommended approval of the application so long as the employees and employers working on the premises in question do not exceed a total of 35; and that approval of the proposal of the Board of Zoning Appeals was denied by the council of the city of Lyndhurst.

Relator alleges that the off-street parking facilities proposed in its application provide spaces for 23 cars, which area would be in full compliance with Section 1(a) 3, Article IV of the ordinance (which relates to surfaces, lighting and location of the areas); that the proposed addition and off-street parking facilities are in compliance with the zoning ordinance of the city of Lyndhurst, but, if it be determined that such off street parking facilities are not in compliance with the ordinance, 'the provisions of said zoning ordinance, and particularly Article IV, Section 1(a)-(f) are vague, uncertain, discriminating and unreasonable; and that the standards and classifications with regard to off-street parking are arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory' and, as applied to the relator, deprive it of its property without due process of law.

The petition contains as an exhibit the full test of Section 1, Article IV of the zoning ordinance of the city of Lyndhurst.

A joint second amended answer was filed by respondents, the city of Lyndhurst and its building inspector, which admits that Article IV of the zoning ordinance is correctly set forth in the petition and pleads the applicable 'administrative' provisions of the ordinance.

The answer says further that as proposed by the relator the office building would, when completed, consist of three full floors of office space; that the total inside floor area would be approximately 7,200 square feet, or 5,300 square feet exclusive of halls, stairs, utilities, lavatories and the like; that ordinances of the city prohibit all parking on Mayfield Road and on Sunview Road in the vicinity of the easterly side of such premises; that public transportation facilities to the location of the building are limited; that employees, as a general rule, come to their place of employment in automobiles; and that if the second floor is constructed, thereby making it possible to have three full floors of office space, such use would violate the zoning ordinance in the following respects:

'a. Said ordinance requires 'at least one automobile per five persons engaged on the premises as employees and owners.' Allocating 60 square feet of usable floor area, exclusive of halls, stairs, lavatories, utilities and the like, for each person, which is reasonable for office buildings, said proposed building would accommodate in 5,300 square feet of usable floor area at least 88 employees. This would require 18 car parking spaces for employees.

'b. Said ordinance provides that in addition to the parking space for employees or owners engaged on the premises, additional car 'parking space reasonably adequate for the commercial vehicles necessary to carry on the business of the occupants of the building,' shall be provided. The normal delivery vehicles and other vehicles necessary to service the building must be provided for, and for this purpose, two car parking spaces are required.

'c. Said zoning ordinance also provides that off-street parking shall be provided in addition 'for the normal volume of car parking by persons coming to the premises on matters incidental to the uses thereof.' For such purpose, a minimum of 10 car parking spaces should be provided, based upon actual determination of cars used by persons presently coming to the premises on matters incidental to the uses thereof.'

Respondents say further that the requirements of the zoning ordinance as set forth are a minimum of 30 automobiles, whereas the relator has provided parking for not more than 21 automobiles.

Respondents then deny all allegations in relator's petition, except where admitted, and pray the court for an order dismissing relator's petition.

Relator filed a demurrer to the amended answer, for the reason that 'on its face it is insufficient in law because the zoning ordinance of respondent city is unconstitutional and void with regard to Article IV, Sec. 1(e).'

The court found 'that the demurrer of the relator is well taken and that the second amended answer of the respondent, filed by agreement of the parties, does not state a sufficient defense to the petition.' The court granted the writ of mandamus, and, the respondents electing not to plead further, a final writ of mandamus was granted and judgment entered.

A third amended answer was filed by the respondents under the provisions of Section 2309.58, Revised Code, which added to the record of the cause the full text of the zoning ordinance.

The cause is before this court on appeal as a matter of right.

Arthur T. Wincek, Cleveland, for appellants.

Rager & Forrester and Ralph D. Kovanda, Cleveland, for appellee.

HERBERT, Judge.

Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to dismiss relator's petition for the reasons that (a) it fails to state a cause of action and (b) it does not set forth a clear right to the remedy of mandamus. Following their own argument, reason (a) must fail since all the pertinent facts are supplied by the two pleadings, and the only disputed fact is as to whether the relator's proposal provided for 23 parking spaces as alleged in the petition or 21 as alleged in the answer. This variation is not controlling, as will appear hereinafter. Coming to reason (b), the very provisions of Article V of the Lyndhurst zoning ordinance, as quoted in respondents' brief, establish that relator has no other available remedy.

The zoning ordinance confers upon the building inspector the duty of administering and enforcing its provisions and provides for an appeal from his decision to the Board of Zoning Appeals. The pleadings establish that such procedure was followed in this case.

Section 5(d) 2 of Article V, dealing with variances and which is cited and quoted in part in respondents' brief, gives the board power to modify in certain applications. The last sentence of that paragraph reads:

'Such variance or modification shall be confirmed by resolution of the council of the village before becoming effective.'

The applicability of this provision to the instant facts is doubtful but, for the purpose of this opinion, it is assumed.

It may be noted further that Section 5(d) 6 of Article V, which establishes the procedure before the Board of Zoning Appeals, contains a subparagraph which concludes: 'such decisions shall be confirmed by the council of the village before becoming effective.'

It would appear, therefore, that the intent of the city council is to require approval by that body of decisions of the Board of Zoning Appeals before such decisions...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Stroud v. City of Aspen
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Colorado
    • March 3, 1975
    ...of Bon Secours Hospital v. City of Grosse Pointe, 8 Mich.App. 342, 154 N.W.2d 644 (1967); State ex rel. Associated Land and Investment Corp. v. Lyndhurst, 168 Ohio St. 289, 154 N.E.2d 435 (1958). Other courts, even though not clearly presented with a challenge to the validity of off-street ......
  • Brown v. City of Cleveland
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • April 29, 1981
    ......, it would almost seem unnecessary to state that zoning ordinances which are enacted pursuant ... Ohio St.2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rocky River (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 23, 309 ...         See, also, State ex rel. Keener v. Serr (1976), 53 Ohio App.2d 143, 372 ... Page 97 . rel. Assoc. Land & Investment Corp. v. Lyndhurst (1958), 168 Ohio ......
  • Columbia Oldsmobile, Inc. v. City of Montgomery
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • December 12, 1990
    ...... of Montgomery annexed an 11.5-acre parcel of land that borders Perin Road to the north, the village ..., 408, 423 N.E.2d 123, 125; see, generally, State ex rel. Associated . Page 67. Land & Investment Corp. v. Lyndhurst (1958), 168 Ohio St. 289, 7 O.O.2d ......
  • State ex rel. River Grove Park, Inc. v. City of Kettering
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • April 2, 1962
    ...Hauser, Commr. of Buildings v. State, ex rel. Erdman, 113 Ohio St., 662, 150 N.E., 42; State, ex rel. Associated Land & Investment Corp., v. City of Lyndhurst, 168 Ohio St., 289, 154 N.E.2d 435; State, ex rel. Ice & Fuel Co., v. Kreuzweiser, Inspr. of Buildings, 120 Ohio St., 352, 166 N.E.,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT