State ex rel. Baker v. Grange

• Decision Date: 15 February 1929
• Docket Number: No. 25335.,25335.
• Citation: 200 Ind. 506,165 N.E. 239
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BAKER v. GRANGE et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

200 Ind. 506

165 N.E. 239

STATE ex rel. BAKER

v.GRANGE et al.

No. 25335.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 15, 1929.

Appeal from Vanderburgh Circuit Court.

Action by the State, on the relation of Joseph H. Baker, against Frank C. Grange and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed, with directions.

Benj. F. Zieg, E. H. Ireland, and Wm. McClain, all of Evansville, for appellant.

Daniel H. Ortmeyer, of Evansville, for appellees.

MARTIN, C. J.

Appellant brought this suit to compel the county board of canvassers at the general election held in Vanderburgh county in 1926 to certify (under section 4, c. 113, p. 191, Acts 1905; section 7558, Burns' 1926) to the clerk of the Vanderburgh circuit court that Joseph H. Baker was duly and legally elected as justice of the peace of Pigeon township, a township having more than 10 voting precincts (see sections 5-11, c. 113, Acts 1905; sections 7559-7565, Burns' 1926). It was alleged that Baker's name and the name of Abram P. Ancker were the only names that appeared on the ballot and were voted for as candidates for the office of justice of the peace of Pigeon township, which is located in whole or in part in the city of Evansville, Ind.; that the certificate of the board showed that Baker received 7,143 votes and Ancker received 9,587 votes; that the board certified Ancker's name as duly elected, but refused to certify Baker's name; that by an order of the board of county commissioners, made in 1906 and still in force, the number of justices of the peace in Pigeon township was fixed at two.

Appellees demurred to the complaint, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, contending (1) that the complaint failed to show any duty, the performance of which the law specifically required of them; and (2) that the complaint disclosed that Pigeon township is located wholly within the corporate limits of a city of the state of Indiana wherein a municipal court existed, and that the number of justices of the peace in such a township was limited to one.

Section 1, c. 117, Acts 1925 (section 1858, Burns' 1926), which was Senate Bill No. 188 in the General Assembly of 1925, provides: “That in all townships of the state, located in whole or in part within the corporate limits of any city of said state wherein municipal courts exist, or may hereafter exist under the provisions of any law, now in force, or which may be hereafter passed, the number of justices of the peace shall be limited to one in each of such townships. ***”

[1] The city court of the city of Evansville is a municipal court in the ordinary sense in which the word “municipal” is used (see Miller v. People [1907] 230 Ill. 65, 82 N. E. 521), and if the act just quoted from were to be considered alone and apart from other concurrent legislation we would hold it to be applicable and conclusive against appellant's contention in the instant case. But the 1925 Legislature enacted two other laws, which concern courts which are denominated “municipal courts,” and the word municipal in the first of these is used to describe, not a city court, but a specifically designated county court. This law, enacted as Senate Bill No. 179, created a court of inferior jurisdiction, to be called the “municipal court of - county,” consisting of four judges, in any of the counties of the state wherein is situated an incorporated city containing a population of not less than 300,000 inhabitants according to the last preceding census of the United States, and abolishing city courts located in cities in such counties. Sections 1-29, c. 194, Acts 1925; sections 1724-1752, Burns' 1926. (Marion county is the only county in the state which comes within this classification at the present time, and the only court now existing under this act is the municipal court of Marion county.) The other law, enacted as Senate Bill 189, gives parties to a civil action and defendants in a criminal prosecution before a justice of the peace in counties where municipal courts exist the right to a change of venue to such municipal courts. Sections 1, 2, c. 110, Acts 1925; sections 1907, 1908, Burns' 1926.

[2] A legislative construction in one act of the meaning of certain words (although not conclusive, for the words may have been used in different senses) is entitled to consideration in construing the same words, in another act. 36 Cyc. 1143.

[3] Statutes which relate to the same thing, or to the same subject, person, or object, are in pari materia, and it is presumed that such acts are imbued with the same spirit and actuated by the same policy. 36 Cyc. 1151. And they should be construed together as if parts of the same act, 36 Cyc. 1157, to determine their effect. State v. Rackley (1829) 2 Blackf. 249;State v. Gerhardt (1896) 145 Ind. 439, 44 N. E. 469, 33 L. R. A. 313; 25 R. C. L. 1060. This rule applies with peculiar force to statutes passed at the same session of the Legislature; statutes contemporaneous, or nearly contemporaneous. Bishop v. Boyle (1857) 9 Ind. 169, 68 Am. Dec. 615, and note; Swinney v. Ft. Wayne, etc., R. Co. (1877) 59 Ind. 205;State ex rel. v. Flynn (1903) 161 Ind. 554, 582, 69 N. E. 159;City of New Albany v. Lemon (1926) 198 Ind. 127, 149 N. E. 350, 152 N. E. 723; 25 R. C. L. 1062; 36 Cyc. 1151.

[4][5][6] A legislative body has the power, within reasonable limitations, to prescribe legal definitions of its own language. State v. Schlenker (1900) 112 Iowa, 642, 84 N. W. 698, 51 L. R. A. 347, 84 Am. St. Rep. 360. And it may include within the concept and definition of a term ideas which may not unreasonably be included therein, though perhaps not strictly within its ordinary definition. In re Arrigo (1915) 98 Neb. 134, 152 N. W. 319, L. R. A. 1917A, 1116;State v. American Surety Co. (1911) 90 Neb. 154, 133 N. W. 365, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 973;Id., 91 Neb. 22, 135 N. W. 365, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 973; 25 R. C. L. 1049. The cardinal principle in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. Brown-Ketcham Iron Works v. Swift Co. (1913) 53 Ind. App. 630, 100 N. E. 584, 860. And where, in an act it is declared that a term shall receive a certain instruction, the courts are bound by that construction, though otherwise the language would be held to mean a different thing. Smith v. State (1867) 28 Ind. 321, 325;State ex rel. v. Harrison (1888) 116 Ind. 300, 307, 19 N. E. 146;Arnett v. State (1997) 168 Ind. 180, 80 N. E. 153, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1192; 25 R. C. L. 1049.

Considering together the three acts above cited, which were all passed at the same session of the Legislature, we conclude that the term “municipal court,” in Senate Bills 188 and 189, was used in the same sense that it was used in Senate Bill 179, viz. the name of a certain county court of inferior jurisdiction in counties which contain a city of not less than 300,000 inhabitants.

The word “municipal” pertains to local self-government, similar to that of the Roman “municipium.” The use of the term “municipal law” has sometimes been extended, so as to apply, not only to the law of a city, but to the law of a state, and has thus been used in contradistinction to international law; but the word “municipal” is usually used to denote a corporate administrative unit, such as a town, borough, or city, as distinguished from quasi corporations, such as county, township, and school district. The use of the word “municipal” by the Legislature, in naming the inferior county court created by the act of 1925 was technically...