State ex rel. Baldwin v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 16 September 1941
• Citation: 148 Fla. 155,3 So.2d 802
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BALDWIN et al. v. COLEMAN, Sheriff.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

3 So.2d 802

148 Fla. 155

STATE ex rel. BALDWIN et al. v. COLEMAN, Sheriff.

Florida Supreme Court

September 16, 1941

Wm. J. Pruitt, of Miami, for relators.

J. Tom Watson, Atty. Gen., Sidney L. Segall, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Woodrow M. Melvin, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BUFORD, Justice.

This is an original proceeding in habeas corpus.

Relators being charged with a violation of Chapter 21076, Acts of 1941 procured writ of habeas corpus to test the constitutionality of the Act.

The title of the Act is:

'An Act Regulating the Sale of Alcoholic Beverages in Counties having a population of over 265,000 According to the Last State or Federal Census; Defining Certain Terms as Set Forth Herein Fixing Certain Hours When Alcoholic Beverages may Not Be Sold; Providing Exceptions for Hotels, Package Stores Restaurants and Night Clubs; Providing for a Penalty for the Violation Hereof; and Repealing all Laws in Conflict Herewith.'

The first contention is that the Act is a local and special law applying to Dade County only and that the limitation of the operation of the Act to counties having a population of over 265,000 according to the last State or Federal census is a classification without reason and, therefore, could not be construed as a general law.

It is admitted that Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution, as amended at the General Election of 1938, was not complied with in the passage of the Act by the Legislature.

The procedure adopted by the Legislature in the passage of this Act appears to be identical with the procedure followed in the adoption of House Bill No. 200XX, Acts of the Legislature of 1931 which was under consideration by us in the case of Anderson, Jr., v. Board of Public Instruction of Hillsborough County, 102 Fla. 695, 136 So. 334, 337. In that case we said:

'But even though a bill is introduced and treated by the Legislature as a general law, if the bill in truth and in fact is clearly operative as a local or special act and the court can so determine from its obvious purpose or legal effect as gathered from its language or its context, this court will so regard it and deal with it as a local or special act in passing on its validity, regardless of the guise in which it may have been framed and regardless of whether the particular county or locality intended to be affected by it is in terms named or identified in the act or not. See Jordan v. State ex rel. Davis 129 So. 747; Stripling v. Thomas 132 So. 824; Whitney v. Hillsborough County, 99 Fla. 628, 127 So. 486.'

Aside from the fact that the legislative record shows strong evidence that the Act was considered by the Legislature as a local and special law, the contents of the Act leads to a like conclusion.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the Legislature may classify counties for governmental purposes according to population for the purpose of enacting general laws and where a proper reasonable classification is made according to population, or otherwise, such Act may be regarded as a general law and not as a special or local law, although the result is an Act the operation of which is confined to a single county falling within the population classification. State v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804; State v. Smith, 88 Fla. 151, 101 So. 350; Anderson, Jr. v. Board of Public Instruction of Hillsborough County, supra. But, it is also settled that the classification adopted must be reasonable and not arbitrary. See authorities above cited. Classification must always rest upon a difference which bears some reasonable and just relation to the Act in respect of which the classification is proposed. See Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 22 S.Ct. 431, 46 L.Ed. 679; State v. Atlantic C. L. Ry. Co., 60 Fla. 465, 54 So. 394; Anderson, Jr., v. Board of Public Instruction of Hillsborough County, supra.

In Hiers v. Mitchell, 95 Fla. 345, 116 So. 81, 86, we said:

'When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.'

Section 2 of the Act provides:

'Section 2. In every county of the State of Florida...