State ex rel. Bales v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 20 November 1908
• Citation: 106 Minn. 138,118 N.W. 676
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BALES v. BAILEY, Sheriff.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

106 Minn. 138

118 N.W. 676

STATE ex rel. BALES

v.BAILEY, Sheriff.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 20, 1908.

Appeal from District Court, Beltrami County; C. W. Stanton, Judge.

Application by the state, on the relation of Don Bales, for writ of habeas corpus to Thomas Bailey, sheriff. From a judgment discharging the writ, relator appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

There may be a de facto officer, though no de jure office exists, as in de facto municipal corporations or de facto courts.

The legal existence of a court organized and created under color of law cannot be questioned in habeas corpus sued out by a person convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in proceedings had before it.

Even though defectively organized, the organization being authorized by law, the municipal court of Bemidji is at least a de facto court and the judge and clerk thereof de facto officers, and the right of the court to exercise judicial functions can be inquired into only at the instance of the state in direct proceedings brought for that purpose. Frank A. Jackson, for petitioner.

Henry Funkley, for respondent.

BROWN, J.

Relator was convicted in the municipal court of Bemidji of petit larceny, and sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail for the term of 90 days. He thereafter sued out a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his imprisonment was illegal and without authority of law, in that the said municipal court was never legally created or established. The writ was discharged by the court below, and relator appealed.

We are confronted at the outset with the question whether the legal existence of the court in which relator was convicted and sentenced may be inquired into in a proceeding of this kind. If not, then the other questions presented require no attention. The office of the writ of habeas corpus is to afford the citizen a speedy and effective method of securing his release when illegally restrained of his liberty. Its scope, when directed to an inquiry into the cause of imprisonment in judicial proceedings, extends to questions affecting the jurisdiction of the court, the sufficiency in point of law of the proceedings, and the validity of the judgment or commitment under which the prisoner is restrained. It cannot be employed as a writ of quo warranto to inquire into the title of the person to the office of judge of the court whose judgment or commitment is assailed. 15 Enc. Law, 115. Nor as a writ of error to review alleged errors committed on the trial. Nor as an appeal or writ of certiorari. State ex rel. v. Kinmore, 54 Minn. 135, 55 N. W. 830,40 Am. St. Rep. 305. At common law courts of superior jurisdiction would review on this writ commitments by inferior magistrates, and in doing so sometimes go back of the commitment, and inquire into the grounds thereof and their sufficiency. This wide scope of inquiry, however, came from the superiority of the higher court, and not from statutory authority. But the rule in many of the states has been modified or changed, and, where so modified, the writ extends as a general rule to defects appearing upon the face of the record only. Church on Habeas Corpus, 234. The rule in this state by statute is that, if the judgmentberendered or the commitment issued by a competent court and be fair upon its face, nothing further than the jurisdiction of the court will be inquired into. State ex rel. v. Sheriff, 24 Minn. 87;State ex rel. v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 57 N. W. 206, 794,43 Am. St. Rep. 525;State ex rel. v. Kilbourne, 68 Minn. 320, 71 N. W. 396;State ex rel. v. Norby, 69 Minn. 451, 72 N. W. 703. Our statutes provide (section 4586, Rev. Laws 1905) that where, upon the return of the writ, it shall appear that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is held and detained by virtue of a final judgment of a competent court of civil or criminal jurisdiction, he shall be remanded to the custody of the officer. Section 4587 provides that, if it shall appear on the return of the writ that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of a process of a court ‘legally constituted,’ he can be discharged only when it shall be made to appear (1) that the court under which the prisoner is committed was originally without jurisdiction to render the judgment; or (2) by some act or omission subsequently occurring the prisoner is entitled to his discharge; or (3) when the process under which he is held is in matter of substance defective; or (4) when issued without authority; or (5) when the person detaining the prisoner is not the person authorized by law to detain him; or (6) where the process was wholly unauthorized by judgment or provision of law. These statutory provisions abrogate the common-law rule, and preclude the right of the court to go behind the judgment or commitment and determine the validity thereof from matters de hors the record, except in those cases where the evidence is brought up on certiorari as ancillary to the writ of habeas corpus as in the case of Snell, 31 Minn. 110, 16 N. W. 692.

It is not contended by relator that any of the grounds for release specified in the statute are present in this case, except that the municipal court of Bemidji was not legally constituted, was not a ‘competent court’ within the meaning of the statute, and had therefore no jurisdiction to hear, try, or determine the prosecution against relator. We are of opinion that this question cannot be determined in this proceeding.

The Constitution of the state expressly authorizes the Legislature to create and establish such courts inferior to the supreme and district courts as public interests may from time to time require. Under this authority the Legislature by section 125, Rev. Laws 1905, provided for the organization of municipal courts in certain villages and cities of the state upon a compliance with the conditions therein prescribed. In April, 1905, the city council of Bemidji, a city coming within the terms of the statute, acting under and pursuant to its provisions, duly resolved that a municipal court be established in and for that city, the resolution to take effect and be of force on August 1st following. The proceedings of the council were in all things in conformity with the law, and the resolution was duly submitted to the city mayor for his approval or rejection. The mayor vetoed the resolution, whereupon, in the due course of events, it was again brought before the council for consideration in connection with the mayor's disapproval. It was then passed by unanimous vote of the council over the veto. Thereafter the court was duly constituted by the appointment of a judge and clerk, as provided for by the statute under which the council acted, who qualified and entered upon the discharge of their duties. It was before this court as thus established that relator was convicted. It is his contention that the approval of the resolution by the mayor was an essential prerequisite to the organization of the court, and, he having disapproved or vetoed the same, that was an end of the matter; that the council had no power or authority to pass the resolution over his veto, hence that the court was not legally created or established. We do not pass upon the question whether the court was legally created or intimate any opinion to the effect that it was not. The question is not reached.

The question whether the legal existence of a court may be inquired into on habeas corpus proceedings has been answered by different courts both in the affirmative and the negative (21 Cyc. 301); the weight of authority, however, as we view the matter, being with those courts which hold under statutes like those of this state that the writ cannot reach that question. That the right of a person to exercise the functions of a public office, who has qualified and entered upon the discharge thereof under color of authority, though his title be not good in point of law, cannot be called in question collaterally upon habeas corpus or other indirect method, is sustained by all the courts. Note to 87 Am. St. Rep. 177; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass. 445, 23 Am. Rep. 374;In re Manning, 76 Wis. 365, 45 N. W. 26;In re Brainerd, 56 Vt. 495; Ex parte Ward, 173 U. S. 452, 19 Sup. Ct. 459, 43 L. Ed. 765;Patterson v. State, 49 N. J. Law, 326, 8 Atl. 305. No reason occurs to us why the same rule should not apply to de facto municipal corporations and de facto courts. The authorities maintaining that the legal existence of the court may thus be inquired into proceed on the theory that there can be no such thing as a de facto court. In re Norton, 64 Kan. 842, 68 Pac. 639,91 Am. St. Rep. 255. But that doctrine is not fully supported either on principle or authority, at least it is not without exceptions. Municipal corporation, although not legally organized, is still a de facto corporation. State v. District Court, 90 Minn. 118, 95 N. W. 591; St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. Village, 73 Minn. 225, 75 N. W. 1050; 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations (4th Ed.) 43; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 309, 310; 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. 1135; Speer v. Kearney County, 88 Fed. 749, 32 C. C. A. 101;Omaha v. South Omaha, 31...