State ex rel. Barbara Jean S. v. Stephen Leo S.
Decision Date | 20 November 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 23326,23326 |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of West Virginia ex rel. BARBARA JEAN S., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. STEPHEN LEO S., Defendant Below, Appellee. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Syllabus Point 4, Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995).
2. " Syllabus Point 5, Laurie v. Thomas, 170 W.Va. 276, 294 S.E.2d 78 (1982).
3. "Where the welfare of the child has not been adversely affected, a custodial parent may be barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel from seeking enforcement of the decretal obligation of a noncustodial parent who has executed formal consent to adoption by the custodial parent and the custodial parent's current spouse in exchange for the release of that decretal obligation if the adoption is not consummated to the detriment or disadvantage of the noncustodial parent due to inaction on the part of the custodial parent." Syllabus Point 3, Kimble v. Kimble, 176 W.Va. 45, 341 S.E.2d 420 (1986).
Charles B. Mullins, II, Pineville, for Defendant Below, Appellee.
R. Jeffrey Johnson, Office of the Child Advocate, Charleston, for Plaintiff Below, Appellant.
This is a domestic relations case involving child support arrearage. The appellant, Barbara Jean S., appealed from a final order of the Circuit Court of Wyoming County setting aside the recommended order of the family law master. The family law master recommended the appellee, Stephen Leo S., pay appellant $28,000 in child support arrearage. The circuit court's order nullified payment of arrearage in any amount. The appellant seeks to have the family law master's recommendation reinstated. 1
This case starts out with the divorce granted to the appellant and appellee on January 30, 1987. The divorce decree awarded custody of the parties' two children to the appellant. 2 The decree also awarded appellant $300 per month in alimony and obligated the appellee to pay $500 per month in child support payments. In 1989, the appellant decided to marry Thomas Crouse. Also in the same year, the appellee decided to marry Sharon Crouse. The record indicates that Thomas and Sharon were previously wed and had three children from their marriage. Prior to the remarriage of the four individuals, they each executed an agreement on November 17, 1989, which purported to absolve the appellee of child support payments to the appellant. Under the agreement, Thomas Crouse was obligated to provide for the support of appellant's two children. In turn, the appellee agreed to provide for the support of Thomas' three children. 3 The record indicates that the four individuals eventually carried out their marriage plans.
In 1994, the appellant and appellee ended up in front of a family law master. 4 The appellant sought to enforce arrearage payment of child support from November 17, 1989, to the date of filing her petition for modification of the divorce decree. The appellee, on the other hand, requested that the alimony and child support provisions in the divorce decree be terminated. A hearing on the matters was held by the family law master. The appellee argued that his obligation to pay child support was removed by the agreement between the parties on November 17, 1989, and because of the fact that both children were now emancipated--one child having become emancipated by age, while the other became emancipated through marriage. The family law master issued her recommended order which required the appellee to pay child support arrearage for the period November, 1989 to June, 1994, in the amount of $28,000. It was further recommended that the alimony provision be terminated, and that the child support payments be reduced from $500 per month to $389.70 per month starting March, 1995. The family law master continued the child support for the youngest child, even though said child was emancipated through marriage.
The appellee objected to the family law masters' recommendation, insofar as it obligated him to pay arrearage child support and future child support. By order entered May 5, 1995, the circuit court set aside the family law master's recommendation. This appeal followed. The appellant is asking that the family law master's recommendation be reinstated.
In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court, we apply a two-prong deferential review standard. Our review of the final order and the ultimate disposition are made under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review. See Syl. Pt. 1, Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W.Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995); Phillips v. Fox, 193 W.Va. 657, 661, 458 S.E.2d 327, 331 (1995). We stated in Syllabus Point 1 of Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995), that:
"A circuit court should review findings of fact by a family law master only under a clearly erroneous standard, and it should review the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion standard."
We also held in Syllabus Point 3 of Stephen L.H. that:
"Under the clearly erroneous standard, if the findings of fact and the inferences drawn by a family law master are supported by substantial evidence, such findings and inferences may not be overturned even if a circuit court may be inclined to make different findings or draw contrary inferences."
Finally, under Syllabus Point 4 of Stephen L.H. we stated that:
The first issue we must address is whether the appellant's delay in prosecuting this claim for child support arrearage is foreclosed by the doctrine of laches. In Syllabus Point 4 of Laurie v. Thomas, 170 W.Va. 276, 294 S.E.2d 78 (1982), we indicated that Time, standing alone, is insufficient to trigger the doctrine of laches. In Syllabus Point 5 of Laurie we held:
"
In the instant proceeding, there is no question that the appellant's delay in seeking legal redress will work an unjustifiable hardship on the appellee. With each passing year, the appellee provided child support for the children of his second wife, which monies could have been given to the appellant had she timely invoked her right to receive child support payments from the appellee. The doctrine of laches would appear to be appropriate in this case to prevent the appellant from seeking arrearage child support payments. However, in Syllabus Point 6 of Robinson v. McKinney, 189 W.Va. 459, 432 S.E.2d 543 (1993), we held that "[t]he ten-year statute of limitations set forth in W.Va.Code, 38-3-18 [1923] and not the doctrine of...
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