STATE EX REL. BB, 20000949-CA.
| Citation | 2002 UT App 82,45 P.3d 527 |
| Decision Date | 21 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 20000949-CA.,20000949-CA. |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, in the interest of B.B., a person under eighteen years of age. K.S. and K.S., Appellants, v. S.H. and G.H., Appellees. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Brook J. Sessions, Harris & Carter, Provo, for Appellants.
Leslie W. Slaugh, Howard Lewis & Petersen, Provo, for Appellees.
Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian Ad Litem.
Before BILLINGS, Associate P.J., and GREENWOOD, and ORME, JJ.
¶ 1 K.S and K.S. (the Parents) are the adoptive parents of B.B. They appeal a juvenile court order asserting jurisdiction to enforce a pre-adoption visitation order issued in favor of S.H. and G.H., B.B.'s biological maternal grandparents (the Grandparents), after the Parents adopted B.B. The Parents also appeal the juvenile court's order awarding attorney fees to the Grandparents. Because we conclude the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction, we reverse both orders.
¶ 2 The parental rights of B.B.'s biological mother and father were terminated after the juvenile court determined B.B. was a neglected child. The Parents1 and the Grandparents filed competing petitions for custody and guardianship of B.B. To resolve the dispute, the Grandparents agreed to withdraw their petition and allow the Parents to obtain custody in exchange for visitation rights. The Grandparents also agreed to support the Parents' adoption of B.B. The juvenile court then entered an order establishing a visitation schedule (the Pre-adoption Visitation Order) stipulated to by the parties. Seventeen days later, the juvenile court granted the Parents' adoption petition. The adoption decree did not mention the Pre-adoption Visitation Order or visitation in any form for the Grandparents.
¶ 3 After the Parents adopted B.B., they initially allowed the Grandparents to exercise visitation as specified in the Pre-adoption Visitation Order. Out of concern for B.B., however, the Parents terminated B.B.'s visits with the Grandparents. The Grandparents then filed an Order to Show Cause requiring the Parents to appear in juvenile court to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for not abiding by the Pre-adoption Visitation Order. The Parents filed a Motion to Quash the Order to Show Cause, claiming the juvenile court's jurisdiction ended when it granted the Parents' petition for adoption. The juvenile court denied the Motion to Quash and entered two separate orders: (1) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order (the Visitation Order); and (2) Order of Attorney Fees and Judgment (the Attorney Fee Order). The Visitation Order asserted jurisdiction and granted the Grandparents visitation rights pursuant to the stipulated Pre-adoption Visitation Order. The Attorney Fee Order required the Parents to pay the Grandparents' attorney fees incurred for the Order to Show Cause. This appeal followed.
¶ 4 The Grandparents argue that the Visitation Order is not final; thus denying this court jurisdiction. We determine whether an order is final as a matter of law. See In re M.W., 2000 UT 79, ¶¶ 23-26, 12 P.3d 80
. The Grandparents also contend that the Parents' appeal of the Attorney Fee Order was not adequately raised in the Parents' Notice of Appeal. We determine whether the Notice of Appeal is adequate to grant this court jurisdiction as a matter of law. See Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, ¶ 7, 977 P.2d 474.
¶ 5 The Parents and the guardian ad litem argue the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Visitation Order subsequent to the adoption decree. Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review for correctness. See Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct.App.1993)
. The Parents also argue that because the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it should not have awarded attorney fees. In this context, we review the award of attorney fees for correctness. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, ¶ 13, 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44.
¶ 6 The Grandparents argue this court lacks jurisdiction because the Visitation Order was not a final order. The Visitation Order stated, among other things, that the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the Pre-adoption Visitation Order, and the Grandparents were entitled to visitation rights as set forth in the Pre-adoption Visitation Order. Subsequent to the Visitation Order, the juvenile court reviewed the Pre-adoption Visitation Order and modified it. Because of these subsequent modifications, the Grandparents argue that the Visitation Order was not a final order. We disagree.
¶ 7 The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction over appeals from juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-909(1) (1996). Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states: "An appeal may be taken from a ... juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments...." Utah R.App. P. 3(a) (emphasis added). Generally, "a judgment is final when it ends the controversy between the parties litigant." Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 9, 5 P.3d 649 (citation and quotations omitted). In In re M.W., 2000 UT 79, ¶ 26, 12 P.3d 80, the supreme court held that an order entered after an adjudication hearing on a petition of abuse was final for purposes of appeal. The finality was not affected by the juvenile court's retention of jurisdiction over the juvenile for further proceedings. In so holding, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Id. at ¶¶ 25-26 (citations omitted). Accordingly, even though a juvenile court periodically reviews its orders, the orders may still be final for purposes of appellate review.
¶ 8 The Visitation Order expressly held that the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction over B.B., and that the Grandparents were entitled to visitation rights under the Pre-adoption Visitation Order. The hearing subsequent to the issuance of the Visitation Order was merely a review of that order. The Visitation Order resolved the controversy between the parties as raised in the Order to Show Cause concerning the juvenile court's jurisdiction to enforce the Pre-adoption Visitation Order. Because the Visitation Order was final, we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.2
¶ 9 While conceding that the Attorney Fee Order was final for purposes of appeal, the Grandparents argue that because the Parents failed to mention the Attorney Fee Order in their Notice of Appeal, it is not properly before this court. For an appeal to be properly raised, "[t]he notice of appeal... shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from...." Utah R.App. P. 3(d). The Utah Supreme Court has held that this requirement is jurisdictional because "`the object of a notice of appeal is to advise the opposite party that an appeal has been taken from a specific judgment in a particular case.'" Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, ¶ 7, 977 P.2d 474 (quoting Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798, 800 (1964)). However, "[n]otices of appeal are to be liberally construed." Roberson v. Draney, 54 Utah 525, 182 P. 212, 213 (1919) (citations and quotations omitted); see also U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, ¶ 28, 990 P.2d 945
.
¶ 10 The Parents' Notice of Appeal states that they appeal "the ruling of the court on the Motion to Quash and Objection to Setting Hearings without re-opening the file." While the notice provided by this statement is not ideal, it sufficiently notifies the Grandparents that the orders resulting from the September 6, 2000 hearing are being appealed, particularly where the orders bear the same date.3 Therefore, the Notice of Appeal is sufficient for this court to assume jurisdiction over the issue of attorney fees.
¶ 11 The Parents and the guardian ad litem argue the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Visitation Order subsequent to the adoption decree. Under Utah law, the juvenile court can maintain continuing jurisdiction over B.B. until she is 21 years old, unless the court terminates jurisdiction prior to that time. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-121(1) (Supp. 2001). "The continuing jurisdiction of the court terminates ... upon order of the court." Id. § 78-3a-121(2)(a)(i). Hence, the dispositive issue is whether a decree of adoption is an "order of the court" that terminates the juvenile court's jurisdiction. To resolve this issue, we turn first to the plain language of Utah's juvenile court statutes and adoption statutes. See State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1997)
( " (Citation omitted.)); see also Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶ 17, 5 P.3d 616 .
¶ 12 Utah's juvenile courts are creatures of statute, and thus are courts of limited jurisdiction. See In re adoption of Trimble, 16 Utah 2d 188, 398 P.2d 25, 26 (1965); In re S.L., 1999 UT App 390, ¶ 52, 995 P.2d 17 ...
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