State ex rel. Bd. of Ed v. Morley

• Decision Date: 15 May 1934
• Docket Number: Case Number: 25423
• Citation: 1934 OK 302,34 P.2d 258,168 Okla. 259
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BOARD OF ED., CITY of TULSA, v. MORLEY et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1934 OK 302

34 P.2d 258

168 Okla. 259

STATE ex rel. BOARD OF ED., CITY of TULSA, v. MORLEY et al.

Case Number: 25423

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: May 15, 1934

Syllabus

¶0 1. Statutes--Construction Rendering Every Word Operative.

A statute should be given construction which renders every word operative rather than one which renders some words idle and nugatory.

2. Same--Presumption That Legislature Expressed Intent.

The presumption is that the Legislature expressed its intent in a statute and that it intended what it expressed.

3. Same--Consideration of Title of Act to Determine Legislative Intent Where Meaning of Provision Uncertain.

When the meaning of a portion of the body of a legislative act is uncertain, it is proper to consider the title of the act to determine the legislative intent, in this jurisdiction where the Constitution requires that the purpose of an act be clearly expressed in its title. (Section 57, art. 5. Const. Okla.)

4. Statutes--Construction of Amendment to Particular Section of General Law.

An act to amend a particular section of a general law is limited in its scope to the subject-matter of the section proposed to be amended. Such amendment ex vi termini implies merely a change of its provisions upon the same subject to which the original section relates. ( Syl. 1, Pottawatomie County v. Alexander, 68 Okla. 126, 172 P. 436.)

5. Same--New Matter in Amendment.

Though a particular section of a law may, by amendment, be broadened so as to bring within its provisions matter which could logically and legally have been placed in it originally, such new matter must be something which had not been already specially and differently provided for in another section of the same statute and to which section no reference is made in the amendatory law. ( Syl. 2, Pottawatomie County v. Alexander, 68 Okla. 126, 172 P. 436.)

6. Statutes--Subjects and Titles--Constitutional Provisions.

Section 57, art. 5, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, provides in part: "Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title. * * *" Held, this provision is positive and mandatory.

7. Same--Portion of Amendatory Act Relating to Disposition of Surplus in Funds of Municipalities Held Invalid as Not Being Covered in Title of Act.

That portion of chapter 85, Session Laws 1933, reading: "If and when a surplus of cash shall accrue in any fund account the ame shall forthwith be transferred to the same fund for the next succeeding year," held to be unconstitutional and invalid.

8. Schools and School Districts--Mandatory Duty of Excise Board to Make Supplemental Appropriations Upon Proper Showing.

The use of the word "may" in section 12680, O. 8. 1931, does not vest the excise board with power to refuse to make supplemental appropriations where the need therefor is shown to exist; where income and revenue provided or accumulated is available for the purpose for which the appropriations are sought; and Where the governing body of a school district has certified its needs therefor in the manner provided by law to the excise board.

9. Same.

The excise board is not vested with discretion to determine the necessity for supplemental appropriations of school districts.

Original action in mandamus by the State on relation of the Board of Education of the City of Tulsa against Ralsa F. Worley and others, constituting the Excise Board of Tulsa County. Writ granted.

C. R. Rosenstein, for plaintiff.

J. Berry King, Atty. Gen., and Randell S. Cobb., Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

L. L. Cowley, amicus curiae.

Silverman, Rosenstein & Fist, of Counsel.

Clay Tallman, O. C. Cash, J. H. Hill, Frank Orr, and Mastin Geschwind, amici curiae.

BUSBY, J.

¶1 This is an original action in mandamus in which the board of education of the city of Tulsa seeks to compel the excise board of Tulsa county and the members thereof to approve a request of the plaintiff for supplemental appropriations for current expenses of the Tulsa public schools (independent school district No. 22, Tulsa county).

¶2 On February 3, 1934, the plaintiff, in compliance with the requirements of section 12680, O. S. 1931, prepared and submitted to the excise board of Tulsa county a statement showing the financial condition of the Tulsa school district as of January 31, 1934. The statement reflected a cash surplus of revenue in the general fund in the sum of $ 114,805.09, derived from taxes levied and assessed for the fiscal year of 1930-1931 and prior years. There were no outstanding unpaid warrants or unsatisfied debts for those years. However, the statement reflected deficits represented by outstanding unpaid warrants for the fiscal years of 1931-32 and 1932-33. It is not contended in this case that the financial statement submitted by the plaintiff was incorrect in any particular. Plaintiff requested that defendant excise board make supplemental appropriations in the aggregate amount of $ 111, 460.51. On March 7, 1934, the defendant passed upon plaintiff's request and denied the same.

¶3 In defense of its refusal to grant the request for a supplemental appropriation, the defendant asserts that chapter 85, S. L. 1933, repealed by implication, or rendered inoperative when applied to the case at bar, that portion of section 12680, supra, authorizing a "surplus of revenue" to be used for supplemental appropriations. It also asserts as an additional defense that it is vested with discretionary power to determine the necessity for such supplemental appropriations, and that it was justified in refusing to grant the same as a proper exercise of its discretion.

¶4 The principal question to be determined in this case is: (1) Does chapter 85, S. L. 1933, prevent a surplus of revenue derived from taxes levied and assessed for previous fiscal years from being used for supplemental appropriations? For the reasons hereinafter stated, we have answered this question in the negative. This answer raises the additional question: May the excise board in its discretion refuse to make a supplemental appropriation at the request of a school district when the financial statement prepared and submitted by such district correctly reflects a surplus of revenue available for current expenses? These questions will be discussed in the order named.

¶5 The effect of chapter 85, supra, on the power to make supplemental appropriations depends upon the meaning of the language used in the act as well as the validity of the provisions thereof. A logical treatment of this case requires that we first determine the meaning of the provisions involved, reserving questions concerning validity for later consideration.

¶6 As a basis for considering the questions involved, we must recognize the statutory basis of the power to make Supplemental appropriations from a surplus of revenue. Section 12680, O. S. 1931, provides in part:

"If the financial statement herein required shall correctly reflect a surplus in revenue in any fund available for current expenses, and the excise board shall so affirmatively find, it may make supplemental appropriations to an amount not exceeding the aggregate of such surplus."

¶7 It is conceded by the parties to this action and established by the previous decisions of this court that a surplus accumulated from taxes levied and assessed during previous fiscal years constitutes a "surplus of revenue" within the meaning of the above-quoted statutory provision.

¶8 It is also agreed that prior to the enactment of chapter 85, supra, when a "surplus of revenue" existed, it was available for supplemental appropriations. Protest of Cities Service Gas. Co. et al., 1. 62 Okla. 131, 19 P.2d 546. It is asserted by the plaintiff and denied by the defendant that, notwithstanding the passage of the act, such a surplus is still available for such appropriations.

¶9 Chapter 85, S. L. 1933, purports only to amend section 12678, O. S. 1931. It does not refer to purport, or pretend to alter, change, or repeal any of the provisions of section 12680, O. S. 1931, the section of the statute governing and authorizing supplemental appropriations. In the body of the amending act (chap. 85, supra) the following language is contained:

"The rates of levy for current expense, sinking fund and other purposes authorized by law shall be separately made and stated, and the revenue accruing therefrom, respectively, when collected, shall be credited to separate fund accounts to be designated and known respectively as the general fund, sinking fund and special funds according to the purposes of the levy. If and when a surplus of cash shall accrue in any fund account, the same shall forthwith be transferred to the same fund for the next succeeding year." (Emphasis ours.)

¶10 The emphasized portions of the act are said by the defendant to repeal by implication or render inoperative the provisions of section 12680, authorizing supplemental appropriations to be made from a surplus balance of revenue for the asserted reason that it requires such surplus to be forthwith transferred from the fund of the current fiscal year to the same fund of the next succeeding year, thereby rendering it impossible to use the same to meet the needs of the current year. On the other hand, counsel for the plaintiff say, in substance, that little if any importance should be attached to the appearance of the word "forthwith," occurring in the portion of the act above quoted. They assert that:

"The proper, reasonable, and logical construction of the language contained in chapter 85 of the Session Laws of 1933, here in before referred to, is that any surplus received or accumulated during the present fiscal year, shall, at the proper time, to wit, June 30, or the end of the current fiscal year, be applied to the reduction of levies for the succeeding year, unless, in the meantime, pursuant to the authority granted by the terms of section 12680, O. S. 1931, such funds shall have been appropriated by

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