State Ex Rel. Bd. of Com'rs of Indian River Mosquito Control Dist. v. Board of Com'rs of Indian River County

• Decision Date: 22 December 1931
• Citation: 103 Fla. 946,138 So. 625
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BOARD OF COM'RS OF INDIAN RIVER MOSQUITO CONTROL DIST. v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS OF INDIAN RIVER COUNTY.[*]
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

138 So. 625

103 Fla. 946

STATE ex rel. BOARD OF COM'RS OF INDIAN RIVER MOSQUITO CONTROL DIST. v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS OF INDIAN RIVER COUNTY.^[*]

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

December 22, 1931

Original proceeding in mandamus by the State of Florida, on the relation of the Board of Commissioners of Indian River Mosquito Control District, against the Board of County Commissioners of Indian River County and others. On respondent's demurrer to, and motion to quash, the alternative writ.

Demurrer and motion to quash overruled, and motion for a peremptory writ granted.

COUNSEL Vocelle & Mitchell, of Vero Beach, for relators.

C. P Diamond, of Vero Beach, for respondents.

OPINION

DAVIS J.

This is an original proceeding in which an alternative writ of mandamus was issued to the respondents as the board of county commissioners and taxing officials of Indian River county Fla., to coerce the levy of a special statutory district tax under chapter 11128, Special Laws of Florida, 1925, as amended by chapter 14381, Laws of Florida, Sp. Acts of 1929.

It is shown that the board of commissioners of Indian River mosquito control district, pursuant to the provisions of the statutes referred to, has levied a six-mill tax for the purposes of the district during the tax year 1931. This levy was duly certified to the board of county commissioners as required by law, but that board refused to carry the levy resolution into effect. The alternative writ is demurred to and respondents have also moved to quash it on the ground that the board of commissioners of Indian River mosquito control district were without authority to adopt a tax resolution until after the making up and approval of the tax assessment roll for the current year, and that the tax in question is not authorized nor required by law.

The relators, in turn, move for a peremptory writ on the ground that the duty sought to be required of the county commissioners is mandatory and nondiscretionary, and that such officials have no other alternative than to comply with the statutes and place the levy on the tax rolls.

Indian River mosquito control district is a special taxing district which was created in 1925 (see chapter 11128, supra). Its declared purpose is to do any and all things necessary for the control and complete elimination of all species of mosquitoes in said district, which purpose was found and declared in the creating act to be 'for public purposes and to be necessary for the maintenance of the health of the inhabitants of the territory embraced in said District and for the convenience, comfort and welfare of the said District and the inhabitants thereof.' (Section 10.)

Administration of the affairs of the district is confided to a governing body known as the board of commissioners thereof. This board is the relator here.

By the terms of the act, said board is given full power to handle the affairs of the district and to levy a tax each year for the purposes of the district not later than July 15th, which levy shall be made by resolution to be adopted and certified to the board of county commissioners and to the comptroller not later than August 1st each year. The statute makes it the duty of the board of county commissioners and other taxing officials to carry out the levy provided for in this resolution after it is adopted. The limit of the tax is fixed at ten mills. The power of the district to issue bonds was before this court in Merriman v. Hutchinson, 95 Fla. 600, 116 So. 271, and the bonding provisions of the act held to be unconstitutional because no limit was provided as to the amount of tax that might be levied for any such bonds. After this, in 1929, the act was amended so as to definitely limit the amount of the tax that might be at any time levied to a levy of not exceeding ten mills. See chapter 14381, supra.

The terms of the statute vest no power or discretion in the board of county commissioners to revise or reduce a levy which has been properly authorized by the board of commissioners of the district, so the duty of the county commissioners to levy the tax ordered is mandatory, unless some other lawful excuse for refusal to do so exists. See State ex rel. Atlantic-Gulf Special Road & Bridge District v. Bass, 96 Fla. 478, 118 So. 212, 213; State ex rel. Atlantic-Gulf Special Road & Bridge District v. Helseth (Fla.) 138 So. 477, decided at the present term; Tomasello v. Board of Public Instructions for Santa Rosa County, 55 Fla. 341, 45 So. 886.

The fact that the levy was ordered in May, 1931, before the general county tax assessment roll was examined, approved, and equalized, and the total valuations of the county finally approved and fixed, does not constitute a lawful excuse for the respondents here to refuse to make the required levy. See State ex rel. Atlantic-Gulf Special Road & Bridge District v. Helseth (Fla.) 138 So. 477, decided at the present term, supra.

The fact that the bonding provisions of the original 1925 act have been declared unconstitutional and inoperative does not defeat the continued existence and functioning of the district in view of the 1929 amendment, which recognizes and continues the district without reference to the eliminated bonding provision. See State v. Fort Pierce Inlet District, 94 Fla. 1157, 115 So. 547. This does not overlook what we said in Jinkins v. Entzminger, 101 Fla. ----, 135 So. 785, to the effect that, where a special taxing district could only accomplish its purpose by the issuance of bonds, the district failed and became functus officio when the issuance of bonds became impossible under the law.

In the case just cited, the purpose of the district was the accomplishment of a construction project, without which there would be no necessity for the functioning of the district, beyond settling up the preliminary expenses incurred in making surveys and the like to ascertain whether the district could be successfully operated to carry out the legislative purpose to have a canal made to connect two waterways. Here the purpose of the district is to control and eradicate certain pests, and the statute in its 1929 amendment, evinces a purpose to bring about this result through the operation of the district as a going and permanent institution, even though no bonds whatsoever should ever be authorized. In this aspect, the case here differs from Jinkins v. Entzminger, supra, and the rule of that case is not applicable to this one.

The machinery of the Indian River mosquito control district is set up and designed to function fully and completely in carrying out the purposes of the district without reference to the issuance of bonds. The special tax levy is, by the direct language of the resolution providing for it, to be used 'solely in carrying...