State Ex Rel. Bd. Of Educ. Of City Of Bridgeport v. D'aulisa

Decision Date26 February 1947
Citation133 Conn. 414,52 A.2d 636
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE ex rel. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF BRIDGEPORT v. D'AULISA, City Comptroller.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Alcorn, Judge.

Action by the State, on the relation of the Board of Education of the city of Bridgeport, for a writ of mandamus compelling Adolph D'Aulisa, city comptroller, to certify for payment certain teachers' and superintendents' payroll items. Judgment for defendant after trial to the court, and plaintiff appeals.

Error, judgment set aside, and case remanded.

The appellee filed a motion for reargument which was granted.

David R. Lessler, of Bridgeport, for appellant.

Harry Schwartz, of Bridgeport, (John V. Donnelly, of Bridgeport, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, BROWN, Judge.

In this action for a mandamus to compel the defendant as comptroller of the city of Bridgeport to certify for payment certain teachers' and superintendents' current salary payroll items, for the period from April 1 to April 12, 1946, of the fiscal year ending march 31, 1947, the board of education of the city of Bridgeport, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, is the relator. The court rendered judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff has appealed. The material facts established by the finding, which is not subject to correction, may be thus summarized: The plaintiff is the agency charged by statute and charter with duties incident to providing public educational facilities in the city. The city's board of apportionment and taxation is the agency responsible for making annual appropriations to meet the requirements of all departments of the city, including that of the plaintiff, and for laying taxes to raise funds to cover these appropriations. In December, 1945, the plaintiff submitted to the defendant a detailed estimate of its requirements for the fiscal year commencing April 1, 1946. Acting upon these estimates, the defendant in turn submitted his recommended appropriations to the board of apportionment and taxation. On the basis of the budget so submitted by the plaintiff and the defendant's recommendations thereon, the board made specific appropriations to the plaintiff covering various types of expenditures including items for equipment, supplies, repairs, salaries for teachers and wages and salaries of other employees. These appropriations totaled $2,378,144 for the fiscal year. The procedure was customary and in accordance with the provisions in charter and statute.

Early in April, 1946, in anticipation of the first semimonthly payments under the appropriations so made, the plaintiff prepared payroll sheets setting forth certain salary payments which it desired to make for the first payment period to teachers and certain other employees and transmitted them to the defendant for action pursuant to § 155 of the city charter, revision of 1939, 18 Spec.Laws, p. 664, 6658 as amended by 20 Spec.Laws, p. 148, which provides that ‘Said board [the plaintiff] shall audit and approve, semi-monthly, all bills for the ordinary current expenses of its department, and report the same to the city auditor, who shall thereupon certify whether or not the appropriation is sufficient for the payment thereof, and if sufficient he shall so certify to the city treasurer, and thereupon the same shall become due and payable.’ As a result of his calculations based on the payrolls submitted and upon his experience, the defendant concluded that at the rate indicated by these proposed salary payments the plaintiff's total salary requirements would result in a reasonably definite prospective deficit of $232,369 in the amounts appropriated for the salaries in question for the fiscal year. In reaching this decision the defendant did not consider any item of the plaintiff's appropriations except the ones which applied to the salaries in question as identified and allocated on the payroll sheets. Neither did he take into account the possibility of the plaintiff's transferring any unexpended balances from other of its appropriations to its salary account, nor of its taking future action to render available for its teaching employees $187,922 from a ‘Reserve for Employees' Bonus' which had been established by the city entirely apart from the plaintiff's appropriations. In consequence of his conclusion that the amounts presented, when calculated in terms of the entire fiscal year, would substantially exceed the appropriations made, the defendant decided that he could not certify that sufficient appropriated funds were available, and he notified the plaintiff accordingly.

The court concluded: (1) The defendant, in declining to certify the payrolls, was performing a function calling for the exercise of his judgment and discretion. (2) He did not refuse to act in the matter submitted to him or to exercise his judgment and discretion. (3) His action was taken in good faith in the exercise of his interpretation of his legal duty. (4) The plaintiff failed to establish that it had a clear right to the remedy of mandamus. (5) It did not establish that it had no other sufficient remedy at law. Briefly summarized, the plaintiff's claims are that it constitutes a separate state agency which has exclusive control of the salaries to be paid its personnel and of the expenditure of all funds in the budget appropriated by the city to its use, and that the defendant's power, under § 155 of the charter, with relation to the disbursement of appropriations made to it is restricted solely to the ministerial function of certifying whether or not sufficient appropriated money is at hand to pay the particular bill presented, with no right in him to exercise any discretion or judgment.

State statutes as well as charter provisions of the city must be considered in determining the defendant's right and duty as to the certification of the payroll items in question. That under our law the furnishing of education for the general public is a state function and duty is manifest from the extensive legislation relating to it. See chapters 44 to 57 of the General Statutes, as amended. Under the statutes, provision is made for the education of the inhabitants of each town through its town board of education. Accordingly, as we have stated, ‘A town board of education is an agency of the state in charge of education in the town; to that end it is granted broad powers by the legislature; and it is beyond control by the town or any of its officers in the exercise of those powers or in the incurring of expense, to be paid by the town, necessitated thereby, except as limitations are found in statutory provisions. Groton & Stonington Traction Co. v. Town of Groton, 115 Conn. 151, 155, 160 A. 902; General Statutes, Cum.Sup.1935, § 297c.’ Board of Education of Town of Stamford v. Board of Finance, 127 Conn. 345, 349, 16 A.2d 601, 603. In so far as the present case is concerned, the expression ‘statutory provisions' as so used includes the legislature's enactments contained in the charter of the city of Bridgeport as well as those in the General Statutes. See State ex rel. Wallen v. Hatch, 82 Conn. 122, 124, 72 A. 575. Under the charter, the city succeeded to all burdens, expenses, duties, rights, powers and privileges of the town of Bridgeport specified by law relative to the support and maintenance of schools. Charter & Ordinances of Bridgeport, Rev.1939, § 4, 15 Spec.Laws, p. 495. Therefore the question arises whether any limitations upon the plaintiff's power to disburse the appropriations which have been made for its budget exist either by statute or under the provisions of the charter within the principle quoted above.

Section 275c of the 1935 Cumulative Supplement provides that the board of education ‘shall prepare an itemized estimate of the cost of maintenance of public schools for the ensuing year and shall...

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27 cases
  • West Hartford Ed. Ass'n v. Dayson DeCourcy
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 19 April 1972
    ... ... to serve as policy maker on behalf of the state and for the local community on educational ... State ex rel. Board of Education v. D'Aulisa, 133 Conn. 414, ... ...
  • Connecticut Coalition for Justice v. Rell
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 30 March 2010
    ...West Hartford Education Ass'n, Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 573, 295 A.2d 526 (1972); see also State ex rel. Board of Education v. D'Aulisa, 133 Conn. 414, 418-19, 52 A.2d 636 (1947) ("Under the statutes, provision is made for the education of the inhabitants of each town through its to......
  • Stolberg v. Caldwell
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 8 August 1978
    ...and duty under our law. West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 573, 295 A.2d 526; Board of Education v. D'Aulisa, 133 Conn. 414, 418, 52 A.2d 636. Since early times the state has had a continuous interest in education; the duty of providing for the education of chil......
  • Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, (SC 18032) (Conn. 3/30/2010)
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 30 March 2010
    ...West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 573, 295 A.2d 526 (1972); see also State ex rel. Board of Education v. D'Aulisa, 133 Conn. 414, 418-19, 52 A.2d 636 (1947) ("Under the statutes, provision is made for the education of the inhabitants of each town through its to......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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