State ex rel. Bd. of Health Center Trustees of Clay County v. County Com'n of Clay County, 77459

• Decision Date: 25 April 1995
• Docket Number: No. 77459,77459
• Citation: State ex rel. Bd. of Health Center Trustees of Clay County v. County Com'n of Clay County, 896 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1995)
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BOARD OF HEALTH CENTER TRUSTEES OF CLAY COUNTY, Respondent, v. COUNTY COMMISSION OF CLAY COUNTY, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 627

896 S.W.2d 627

STATE ex rel. BOARD OF HEALTH CENTER TRUSTEES OF CLAY COUNTY, Respondent, v. COUNTY COMMISSION OF CLAY COUNTY, et al., Appellants.

No. 77459.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

April 25, 1995.

Tom B. Kretsinger, Jr., Liberty, for appellants.

Patricia L. Hughes, Liberty, for respondent.

THOMAS, Judge.

This case involves an appeal from a judgment and order in mandamus from the Circuit Court of Clay County ordering and directing appellants to authenticate the 1993 property tax levy on behalf of the Board of Health Center Trustees of Clay County (Board) in the amount of $.09 of $100 of assessed valuation rather than the $.07 determined by the Clay County Commission (Commission). This Court has jurisdiction because the case involves the construction of revenue laws. Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. We affirm the trial court's determination of tax rates and reverse the award of attorneys fees.

I.

The Clay County Health Center (Health Center) was established in 1953 after winning approval of the voters of Clay County in a special election. The Health Center is governed by a five member Board of Health Center Trustees, who are elected by the voters of Clay County, and is operated pursuant to section 205.042. ¹ The statutory purpose for county health centers is for the improvement of health of all inhabitants of the county. § 205.050. Funding for the Health Center was to come from a property tax levy imposed by the Board. As determined by the 1953 election, the maximum levy allowed is $.10 per $100 of assessed valuation.

Following a general statewide increase in assessed property valuations in 1985, the Hancock Amendment, article X, section 22, of the Missouri Constitution, required a tax rollback to prevent a windfall benefit to governmental taxing units. Under the state auditor's formula for determining compliance with the law, the ceiling for the levy, which remained at $.07 from 1985 through 1990, increased to $.08 in 1991, and increased to $.09 in 1992. This formula, developed by the state auditor pursuant to section 137.073.6, compared the increase in the total assessment value of property from the prior year, excluding increases related to new construction or annexations, to the change in price level for the same period. The Board voted on August 12, 1993, to increase the levy for fiscal year 1993 from $.07 to $.09 due to an increased demand for health care services. Prior to the levy for all taxing authorities in a county being placed on property tax bills by the collector of revenue, the Commission certifies the amount. After receiving the Board's $.09 levy along with its proposed budget, the Commission held a hearing on the increase. Despite no testimony for anything other than a $.09 levy, the Commission determined that it would not grant an increase and would only approve $.07.

The Board filed a petition in mandamus with the Circuit Court of Clay County to compel the Commission to authenticate the amount of the tax levy for the Health Center as determined by the Board of Health Center Trustees. Following a trial, the court issued an order and awarded attorneys fees to the Board for pursuing this matter of public interest.

II.

The Commission's first point on appeal is that the trial court's order to authenticate the $.09 1993 tax levy of the Board was not supported by evidence of voter approval of the creation of the Health Center. The Commission asserts that there is no competent evidence to support the 1953 election authorizing a one mill ² levy for the creation of the Health Center. The Commission contends that the only evidence presented was the oral testimony of Reverend Maurice Hall, a minister involved in the petition drive and election resulting in the establishment of the Health Center, who subsequently served on its Board for the next twenty years. The Commission's position is that Hall's testimony should have been stricken as hearsay. The Board introduced into evidence certified copies of both the notice of the special election and the ballot. In addition, the Board asserts that the oral testimony relating to the election results was properly admitted by the trial court because the witness testified from firsthand knowledge in that he was directly involved in the creation of the Health Center. His statement is not hearsay, but it may raise a best evidence issue. However, this evidence does not involve proof of the terms or contents of a writing but rather involves proof of a fact which exists independent of a writing and is proved by a writing. As such, the best evidence rule does not apply. Cooley v. Director of Revenue, 896 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. banc 1995). The Commission never contends that the election did not occur or that the creation of the Health Center was not valid, thus causing the action of the Board over the past thirty-five years to be invalid, nor did it present any evidence of its own to refute the testimony of Reverend Hall stating that the election was not sufficient to validly create the Health Center.

The testimony presented was adequate to support the court's ruling on this point, and the Commission's point is denied.

III.

The Commission next contends that increasing the levy violated statutes and the Constitution of Missouri which grant discretion to the Commission to set the health levy and require the Commission to set the levy at a level sufficient to produce the necessary revenues to support the health budget. The Commission also contends that the levy increase violated the Hancock Amendment, article X, section 22, of the Missouri Constitution.

Section 205.141 states: "The county commission ... shall have the power to levy upon all property subject to its taxing powers, an annual tax in an amount not to exceed ten cents on each one hundred dollar valuation for the purpose of operating or maintaining a public county health center or institution." This section was enacted in 1958, five years after the establishment of the Health Center.

Section 205.042.8, enacted prior to the establishment of the Health Center, states: "The board of health center trustees shall determine annually the rate of the tax levy, except that rate so determined shall not exceed the maximum rate authorized by the vote of the people of the county."

The Commission contends that sections 205.141 and 205.042.8 are hopelessly conflicting and that the last statute enacted should act to repeal the first to the extent that the statutes conflict, i.e., because both statutes give the power to set the levy to different bodies, the only power to levy is in the hands of the county commission. We disagree. The statutes can be reconciled by the type of health center in operation in the county. Section 205.042 concerns counties, such as Clay, which have an independent health center that was established by a vote of the people and is governed by an independent board. This type of operation is separate from the county commission regarding budgeting and taxing issues; such entity merely submits the budgets and levies to the commission for the commission to certify and forward to the county collector for inclusion on the property tax bills. The commission's action of certifying the levy is a ministerial function not involving discretion.

The other type of health center is one that is established as a department of county government. This type of organization is completely controlled by county government in that the center has no independent autonomous control over its budget, personnel, or sources of funding. With a health department, the county controls the amount and nature of the annual budget. Funding for the budget is authorized by the county commission subject to the limits of section 205.141.

In determining which statute to apply to this case, the apparent conflict is resolved by the two different organizational structures for health services; the statute specifically dealing with a health center board of trustees, section 205.042, governs independent health boards, such as in Clay County, while the other statute, section 205.141, applies to counties not having such an independent board of health. Section 205.042 therefore applies in this case and the Board is allowed to authorize the levy as long as it complies with the law. The Commission's reliance on the county budget law, section 50.525, et seq., is misplaced because it does not apply to independent authorities such as the Board, but rather to departments that receive the revenue from the county government. This point is denied.

The Commission also contends that an increase in the levy without voter approval violates the Hancock Amendment and the enabling legislation, section 137.037. We do not reach a decision on whether the Hancock provisions were violated because the Commission has no standing to bring such a challenge. The Commission's role for independent taxing authorities such as the Board is the ministerial duty of accumulating the levies assessed by such political subdivisions and certifying them to the collector for inclusion on the tax bills. Its role is not to act as a judge of the constitutionality of the tax. Moreover, the class of persons who can bring suit to enforce the Hancock Amendment is limited to taxpayers. Art. X, § 23; § 137.073.8; Fort Zumwalt School District v. State, 896 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Mo. banc 1995). The Commission has no standing in such a matter. This point is denied.

IV.

The Commission's next point is that mandamus is not the proper method for contesting the increase in the levy because the Board failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Commission cites section 49.230, which provides that "[a]ppeals from the decisions, findings and orders of county commissions shall be conducted under the provisions of [the Administrative Procedure Act]." As noted in section II of this opinion, however, the Commission has no power to challenge the budget and levy of the Board. Therefore, the...