State ex rel. Bey v. Byrd

• Decision Date: 05 May 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2019-0547,2019-0547
• Citation: 2020 Ohio 2766,154 N.E.3d 57,160 Ohio St.3d 141
• Parties: The STATE EX REL. PARKER BEY, Appellant, v. BYRD, Clerk of Courts, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

160 Ohio St.3d 141

154 N.E.3d 57

2020 Ohio 2766

The STATE EX REL. PARKER BEY, Appellant,

v.BYRD, Clerk of Courts, Appellee.

No. 2019-0547

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted October 2, 2019

Decided May 5, 2020

Vincent El Alan Parker Bey, pro se.

Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian R. Gutkoski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

O'Connor, C.J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Vincent A. Parker, a.k.a. Vincent El Alan Parker Bey, appeals the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals denying his complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel appellee, Nailah K. Byrd, the Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts, to produce various court records and denying Byrd's request that Parker Bey be declared a vexatious litigator. We affirm in part and reverse in part the Eighth District's judgment, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} Parker Bey is incarcerated at the Trumbull Correctional Institution. In September 2018, he sent two records requests to Byrd by certified mail. In the first, Parker Bey asked for a copy of a single journal entry from his 1995 criminal case. In the second, he requested copies of three additional journal entries from the 1995 case as well as a copy of the clerk of courts' records-retention schedule. Byrd did not respond to the first request and provided only one of the journal entries sought in Parker Bey's second request.

{¶ 3} On November 16, 2018, Parker Bey filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals. Citing the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, he sought an order compelling Byrd to provide copies of the remaining three journal entries and a copy of the clerk of courts' records-retention schedule. He also requested court costs and statutory damages.

{¶ 4} Byrd moved for summary judgment, arguing that as a matter of law under R.C. 149.43(B), she had no duty to provide the requested records to Parker Bey. Byrd's motion also requested that Parker Bey be declared a vexatious litigator. On January 2, 2019, the court of appeals denied summary judgment, noting that a week after Byrd filed her motion, this court held in State ex rel. Harris v. Pureval , 155 Ohio St.3d 343, 2018-Ohio-4718, 121 N.E.3d 337, ¶ 10, that the Public Records Act did not apply to an inmate's request for court records. However, the court allowed Byrd to file a supplemental brief.

{¶ 5} In her supplemental brief, Byrd argued that pursuant to Harris , the Rules of Superintendence govern Parker Bey's request for court records. Because Parker Bey seeks relief under R.C. 149.43, Byrd denied any obligation to produce the records. Nonetheless, Byrd attached copies of two of the requested records to her brief and averred that the other two records do not exist.

{¶ 6} Parker Bey filed a motion to strike Byrd's supplemental brief on the grounds that Byrd had not served him with a copy.¹ The court of appeals denied the motion.

{¶ 7} On March 6, 2019, the court of appeals denied Parker Bey's request for mandamus relief. The court noted that the Rules of Superintendence, not the Public Records Act, apply when an inmate seeks court records and concluded that Byrd therefore has no clear legal duty to provide the requested records under R.C. 149.43. The appeals court declined to declare Parker Bey a vexatious litigator.

{¶ 8} Parker Bey timely appealed, and the matter is fully briefed. In her merit brief, Byrd asks this court to impose sanctions on Parker Bey and to declare him a vexatious litigator, pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B) and R.C. 2323.52.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Parker Bey's propositions of law

{¶ 9} We consider Parker's Bey's propositions of law out of order for ease of analysis.

1. The third proposition of law

{¶ 10} As his third proposition of law, Parker Bey argues that under R.C. 149.43, he is entitled to the requested records and to statutory damages and court costs.

a. The journal entries

{¶ 11} Parker Bey seeks access to three journal entries from his criminal case, which commenced in 1995. Mandamus is the appropriate remedy by which to compel compliance with the Public Records Act. State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees , 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6. The Eighth District denied Parker Bey's request because it was made pursuant to the Public Records Act, not the Rules of Superintendence. However, Sup.R. 47(A)(1) states, "Access to case documents in actions commenced prior to July 1, 2009 , shall be governed by federal and state law." (Emphasis added.) Journal entries are case documents. See Sup.R. 44(C)(1) ; State ex. rel. Fernbach v. Brush , 133 Ohio St.3d 151, 2012-Ohio-4214, 976 N.E.2d 889, ¶ 2. And Parker Bey's case commenced prior to July 1, 2009. Accordingly, this action to compel the production of journal entries from a 1995 case was properly brought under the Public Records Act.

{¶ 12} We have previously recognized that Sup.R. 44 through 47, the public-access provisions of the Rules of Superintendence, apply only to case documents in cases commenced on or after July 1, 2009. In State ex rel. Striker v. Smith , 129 Ohio St.3d 168, 2011-Ohio-2878, 950 N.E.2d 952, ¶ 21, fn. 2, this court refused to apply Sup.R. 44 through 47, stating, "This case, which challenges the alleged refusal of a municipal court clerk to timely provide copies of case documents, involves a 2008 request for records from a case that was commenced in 2006. Sup.R. 44 through 47 became effective on July 1, 2009. Therefore, under Sup.R. 47(A)(1), the court's public-access superintendence rules are inapplicable to [the appellant's] records request." See also State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons , 140 Ohio St.3d 7, 2014-Ohio-2354, 14 N.E.3d 989, ¶ 11, fn. 2 (lead opinion) (relator properly invoked Public Records Act in 2013 mandamus action seeking documents in actions commenced before July 1, 2009).

{¶ 13} Accordingly, we hold that the court of appeals erred in denying Parker Bey's complaint on the grounds that he did not invoke the Superintendence Rules as the basis for his request. On remand, the court of appeals shall apply the Public Records Act to determine whether Parker Bey is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel Byrd to produce the requested journal entries and whether Parker Bey is entitled to statutory damages and court costs.

{¶ 14} Both the public-access provisions of the Rules of Superintendence and the Public Records Act favor open access to records. See Sup.R. 45(A) ("Court records are presumed open to public access"); State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty. , 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 N.E.2d 334 (1996) (" R.C. 149.43 is construed liberally in favor of broad access, and any doubt is resolved in favor of disclosure of public records"). Neither the statute nor the rules require a requester to identify the legal authority providing a basis for the request when requesting a record, and records that are open to the public should be reasonably provided. See Sup.R. 45(B)(1) ("A court or clerk of court shall make a court record available by direct access, promptly acknowledge any person's request for direct access, and respond to the request within a reasonable amount of time"); accord R.C. 149.43(B)(1) ("[u]pon request * * *, all public records responsive to the request shall be promptly prepared and made available for inspection"). Generally, it is not necessary to cite a particular rule or statute in support of a records request until the requester attempts to satisfy the more demanding standard applicable when claiming that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel compliance with the request.

{¶ 15} To the extent that this decision conflicts with this court's decision in State ex rel. Husband v. Shanahan , 157 Ohio St.3d 148, 2019-Ohio-1853, 133 N.E.3d 467, we overrule that decision as having been incorrectly decided and inconsistent with the clear terms of the Rules of Superintendence. Moreover, we acknowledge that certain language in Harris , 155 Ohio St.3d 343, 2018-Ohio-4718, 121 N.E.3d 337, may have led to the Eighth District's misapplication of the Superintendence Rules in this case. In Harris , we cited the July 1, 2009 effective date of Sup.R. 44 through 47 as support for the conclusion that the Public Records Act did not apply. Id. at ¶ 10. In that case, however, the relator was seeking certificates of assignment from his 1991 criminal case. Id. at ¶ 4. Although those documents were created before Sup.R. 44 through 47 became effective, there was no reason to conclude in that case that the certificates at issue—if they existed at all—were "case documents" under Sup.R. 44(C) rather than "administrative documents" under Sup.R. 44(G).² See Sup.R. 44(G)(1) (defining "administrative document" as including documents "created, received, or maintained by a court that serves to record the administrative, fiscal, personnel, or management functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, organization, or other activities of the court"). Unlike case documents, administrative documents are subject to Sup.R. 44 through 47 regardless of when the documents were created. See Sup.R. 47(A)(2). Accordingly, we correctly applied the Superintendence Rules to the documents at issue in Harris .

b. The records-retention schedule

{¶ 16} Parker Bey also requested the Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts' records-retention schedule. Byrd stated in her supplemental brief filed in the court of appeals that she had no record of Parker Bey's request, but she nonetheless served the schedule on Parker Bey, as reflected by the certificate of service that accompanied the filing. See Civ.R. 5(B)(2) ; see also Davis v. Immediate Med. Servs., Inc. , 80 Ohio St.3d 10, 15, 684 N.E.2d 292 (1997). Parker Bey contends that he never received the document. Because Byrd has made clear that she is willing to provide Parker Bey with a copy of the retention schedule, there is no...