State ex rel. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Noll
| Decision Date | 03 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-1098-OA,80-1098-OA |
| Citation | 100 Wis.2d 650,302 N.W.2d 487 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. BRIGGS & STRATTON CORPORATION, Kimberly-Clark Corporation, A. O. Smith Corporation, and Appleton Electric Corporation, Petitioners, v. Joseph NOLL, Secretary, Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, John R. Byrnes, Administrator, Worker's Compensation Division, DILHR, and the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, Respondents. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Elwin J. Zarwell, Peter W. Bunde (argued), Thomas Armstrong (argued) and Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, on brief, for petitioners.
Gordon Samuelsen, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., on brief, for respondents.
This is an original action before this court. In dispute are the date at which certain statutorily authorized worker's compensation benefit increases take effect and the constitutional authority of the legislature in choosing that date. The facts in this case are not in dispute, the parties having filed a stipulation of facts with this court.
This court has jurisdiction over original actions by virtue of Art. VII, sec. 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution which states:
On December 5, 1979, Senate Bill 472 was introduced into the Wisconsin Legislature. Sec. 4 of this bill amended sec. 102.03(4), Stats., as follows:
"The right to compensation and the amount thereof of the compensation shall in all cases be determined in accordance with the provisions of law in effect as of the date of the injury except as to employes whose rate of compensation is changed as provided in ss. 102.43(7) and (8) and 102.44(1) and (2) (5)." 1
Sec. 6 of the bill amended sec. 102.11(1), Stats., so as to increase the maximum worker's compensation benefits "for injury on or after January 1, 1980." Sec. 6 reads:
Sec. 30 of the same bill provided for an effective date of the amended act as follows:
The bill in this form was delayed and therefore did not pass the legislature before the end of 1979. In 1980 the legislature's consideration of the bill continued. Various amendments were adopted, including one offered on February 12, 1980, which created sec. 29m. This section reads:
In this form the bill became law and was published as Chapter 278, Laws of 1979, on May 12, 1980.
On April 10, 1980, John R. Byrnes of the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, sent a letter to all "Insurers and Self-Insurers" affected by the act. In this letter he told of the increases in maximum benefits authorized by the bill and informed recipients that "the benefit increases contained in the bill are retroactive to January 1, 1980." He wrote that "The retroactive feature of these increases requires you to recalculate benefit payments to individuals injured on or after January 1, 1980...."
If Mr. Byrnes' directive is enforced, approximately 10,000 claims based on injuries occurring between January 1 and May 12, 1980, inclusive, would be affected. Petitioners are among those employers who would bear the burden of recalculating and paying the retroactively increased compensation on some of those claims. They brought this suit, arguing that the increase in compensation is not retroactive to January 1 but actually applies only to claims based on injuries occurring on or after May 13. They argue in the alternative that if the increase in benefits does by its terms apply to claims based on injuries occurring between January 1 and May 12, it is unconstitutional as a retroactive law. We find that the petitioners' second argument has merit.
Two issues are raised by this case: (1) Do the statutory amendments in question require increased compensation benefits for claims based on injuries which occurred on or after January 1, 1980, and before May 13, 1980? And, (2) if such increased benefits are required, is the law which requires them unconstitutional? Our answer to both of these questions is in the affirmative.
It is undisputable that if the bill authorizing the increases in question had become law before the end of 1979, the increases would apply to all claims arising out of injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1980, and this case would never have arisen. Secs. 4, 6 and 30 of the bill are in harmony on this point. Sec. 4 states that compensation shall be determined "in accordance with the provisions of law in effect as of the date of the injury...." 2 Sec. 6 raises benefits "for injury on or after January 1, 1980" and sec. 30 provides that the law shall take effect "on January 1, 1980, or the day after publication, whichever is later." If the bill had been enacted and published before January 1, then all three of these sections would refer to and would commence operation on the same date: January 1, 1980.
Benefit increase bills passed since 1972 have always been passed before the start of the new year and have authorized increases starting on January 1 of the following year. The bill at issue in this case appears to have been planned in the same pattern as its predecessors. Unlike the other benefit increase bills, however, this one was delayed and when the new year began, it still had not been enacted. On February 12, 1980, sec. 29m was added to the bill. This section provides that the act "applies to any injuries incurred, claims made or awards made after January 1, 1980." It is clear that this section was intended by the legislature as a cure for its inability to pass the bill before the end of 1979. Without the addition of sec. 29m, secs. 4 and 30 would have limited the benefit increases to claims based on injuries occurring after the effective date of the statute, rather than on all injuries on or after January 1. Sec. 29m was intended to reverse these consequences and make the benefit increases payable as though the bill were enacted, like its predecessors, before January 1. If this were not the intent of sec. 29m, then that section would be superfluous. As we stated in State ex rel. Knudsen v. Board of Education, 43 Wis.2d 58, 65, 168 N.W.2d 295 (1969):
In view of the previous pattern of the legislative enactments, the late date at which this section was added, and the clear language of the section itself, we must conclude that the legislature intended the increases to be retroactive to January 1, even though the bill did not become effective until May 13.
It is true that the general rule is that an amendment to the statutes takes effect when it is enacted and will not be considered retroactive " 'unless a contrary intention is expressly stated or necessarily implied.' " Dallmann v. Dallmann, 159 Wis. 480, 486, 149 N.W. 137 (1915). In this case, however, such intention is inescapable and we conclude that the legislature intended the amendments to apply starting on January 1, 1980, even though the statute was not enacted until months afterward.
Having found the intent of the statute to be retroactive, we must consider its constitutionality. The general rule is that "A statute dealing with substantive rights cannot affect rights vested on its effective date." Estate of Riley, 6 Wis.2d 29, 37, 94 N.W.2d 233 (1959). A legislature may not constitutionally enact a law which impairs vested rights acquired under prior law, nor may it "enact retrospective laws creating new obligations with respect to past transactions." Haase v. Sawicki, 20 Wis.2d 308, 312, 121 N.W.2d 876 (1963). If the worker's compensation statutes vest rights and fix obligations as of the date of the injury, then any law which attempts to change those rights and obligations after the date of injury is unconstitutional. This court has never specifically held that the compensation laws fix rights and obligations as of the date of injury. We have held, however, that the right to compensation fully accrues at the time of injury. Milwaukee v. Industrial Comm., 185 Wis. 307, 201 N.W. 251 (1924). We have also held that the amount of compensation benefits is determined according to the law as of the date of the injury. Western Condensing Co. v. Industrial Comm., 234 Wis. 452, 456, 291 N.W. 339 (1940); Discher v. Industrial Comm., 10 Wis.2d 637, 103 N.W.2d 519 (1960). We think it reasonable to conclude from these cases and from the statutes themselves that the right to compensation is vested and the amount of the obligation is fixed as of the date of the injury. Sec. 102.03(4), Stats., was in effect at the time of...
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