State ex rel. Brookpark Entertainment, Inc. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections, 90-2255

Citation573 N.E.2d 596,60 Ohio St.3d 44
Decision Date29 May 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-2255,90-2255
PartiesThe STATE, ex rel. BROOKPARK ENTERTAINMENT, INC., d.b.a. Crazy Horse Saloon, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Jennifer L. Brunner, Westerville, and Thomas P. Michael, Columbus, for relator.

Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Pros. Atty., and Michael Butler, for respondent Bd. of Elections.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., Catherine M. Cola and Cherry Lynne Poteet, Columbus, for respondent Secretary of State.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Chester T. Lyman, Columbus, for respondent Director of Liquor Control.

PER CURIAM.

Three conditions must be satisfied before a writ of prohibition will issue: (1) the court or officer against whom the writ is sought is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and (3) refusal of the writ will cause injury for which no adequate remedy in the ordinary cause of law exists. State, ex rel. Racing Guild of Ohio v. Morgan (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 54, 17 OBR 45, 476 N.E.2d 1060. A writ of mandamus will issue where the relator demonstrates that he is entitled to respondent's performance of a clear legal duty and that he has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State, ex rel. Westchester Estates, Inc. v. Bacon (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 42, 15 O.O.3d 53, 399 N.E.2d 81, paragraph one of the syllabus. For the following reasons, we hold that Brookpark has failed to satisfy both of these tests.

Prohibition

Brookpark contends that the respondents are all about to exercise quasi-judicial authority. "Quasi-judicial" authority has been defined as " ' * * * the power to hear and to determine controversies between the public and individuals which require a hearing resembling a judicial trial * * *.' " State, ex rel. Hensley v. Nowak (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 98, 99, 556 N.E.2d 171, 173, quoting State, ex rel. Methodist Book Concern v. Guckenberger (1937), 57 Ohio App. 13, 16-17, 9 O.O. 30, 31, 11 N.E.2d 277, 279, affirmed (1937), 133 Ohio St. 27, 9 O.O. 432, 10 N.E.2d 1001.

Canvassing and certifying election results, notifying appropriate authorities about these results, and physically picking up liquor permits do not involve hearings and do not require respondents to settle controversies of any kind. See State, ex rel. O'Grady v. Brown (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 17, 2 O.O.3d 94, 356 N.E.2d 296; State, ex rel. Glass v. Brown (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 7, 6 O.O.3d 76, 368 N.E.2d 837 (writs of prohibition to prevent Secretary of State from placing matters on ballot denied because no quasi-judicial authority at issue). Cf. Barton v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Elections (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 291, 530 N.E.2d 871 (election officials exercise quasi-judicial authority in determining the sufficiency of referendum petitions). Brookpark, therefore, has failed to show the first prerequisite for a writ of prohibition to issue.

Brookpark next argues that by declaring the local option election untimely, the district court's decision establishes that the election was void, and, therefore, that respondents have no authority to determine and act on the election results. Relying on the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and estoppel by judgment, Brookpark maintains that the parties in this case are bound by the district court's judgment. We disagree.

Res judicata refers to the principle that:

"A final judgment or decree rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights, questions and facts in issue as to the parties and their privies, and is a complete bar to any subsequent action upon the same cause of action between the parties or those in privity with them. * * *." (Emphasis added.) Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 49 O.O.2d 435, 254 N.E.2d 10, paragraph one of the syllabus.

Collateral estoppel, an aspect of res judicata, prevents a question that has been actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a first cause of action from being relitigated between the same parties or their privies in a second, different cause of action. Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 2 OBR 732, 734, 443 N.E.2d 978, 981.

Likewise, under the principle of estoppel by judgment:

" * * * [T]he final adjudication of a material issue by a court of competent jurisdiction binds the parties in any subsequent proceeding between or among them, irrespective of a difference in forms or causes of action. * * * " State, ex rel. Ohio Water Serv. Co. v. Mahoning Valley Sanitary Dist. (1959), 169 Ohio St. 31, 8 O.O.2d 1, 157 N.E.2d 116, paragraph two of the syllabus. Accord Kelly v. Georgia- Corp. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 134, 137, 545 N.E.2d 1244, 1248. But, see, Krahn v. Kinney (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 107, 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (estoppel by judgment does not apply where the causes of action are not the same).

Each of these doctrines requires a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction for its preclusive effect to apply. Here, however, the district court specifically held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and, for that reason, it dismissed Brookpark's case. Thus, even though the district court had first discussed how R.C. 4301.321 and 4301.331 apply to the instant local option election and went on to discuss Brookpark's constitutional arguments, the court's judgment is not conclusive of these matters. Accordingly, we hold that neither the district court's factual findings nor its conclusions of law are binding as between these parties.

Brookpark also urges us to consider the district court's decision as persuasive authority. We, however, are unable to accept that court's reading of Ohio local option law or its finding that Brookpark's violation "occurred," for the purpose of this law, on October 1, 1989.

The district court read R.C. 4301.321 to require an election within one year of a permit holder's violation of liquor control law. The time limit in R.C. 4301.321, however, is keyed to the date on which the liquor control commission finds the violation, not the date on which the violation occurs. The statute stated, in pertinent part:

"The electors of an election precinct may exercise the privilege of local option * * * if the holder of the permit has been found by the liquor control commission to have violated any provision of this chapter * * * of the Revised Code within one year prior to the election." Am.S.B. No. 481, Ohio Leg.Serv. (1989) 5-171, 5-172.

Indeed, contrary to the district court's decision, it is R.C. 4301.331, not R.C. 4301.321, that is keyed to the date on which a violation occurs. Establishing a time limit for the petitions that initiate the local option process, R.C. 4301.331 provided, in pertinent part:

" * * * Such a petition is valid only if the violation of a provision of Chapter 4301. * * * of the Revised Code occurred within one year prior to the date on which the petition is presented to the board of elections. * * * " H.B. No. 562, 142 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4332, 4342.

Furthermore, the material evidence in this case is not in dispute, and none of it supports the district court's conclusion that Brookpark committed its violation on October 1, 1989. Instead, the record plainly establishes that the commission found Brookpark in violation of liquor control law based on an act that took place on August 7, 1989. Accordingly, we specifically find that Brookpark's violation occurred on August 7, 1989. 1

Having made this finding, we now apply R.C. 4301.331. To be timely under the statute, the instant local option petitions had to be filed within one year after Brookpark's August 7, 1989 violation, or by August 7, 1990. The petitions, however, were not filed until August 23, 1990. Thus, while the district court considered these petitions timely, we hold that the petitions were not filed within the time limit prescribed by R.C. 4301.331.

To apply R.C. 4301.321, we must first determine when the liquor control commission "found" Brookpark's violation. Brookpark argues that the commission made this finding on October 24, 1989 (the day of the commission hearing) and, therefore, that the election was untimely under R.C. 4301.321 because it was held more than one year later. Some respondents argue that the commission made its finding on November 16, 1989 (the day the commission's order was mailed), and, therefore, that the election was timely under the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
38 cases
  • Barge v. Jaber
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • August 27, 1993
    ...Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 202, 203, 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983); see State ex rel. Bookpark Ent. Inc. v. Cuyahoga County, 60 Ohio St.3d 44, 573 N.E.2d 596 (1991); State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 63 Ohio St.3d 453, 456, 588 N.E.2d 840 (1992). The judgement in an ea......
  • State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • March 30, 1995
    ...Cty. Bd. of Elections (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 334, 337, 617 N.E.2d 1120, 1123; State ex rel. Brookpark Entertainment, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 44, 46, 573 N.E.2d 596, 599; State ex rel. Burech v. Belmont Cty. Bd. of Elections (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 154, 156,......
  • Ameigh v. Baycliffs Corp.
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • February 6, 1998
    ...N.E.2d 596, 599-600. This is true even if the prior court decision has discussed the issues that are the subject of the current litigation. Id. Therefore, we hold that the property owners are not barred by res judicata from maintaining an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to R.C. 519......
  • Daudistel v. Vill. of Silverton
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • December 26, 2014
    ...Ameigh v. Baycliffs Corp., 81 Ohio St.3d 247, 250, 690 N.E.2d 872 (1998), citing State ex rel. Brookpark Entertainment, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 60 Ohio St.3d 44, 47, 573 N.E.2d 596 (1991). "This is true even if the prior court decision has discussed the issues that are the s......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT