State ex rel. Brown Cnty. v. Myers

• Decision Date: 27 September 1881
• Parties: STATE OF WISCONSIN EX REL. BROWN COUNTY v. MYERS, JUDGE, ETC. (TWO CASES.)
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

52 Wis. 628

9 N.W. 777

STATE OF WISCONSIN EX REL. BROWN COUNTY

v.MYERS, JUDGE, ETC. (TWO CASES.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Filed September 27, 1881.

Gabe Bouck, for relator.

H. J. Huntington, for respondent.

COLE, C. J.

The question raised on these motions to quash relates to the validity of chapter 291, Laws 1880. That act authorizes the mayor and common council of any city, the president and board of trustees of any village, or supervisors of any town, who may consider such city, village, or town aggrieved by the action which may have been heretofore, or shall hereafter, be made or taken under section 1073, Rev. St., by the board of supervisors of the county wherein such city, village, or town is located, to apply, within a year from the time such action by the county board may have been or shall be made, to the circuit judge, wherein such county is situated, for the appointment of three commissioners to review the same, and to examine and determine what sum upon the hundred dollars should be added to or deducted from the aggregate valuations of the taxable property as made by the county board, in order to produce a just relation between all the valuations of the taxable property of the county. The commissioners are to be three discreet freeholders, not residents or owners of real estate in the county, who are to be appointed upon due notice to the board; are required to take and subscribe an oath to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties imposed upon them by the act, but cannot in any case increase the aggregate valuation of all the cities, villages, and towns above the aggregate valuations made by the county board. This is the substance of the act, the validity of which is called in question. The manifest object and intent of this law are to secure justice and equality in the valuation of the taxable property as between a city, village, and towns of the same county. The law goes upon the assumption that a county board, in equalizing the relative value of the taxable property in respect to such govermental subdivisions, may make mistakes or not act impartially. Provision is therefore made through the machinery of this act for reviewing its action by three discreet and disinterested men. The functions of these commissioners over the subject are limited. They may increase or diminish the aggregate valuation of the city or town, as determined by the board, so as to produce a just relation between all the valuations, but cannot in any instance increase the entire aggregate valuation of the taxable property of the county as fixed by the board.

It is not easy to discover any well-founded objection to this law. It surely appears to be a wholesome enactment--one intended to produce, in certain cases, greater uniformity and fairness in the assessments of property, and thus insure greater equality in the burdens of taxation. For it is manifest if there is not a fair valuation of property for the purposes of taxation, there can be no just apportionment of the tax. But, whether the law is wise or unwise, it is the plain duty of the court to uphold it, unless it violates some provision of the constitution. It is claimed by the learned counsel for the county that it does transcend the limits of legislative power, and is invalid, on various grounds: First, he says it unwarrantably interferes with the right of local self-government which is secured to counties, cities, and towns by the constitution; and he says the constitution, in various provisions, recognizes these governmental subdivisions as essential parts of the machinery of the state government, and secures to them control of their local affairs, more especially in all matters of taxation. In a certain sense this argument is sound. There are, doubtless, limits to the legislative power over counties and municipal corporations. That subject has more than once engaged the attention of this court, notably in State ex rel. McCurdy v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664, and cases there cited in the opinion by Mr. Justice Lyon. But the proper determination of this case does not call for any extended consideration of that subject now. An examination of the law in question will show, we think, that it does not in any way unwarrantably invade the power of the county board, or interfere with the right of local self-government. Its object, as we have said, is to secure greater uniformity and equality in the valuation of the taxable property as between the cities and towns of the county. The matter of...