State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula Cnty. Bd. of Elections

• Decision Date: 16 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2014–1405.,2014–1405.
• Citation: 31 N.E.3d 596,2014 Ohio 4022,142 Ohio St.3d 370
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. BROWN et al. v. ASHTABULA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

142 Ohio St.3d 370

31 N.E.3d 596

2014 Ohio 4022

The STATE ex rel. BROWN et al.

v.ASHTABULA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al.

No. 2014–1405.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Sept. 3, 2014.

Decided Sept. 16, 2014.

Louis E. Grube, for relators.

Nicholas A. Iarocci, Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney, and Shelley M. Pratt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Zachary P. Keller, Assistant Attorney General, for intervening respondent.

Taft, Stettinius and Hollister, L.L.P., and Donald C. Brey, Columbus, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae, David Schroeder.

PER CURIAM.

{¶ 1} Relators, Thomas Brown, Clifford Henry, and Michael Vandervort,¹ seek a writ of mandamus compelling respondents, the Ashtabula County Board of Elections and its director, Duane Feher, to place Brown's name on the November 4, 2014 ballot as a judicial candidate for the Ashtabula County Western Area Court. Because relators have not shown a clear entitlement to this extraordinary relief, we deny the writ.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Brown ran unsuccessfully to become the Democratic nominee for a seat on the Ashtabula County Common Pleas Court in the Democratic Party primary election held on May 6, 2014.

{¶ 3} On July 21, 2014, he filed nominating petitions to be a candidate for judge on the Ashtabula County Western Area Court in the November 4, 2014 general election. The Ashtabula County Board of Elections, relying solely on R.C. 3513.04, rejected Brown's petitions.

{¶ 4} Relators filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the board to certify his candidacy for the Western Area Court, asserting that R.C. 3513.04 is unconstitutional. We permitted Ohio Attorney General Michael DeWine to intervene as a respondent to defend the constitutionality of the statute.

Laches

{¶ 5} The attorney general asserts that relators unreasonably delayed in seeking relief and that this action is barred by the doctrine of laches. He suggests that Brown knew or should have known that he intended to challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 3513.04 on May 6, 2014, when he lost the primary election, and that relators failed to exercise the utmost diligence by not filing suit on July 24, 2014, when Brown first learned that the board would not certify his candidacy.

{¶ 6} "The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party." State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 N.E.2d 1277 (1995). Laches may bar relief in an election-related matter if the person seeking relief fails to act with the " ‘utmost diligence.’ " State ex rel. Monroe v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 137 Ohio St.3d 62, 2013-Ohio-4490, 997 N.E.2d 524, ¶ 30, quoting State ex rel. Fuller v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 221, 2002-Ohio-5922, 778 N.E.2d 37, ¶ 7.

{¶ 7} Relators could not have filed this action on May 6, 2014, when Brown lost the primary election, because relators had no claim for relief until the board of elections refused to place Brown's name on the ballot. State ex rel. Linnabary v. Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 16 ("Linnabary did not have a claim to assert until [the secretary of state] removed his name from the ballot"). Nor were respondents prejudiced by the failure to file suit on July 24, 2014, when Brown learned that the board would not certify his candidacy. Had relators filed suit at that time, this mandamus action would not have been docketed as an expedited election action, and the case might not have been decided before the September 20, 2014 deadline for sending absentee ballots to military and overseas voters, potentially placing the board in a significantly worse position.

{¶ 8} We therefore reject the claim that laches bars this action.

Mandamus

{¶ 9} The requirements for a writ of mandamus are well established: (1) the relator must demonstrate a clear legal right to relief, (2) the respondent must have a clear legal duty to perform the requested relief, and (3) there must be no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Harris v. Rhodes, 54 Ohio St.2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 641 (1978).

{¶ 10} And as we explained in State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967),

"the issuance of a writ of mandamus rests, to a considerable extent at least, within the sound discretion of the court to which application for the writ is made. The writ is not demandable as a matter of right, or at least is not wholly a matter of right; nor will it issue unless the relator has a clear right to the relief sought, and makes a clear case for the issuance of the writ. The facts submitted and the proof produced must be plain, clear, and convincing before a court is justified in using the strong arm of the law by way of granting the writ."

Id. at 161, 228 N.E.2d 631, quoting 35 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, Discretion as to Issuance, Generally, Section 37, at 285.

{¶ 11} A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, exercised by this court with caution and issued only when the right is clear. State ex rel. Taylor v. Glasser, 50 Ohio St.2d 165, 166, 364 N.E.2d 1 (1977) ; State ex rel. Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike Comm., 159 Ohio St. 581, 589, 113 N.E.2d 14 (1953).

{¶ 12} But relators are not only required to prove clear entitlement to relief, they must also overcome the presumption of constitutionality afforded to all acts of the General Assembly and demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that R.C. 3513.04 is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 345–346, 673 N.E.2d 1351 (1997) ; State ex rel. Watson v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 88 Ohio St.3d 239, 245, 725 N.E.2d 255 (2000) (applying presumption of constitutionality to statute setting forth qualifications for office of sheriff).

{¶ 13} The United States Constitution provides that states may prescribe "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives," Article I, Section 4, cl. 1, and the Supreme Court has recognized that states retain the power to regulate their own elections. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992).

{¶ 14} To assess the constitutionality of a state election law, the court must first "consider the character and magnitude of" the claimant's alleged injury. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). If the regulation severely restricts voting rights, then strict scrutiny applies and the law must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. Burdick at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059. We have explained that "a law severely burdens voting rights if it discriminates based on political content instead of neutral factors or if there are few alternative means of access to the ballot." Watson at 243, 725 N.E.2d 255. But "not every statutory restriction limiting the field of candidates need advance a compelling state interest," id., and if the regulation is minimally burdensome and nondiscriminatory, then " ‘the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions," Burdick at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059, quoting Anderson at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564.

{¶ 15} Notably, we applied these standards to a prior version of R.C. 3513.04 in Purdy and upheld the statute against constitutional challenge. At that time, paragraph three of the statute stated: "No person who seeks party nomination for an office or position at a primary election * * * shall be permitted to become a candidate by nominating petition * * * at the following general election for any office by nominating petition or by declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate." Sub.S.B. No. 261, 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10605, 10608. We concluded that this statute imposed only a "very limited" and slight burden on potential candidates, Purdy, 77 Ohio St.3d at 344, 673 N.E.2d 1351, "[did] not unreasonably interfere with the right of voters to have candidates of their choice placed on the ballot," id ., and was nondiscriminatory, id. at 343, 673 N.E.2d 1351, and we explained that "Ohio clearly has a legitimate interest in preventing potential conflicts among party members, an interest in preventing the possibility of voter confusion, and an interest in preventing candidacies that may conceivably be prompted by short-range goals," id. at 346, 673 N.E.2d 1351.

{¶ 16} Following our decision in Purdy, the General Assembly enacted a number of amendments to R.C. 3513.04, and the statute now states:

No person who seeks party nomination for an office or position at a primary election * * * shall be permitted to become a candidate by nominating petition * * * at the following general election for any office other than the office of member of the state board of education, office of member of a city, local, or exempted village board of education, office of member of a governing board of an educational service center, or office of township trustee.

(Emphasis added for new material since 1997.)

{¶ 17} Relators maintain that these amendments cannot survive strict scrutiny, because these provisions arbitrarily and invidiously discriminate against Brown and similarly situated individuals and severely burden fundamental rights to associate and vote by limiting the field of candidates available to voters. And, they contend, the restrictions imposed by the statute are purposeless; relators claim that any state interest in regulating partisan elections does not apply to candidates for nonpartisan office, that Brown's candidacy was not short-sighted, and that there is no chance of voter confusion or intraparty conflict in these circumstances.

{¶ 18} The attorney general responds that our decision in Purdy provides the rule of decision in this case, that the rational-basis...