State ex rel. Bryant v. Kent City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-P-2213,90-P-2213
• Citation: State ex rel. Bryant v. Kent City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 595 N.E.2d 410, 71 Ohio App.3d 748 (Ohio App. 1991)
• Parties: , 75 Ed. Law Rep. 1173 THE STATE ex rel. BRYANT, Appellee, v. KENT CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 748

71 Ohio App.3d 748

595 N.E.2d 410, 75 Ed. Law Rep. 1173

THE STATE ex rel. BRYANT, Appellee, v. KENT CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellant.

No. 90-P-2213.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Portage County.

Decided April 2, 1991.

Robert J. Walter and Robert M. Greggo, Columbus, for appellee.

R. Brent Minney, Akron, for appellant.

CHRISTLEY, Judge.

In February 1988, appellee filed a complaint in mandamus against appellant in the Portage County Court of Common Pleas. For relief, appellee sought an order requiring appellant to restore him to his "proper" position as a substitute driver. He also sought damages covering the back wages and other benefits he had lost as a result of the wrongful discharge. The court granted this writ and this appeal followed.

As part of its responsibility to provide transportation for students both to and from school, appellant, the Board of Education for the Kent City School District, maintains a staff of both full-time and substitute bus drivers. The latter group of drivers is used on an "as needed" basis, replacing those regular drivers who are unable to complete their assigned routes. The decision of which substitute to use in a given situation is within the discretion of the transportation supervisor.

As part of his duties, the transportation supervisor also maintains a list of drivers known as the "nighttime roster." The drivers on this limited list are used to take students on field trips and other extracurricular activities. Unlike the day substitutes, these drivers are used on a rotation basis. As a result, they are guaranteed a certain percentage of whatever trips are taken.

In March 1983, appellant hired appellee, Robert Bryant, as a substitute driver. During the remainder of the 1982-1983 school year, appellee worked approximately one hundred five hours in that capacity. In the following school year, he worked approximately one hundred ninety hours as a substitute, and was also a driver on the nighttime roster.

In June 1984, appellee was fired from his position for alleged insubordination. After appellee had filed an appeal under R.C. 124.34, the Kent Civil Service Commission disaffirmed the termination and ordered appellee's reinstatement. This decision was then affirmed on appeal by the Portage County Court of Common Pleas.

Upon technically being reinstated in 1986, appellee attended a bus drivers' meeting, for which he received compensation. To satisfy part of the requirements for his position, he was also given a physical examination for which appellant paid. However, during the eighteen-month period following his reinstatement, the trial court found, appellee was never called upon by the transportation supervisor to substitute for a full-time driver. Nor was appellee assigned to drive on any field trips. Finally, in 1988, appellee filed his complaint in mandamus.

In answering the complaint, appellant alleged that it had complied with the requirements of the decision of the Kent Civil Service Commission. Appellant also admitted that appellee was entitled to back wages and benefits.

After the parties engaged in discovery, a hearing was held on the issue of appellant's compliance with the prior decision. Based upon the evidence presented, the trial court held that by not using appellee in the same manner as it had prior to the termination, appellant was attempting "an end run" to "avoid" the order of the commission. Accordingly, the court granted the writ and ordered that appellee be reinstated "in fact."

Approximately three months following the entry of this first judgment, a second hearing was held on the damages question. Based upon documents submitted by appellee, the trial court awarded him $18,239.18. The majority of this award covered the wages appellee supposedly would have earned as a substitute driver during the six-year period since his termination. This amount was based upon the average amount of hours which other substitutes had actually worked in each of the past years. The remainder of the award covered the wages appellee supposedly would have earned from night field trips during the 1984-1985 school year.

Following the entry of this second judgment, appellant filed a timely appeal from both judgments. It now asserts the following as error:

"The trial court erred when it found that the respondent-appellant failed to comply with the order of the Kent Civil Service Commission and directed the respondent-appellant to reinstate the relator-appellee.

"The trial court erred in computing the damages to which the relator-appellee is allegedly entitled."

As both parties to this appeal correctly note, a writ of mandamus will lie only when the relator can satisfy three basic criteria:

"In order to grant a writ of mandamus, a court must find that the relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, that the respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and that relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law." State ex rel. Westchester Estates, Inc. v. Bacon (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 42, 15 O.O.3d 53, 399 N.E.2d 81, paragraph one of the syllabus.

Under its first assignment, appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the writ of mandamus because appellee, as relator below, failed to satisfy the second criterion, that of duty. This argument is based upon the proposition that in order to comply with the order of the Kent Civil Service Commission, appellant merely had to redesignate appellee as a substitute driver. Specifically, appellant maintains that it was not obligated to guarantee appellee a minimum number of hours as a substitute driver upon his reinstatement.

As part of its factual findings in its first judgment, the trial court stated:

"A substitute bus driver is employed on an 'as needed basis.' There is no rotation system and there are no minimum hours guaranteed. The Transportation Supervisor determines the need for substitutes and which individual to call when a substitute is needed."

Relying upon this finding, which is supported by the evidence in the trial transcript, appellant asserts that the choice of which substitute driver to call in a given situation was a matter within the discretion of the transportation supervisor. Appellant then argues that by requiring the supervisor to treat appellee as he did before termination, the trial court's order controls that discretion. We disagree. The order called for reinstatement, not just as a name to a list, but restoration to the former position--that of a substitute bus driver who was being actively and regularly used as needed.

As a general proposition, a writ of mandamus will not lie to control the discretion of an administrative officer. State ex rel. Benton's Village Service v. Usher (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 59, 63 O.O.2d 90, 295 N.E.2d 657. However, it will lie to correct an...