State Ex Rel. Burbridge v. St. John

• Decision Date: 28 June 1940
• Citation: State Ex Rel. Burbridge v. St. John, 143 Fla. 544, 197 So. 131 (Fla. 1940)
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BURBRIDGE et al. v. ST. JOHN, Tax Assessor.

197 So. 131

143 Fla. 544

STATE ex rel. BURBRIDGE et al. v. ST. JOHN, Tax Assessor.

Florida Supreme Court

June 28, 1940

Subsequent Opinion August 2, 1940.

See 197 So. 549.

En Banc.

Error to Circuit Court, Duval County; A. D. McNeill, Judge.

Proceeding by the State of Florida, on the relation of Clinton Burbridge and others, against Albert H. St. John, as Assessor of Taxes for a writ of mandamus. To review a judgment of dismissal plaintiffs bring error.

Reversed and remanded.

CHAPMAN and BUFORD, JJ., dissenting.

COUNSEL J. T. G. Crawford and Philip S. May, both of Jacksonville, for plaintiffs in error.

Cockrell & Cockrell, of Jacksonville, for defendant in error.

OPINION

BROWN Justice.

The petition for writ of mandamus filed by relators in this cause, and the alternative writ which followed it, alleged in substance that the several relators were owners of real estate in Duval County with dwelling houses located thereon from which the relators derived rental income and upon which they pay state and county and other taxes assessed against the same. That the legal title to certain described property in said county is vested in the Housing Authority of Jacksonville Florida, and that said Housing Authority is a 'body corporate and politic' under the laws of the State of Florida. That the respondent tax assessor had completed the tax roll for the year 1939 and had entered the real property of said Housing Authority on said roll and had marked the same as exempt from all taxes assessed by him for said year. That said land so exempted has been and is being improved by the erection thereon of dwelling houses at a cost of one million dollars, which houses are to be rented to tenants who will be required to pay the reasonable rent value thereof to said Housing Authority in direct competition which the relators and other citizens and tax payers of Duval County owning residential property for investment.

It is further alleged that the respondent claims that it was and is his duty to exempt said property from taxes solely because of the enactment of Chapter 17983, Laws of Florida of 1937, entitled 'An Act Providing that the Property and Debentures of Housing Authorities Shall be Exempt From Taxation and Assessments,' etc.

Then relators proceed to charge that said act above referred to, insofar as it proposes to exempt said described real estate from taxation, is unconstitutional and void because (a) it is not used exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary or charitable purposes within the meaning of Section 1 of Article IX and Section 16 of Article XVI of the Constitution of Florida. And (b) that said act violates the constitutional requirement that the legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation, as well as other grounds not here necessary to mention.

It is also alleged that Chapter 17981 of the Laws of Florida 1937, under which the Housing Authority of Jacksonville was organized, is unconstitutional for several reasons therein set forth.

The command of the alternative writ is that respondent enter upon the tax roll of Duval County for the year 1939 and subsequent years the land herein particularly described, and do enter against said land all taxes and assessments that are entered against the lands of relators and other lands in said county similarly situated.

The alternative writ was issued on August 1, 1939, and on September 2, 1939, the respondent's return to the same was filed, in which none of the allegations of fact contained in the petition and alternative writ are denied, but the respondent tax assessor alleges that the Housing Authority of Jacksonville, Florida, was created and exists under and by virtue of Chapter 17981, Acts of 1937, and that in the extension on said tax rolls, after identifying said real estate, respondent had added the words: 'Housing Authority of Jacksonville, Florida, exempt under Chapter 17983;' that said preliminary tax rolls had been submitted to the Board of County Commissioners when said alternative writ issued and had been returned to the tax assessor with said Board's approval and are now in the custody of the respondent.

Respondent tax assessor also stated in his answer that he is advised and believes that said property of said Housing Authority is and will remain tax exempt pursuant to said Florida legislation and the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Marvin v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145, published in 1938, and that respondent's duty as a county officer has been and is being complied with in acting officially as he did.

The relators on September 15, 1939, moved the court to enter a peremptory writ notwithstanding said return, and on November 8th the Circuit Court made an order denying said motion, and an amendment to said order was entered on November 16, 1939, in which later order the former order was followed and the cause was dismissed.

When the constitutionality of a statute is in general terms sustained as a whole, as against the stated grounds of illegality, as in Marvin v. Housing Authority, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145, the validity of particular provisions of the statute, which were not directly involved, may thereafter be challenged on appropriate grounds; also the legality of theapplication of any portion or all of the statute to the facts of the particular case may be appropriately challenged in due course of litigation, unless the prior adjudication as to such parts of the statute, or as to the application of any portion thereof, have become res adjudicata.

There is no contention here by the respondent that said real estate owned by the Housing Authority is used for religious, scientific, educational, literary or charitable purposes. The only contention of the respondent is that said property is used exclusively for a municipal purpose. This contention the relators, plaintiffs in error here, deny. The allegation of the alternative writ that the land is being improved by the erection thereon of dwelling houses which are to be rented to tenants who will be required to pay a reasonable rental value therefor to the Housing Authority of Jacksonville, is not denied by the respondent's return, and relators contend that the facts thus admitted show plainly that this is not a municipal purpose. This contention of the plaintiffs in error, if well founded, would require us to hold that Chapter 17983, Laws of 1937, which exempts the property of Housing Authorities created by Chapter 17981 of the Laws of 1937, from all taxation, is in conflict with Section 1 of Article IX, and Section 16 of Article XVI of the Constitution. The question here involved then is this: Under the facts alleged and admitted in this case, is the land described in the pleadings held and used by the Jacksonville Housing Authority, a corporation, exclusively for municipal purposes?

The Act under which the Housing Authority of Jacksonville was created, above referred to, Chapter 17981, states that the clearance, replanning and reconstruction of areas in which insanitary or unsafe housing conditions exist and the providing of safe and sanitary accommodations for persons of low income, are 'exclusively public * * * purposes,' for which private property may be acquired and are 'governmental functions of public concern.' There is no declaration in this act that housing projects are formunicipal purposes.

Chapter 17983, Acts of 1937, provides that the property and debentures of housing authorities shall be exempt from all taxes, and states that the property of Housing Authorities is 'exclusively for public uses and municipal purposes.' and 'not for profit,' and are governmental functions of State concern.

So here we have a legislative determination that the property of a Housing Authority, such as the one we have here, created under Chapter 17981, and enjoying also the powers and privileges contained in Chapter 17982, Acts of 1937, constitutes a municipal purpose.

Section 1 of Art. IX of the Constitution says that: 'The Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation' and 'shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, education, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes.'

Section 5 of Article IX states that the legislature shall authorize counties and incorporated cities and towns 'to assess and impose taxes for county and municipal purposes, and for no other purposes.'

Section 16 of Art. XVI of the Constitution provides that: 'The property of all corporations * * * shall be subject to taxation unless such property be held and used exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary or charitable purposes.'

The legislature may, within reasonable and lawful bounds, determine what is a municipal purpose, Brown v. City of Lakeland, 61 Fla. 508, 54 So. 716, and we have held in several cases that the legislative determination of what constitutes a county purpose or a municipal purpose will not be held in violaton of the constitutional provisions above mentioned unless the particular enactment can have no legal or practical relation whatever to any county or municipal purpose.

However claimed exemptions from taxation must be carefully scrutinized. The general provision of the Constitution (Sec. 1, Art. IX) is that the legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation of all property, except such as may be exempted by law for municipal and other named purposes; and under section 16 of Art. XVI, property of corporations,...