State ex rel. Bynum v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 1, 1172S158

• Decision Date: 09 January 1973
• Docket Number: No. 1172S158,1172S158
• Citation: 291 N.E.2d 355,259 Ind. 647
• Parties: STATE of Indiana on the relation of Earl BYNUM, Relator, v. The LaPORTE SUPERIOR COURT NO. 1 and the Honorable Norman H. Sallwasser, Respondents.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 355

291 N.E.2d 355

259 Ind. 647

STATE of Indiana on the relation of Earl BYNUM, Relator, v. The LaPORTE SUPERIOR COURT NO. 1 and the Honorable Norman H.

Sallwasser, Respondents.

No. 1172S158.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Jan. 9, 1973.

Donald D. Martin, Michigan City, for relator.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Colker, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

PRENTICE, Justice.

This matter is before us upon the return of the respondent to the alternative writ of prohibition issued herein on November 20, 1972 and the relator's reply thereto, said writ directing the respondent to refrain, until the further order of this Court, from proceeding further in exercising jurisdiction in causes numbered 4324 and 4325 of the respondent court, and to show cause why the said writ should not be made permanent.

The writ was issued on petition of Earl Bynum, relator, an inmate of the Indiana State Prison at Michigan City, LaPorte County, Indiana, which institution lies within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent court, said relator having been committed in 1955, for the rest of his natural life, upon conviction of murder in the second degree. On May 1, 1972, Bynum was charged in the respondent court in two separate criminal causes, being the aforesaid causes numbered 4324 and 4325 and being, respectively, the commission of a felony while armed with a dangerous weapon and assault and battery with intent to kill alleged to have been committed in LaPorte County, where the respondent court sits. It is Bynum's position that he may not be removed from the prison to the respondent court for proceedings in said causes, by reason of the Acts of 1905, ch. 169, § 135, 1956 Repl.Burns Inc.Stat.Ann. § 9--1017, IC 1971, 35--1--20--2, which in applicable parts, is as follows:

'A convict in any one of the prisons of the state, * * * against whom an indictment or affidavit for felony is pending, * * * may be removed to the county in which such * * * indictment or affidavit is pending, for * * * trial, * * *; but no convict for life shall be so removed, unless * * * the indictment pending against him, is for treason or for murder in the first degree.' (Our emphasis.)

The respondent contends that the words 'removed' and 'so removed' refer to removal from the county rather than to removal from the prison. Under such an interpretation, the respondent could proceed in said causes unhampered by the statute, because to do so would not require his removal from the county. To hold otherwise, they assert, is to grant immunity from prosecution for crimes, other than treason and first degree murder, to prisoners under life sentence and that such could not have been the legislative intent. We fear, however, that they confuse 'legislative intent' with 'legislative result,' which, in spite of the utmost care and caution in drafting, are not always one and the same thing. None will dispute that in construing statutes, it is out duty to give effect to the plain and manifest meaning of the language used. This requires no citation of authority. In cases of ambiguity, we must search for legislative intent. If more than one construction is possible, the court may consider the consequences of a particular construction. Hamilton v. Huntington (1945), 223 Ind. 143, 58 N.E.2d 349, rehearing denied 223 Ind. 143, 59 N.E.2d 122; State ex rel. Fox v. Board of Commissioners of Carroll County (1931), 203 Ind. 23, 178 N.E. 563. A consideration of attendant evils may properly influence the construction in such cases; State v. Rice (1956), 235 Ind. 423, 134 N.E.2d 219; Helms v. American Sec. Co. of Indiana (1939), 216 Ind. 1, 22 N.E.2d 822, and the court will endeavor to give the statute a practical application and to construe it in such a way as to oppose prejudice to public interest. State v. Rice, supra; Helms v. American Sec. Co. of Indiana, supra; Lost Creek School Township, Vigo County v. York (1939), 215 Ind. 636, 21 N.E.2d 58, 127 A.L.R. 1287; Town of Brownsburg v....