State ex rel. Chapman v. Appling
Decision Date | 20 January 1960 |
Citation | 348 P.2d 759,220 Or. 41 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon on the relation of R. F. CHAPMAN, Plaintiff, v. Howell APPLING, Jr., Secretary of State, Defendant. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Dean F. Bryson, Portland, argued the cause and submitted a brief for plaintiff.
Robert G. Danielson, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued the cause for defendant. With him on the briefs were Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen., and Donal D. Sullivan, Asst. Atty. Gen.
This is a proceeding in mandamus in which the relator is R. F. Chapman, state senator for the Seventh Senatorial District, comprising Coos and Curry Counties, and the defendant is Howell Appling, Jr., Secretary of State. The case is here on the defendant's demurrer to the alternative writ based on the ground that the alternative writ fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The question presented is whether the legislative assembly of this state has the power to enact a statute increasing the compensation for services of its members beyond that provided by Article IV, § 29, Oregon Constitution, as amended in 1950. We took original jurisdiction because of the public importance of the controversy. The statute whose validity is challenged is ORS 171.071 (Oregon Laws 1959, ch. 391), which reads:
'The compensation of members of the Legislative Assembly shall be paid by the State Treasurer out of appropriations for legislative expenses, upon warrants drawn by the Secretary of State, at the rate of $175 per month, as follows:
'(4) In addition to the salary provided in subsection (3) of this section, the successor referred to in subsection (3) of this section shall receive salary as provided in subsection (2) of this section for the succeeding year in which a regular session is not held.
'(5) A member of the Legislative Assembly may retain any salary theretofore paid under subsections (1) to (4) of this section if he ceases to be a member for any reason before the expiration of his term.
'(6) If a member of the Legislative Assembly ceases to be a member for any reason before the expiration of his term and during a year in which a regular session is not held, and his successor is elected or appointed and qualifies in such year, such successor shall be paid salary as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
The statute carried an emergency clause and became effective May 5, 1959. On May 6, 1959, Mr. Chapman made written demand on the defendant for the payment to him of the salary claimed to be due him as a member of the legislative assembly for the year 1959, to-wit, $900, that being the difference between the amount he had previously been paid, to-wit, $1200 (pursuant to Article IV, § I9, Oregon Constitution), and the amount fixed by Oregon Laws 1959, ch. 391. The defendant refused compliance with this demand, and the plaintiff thereafter sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel such compliance.
The provision of the constitution which the defendant claims is violated by the 1959 Act is an amendment of Article IV, § 29, which was referred to the people by House Joint Resolution No. 5 of the 45th Legislative Assembly and adopted at the regular general election, November 7, 1950. See Oregon Laws 1951, p. 5. The amendment reads:
Prior to the adoption of this amendment, Article IV, § 29 read:
The foregoing provision was an amendment of Article IV, § 29, adopted in 1942. See Oregon Laws 1943, p. 5. As originally adopted in the Constitution of 1859, the section read:
We call attention to these former provisions at this point, because they use the words 'not exceeding' before the stipulated compensation, and there are no similar words in the section as it now stands. An argument of the relator based on this change in language will be noticed later in this opinion.
The contention of the relator is that Article IV, § 29, as it now reads and has read since 1950, contains no express language of limitation on the power of the legislature, and none is to be implied; hence the legislative assembly has been set free to fix its own compensation. The section, according to this view, means the same as it would have meant had it read that the members of the legislative assembly shall receive for their services a salary of $600 a year until the legislative assembly shall otherwise provide.
We will discuss this contention in the light of certain well-established principles, namely, (1) that a state constitution does not confer power on the legislature, but is a limitation on power, and therefore it is competent for the legislature to enact any law not expressly or impliedly forbidden by the state constitution or prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, and (2) that a court will not strike down an act of the legislature unless its repugnancy to the constitution is clear and free from all reasonable doubt. These principles are so familiar that it is scarcely necessary to cite authority for them. The opinions in Jory v. Martin, 153 Or. 278, 56 P.2d 1093, a case on which the relator places his main reliance, and State v. Cochran, 55 Or. 157, 104 P. 419, 105 P. 884, contain numerous citations to adjudicated cases and the works of learned commentators where these fundamental rules of constitutional construction are expounded.
A third principle to be kept in mind is well stated in 11 Am.Jur. 659, Constitutional Law § 50:
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