State Ex Rel. Chatlos v. Rowland.
| Decision Date | 26 July 1944 |
| Citation | 131 Conn. 261,38 A.2d 785 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. CHATLOS v. ROWLAND. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; O'Sullivan, Judge.
Proceeding in mandamus by the State, on the relation of Arthur A. Chatlos, against Henry L. Rowland to compel defendant, as Secretary of the Bridgeport Zoning Committee, to indorse an application for an alcoholic liquor restaurant permit. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
Error and case remanded with direction.
John J. Hunt, of Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).
John V. Donnelly, of Bridgeport (Harry Schwartz, of Bridgeport, on the brief), for appellee (defendant).
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.
The plaintiff Chatlos owns and operates a restaurant business in Birdgeport and in connection therewith has sold beer under a permit for the sale of alcoholic liquor, limited to beer, issued by the liquor control commission. Prior to August 31, 1942, the premises were in a Business Number 1 zone classification in which the sale of alcoholic liquor under a proper permit was not prohibited. On the date just mentioned the area in which the premises were located was reclassified and became a Business Number 3 zone. The ordinance provided that no building or premises located in such a zone should be used for the sale of alcoholic liquor under any restaurant permit. Thereupon, the use of the plaintiff's property as a restaurant selling alcoholic liquor under a restaurant permit for beer only became a nonconforming use, but as this use existed at the time the reclassification was made the use could be, and was, continued.
On July 16, 1943, the plaintiff desired to secure, for use in connection with the restaurant, in place of a permit for the sale of beer only, one for the sale of any kind of alcoholic liquor. Section 969e of the Cumulative Supplement of 1939 provides that permits for the sale of alcoholic liquor in any city or town ‘shall be confined to the parts thereof prescribed by zoning ordinances, if any.’ The application blank for a permit prescribed by the liquor control commission contains a certificate, to be signed by the proper municipal officer, that ‘the sale of alcoholic liquor’ is not prohibited by the city's ordinances or by-laws at the location for which the permit is sought. An ordinance of the city provided that any such certificate should be indorsed solely by the zoning commission acting through its duly authorized agent. The defendant, as secretary of the zoning commission, was its authorized agent to sign the certificate. He refused, however, to do so. The plaintiff brought this action to compel him to sign it and has appealed from a judgment in his favor.
The sale of liquor in the restaurant constituted a nonconforming use. The section of the zoning ordinance concerning such uses is quoted in the footnote. 1 The trial court concluded that the proposed change in the permit from one for the sale of beer only to one under which any kind of alcoholic liquor might be sold was not permissible under the ordinance and particularly under the section concerning nonconforming uses. From its memorandum of decision, it appears that it regarded the proposal as one which involved a change in the use of the premises and it construed the introductory paragraph of the section of the ordinance in question as permitting a change in use only when an existing building had been structurally altered. That the sale of all alcoholic liquors in the restaurant in place of the sale of beer only involves a change of use hardly admits of question; so far as the record shows, there was to be no enlargement of the existing use; no more space in the building was to be devoted to the restaurant, and it does not appear that more customers would be served therein; there would be, not an extension of use, but a definite alteration in it.
If the introductory paragraph of the ordinance stood alone, it would give support to the conclusion of the trial court. Reflection, however, brings to the fore the consideration that, if a change in use could only be brought about where a building has been structurally altered, then it would be possible at any time for any applicant to circumvent the ordinance by making some minimum structural alteration; and no legislative body would be apt to intend a limitation which could be so easily obviated. However, it is not necessary to go beyond the terms of the ordinance to see that this was not intended. Subparagraph 5 provides: ...
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McAdams v. Barbieri
...and made operative so far as possible. Hutchison v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 381, 385, 100 A.2d 839; State ex rel. Chatlos v. Rowland, 131 Conn. 261, 265, 38 A.2d 785; Lake Garda Co. v. LeWitt, 126 Conn. 588, 592, 13 A.2d 510; State v. Dorau, 124 Conn. 160, 168, 198 A. 573. If we ......
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Clark v. Town Council of Town of West Hartford
...all its provisions if that is possible. Hutchison v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 381, 385, 100 A.2d 839; State ex rel. Chatlos v. Rowland, 131 Conn. 216, 265, 38 A.2d 785. The special act authorizing the council to create zoning districts states that it may divide the town into distr......
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Town of Lebanon v. Woods
...uses to designated localities or districts.' See also Thayer v. Board of Appeals, 114 Conn. 15, 23, 157 A. 273; State ex rel. Chatlos v. Rowland, 131 Conn. 261, 266, 38 A.2d 785. All of our cases, until now, and all of the recognized text writers hold that the regulation of the use of prope......
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Kleinsmith v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Town of Greenwich
...These regulations expressly authorize a change in such use subject to the conditions therein stated. See State ex rel. Chatlos v. Rowland, 131 Conn. 261, 265, 38 A.2d 785. The amendment as passed by the commission provides that the sale of alcoholic liquor under the conditions contained in ......