State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Carl C.

• Decision Date: 18 May 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. 30,951,31,305.,s. 30,951
• Citation: 281 P.3d 1242,2012 -NMCA- 065
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner–Appellee, v. CARL C., Respondent–Appellant, and Dana H., Respondent, and In the Matter of Cheyenne C. and Caylie C., Children. State of New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Department, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Dana H., Respondent–Appellant, and Carl C., Respondent, and In the Matter of Cheyenne C. and Caylie C., Children.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

281 P.3d 1242

2012 -NMCA- 065

STATE of New Mexico ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner–Appellee,

v.CARL C., Respondent–Appellant,andDana H., Respondent,

and

In the Matter of Cheyenne C. and Caylie C., Children.

State of New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Department, Petitioner–Appellee,

v.Dana H., Respondent–Appellant,andCarl C., Respondent,

and

In the Matter of Cheyenne C. and Caylie C., Children.

Nos. 30,951, 31,305.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

May 18, 2012.

New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department, Oneida L'Esperance, Chief Children's Court Attorney, Daniel J. Pearlman, Children's Court Attorney, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee in Carl C.

New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department, Oneida L'Esperance, Chief Children's Court Attorney, Rebecca J. Liggett, Children's Court Attorney, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee in Dana H.

Lopez & Sakura, LLP, Julie Sakura, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant Carl C.

Alex Chisholm, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant Dana H.

Robert Ionta, Gallup, NM, Guardian Ad Litem.

OPINION

VANZI, Judge.

{1} Both Dana H. (Mother) and Carl C. (Father) appeal the district court's adjudication that Cheyenne C. (Infant Child) and Caylie C. (Older Child) (collectively, Children) were abused pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 32A–4–2(B)(1) (2009), finding alternatively that Mother and Father each either physically abused Infant Child or that they did not recognize or acknowledge that the other parent had perpetrated the abuse. We combined the appeals due to the shared record and to address in one opinion Mother's and Father's identical argument that the district court erred in finding that Children were abused without making a finding assigning the abuse to a specific parent. Father further argues that Section 32A–4–2(B), as applied to him, is unconstitutionally vague. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} The following facts were established at the adjudicatory hearing on July 27 and 28, 2010. On February 11, 2010, Infant Child was hospitalized for a respiratory issue. Upon admission, an x-ray and full skeletal survey were performed, which revealed a fracture in Infant Child's left clavicle. The fracture appeared to be healing, and no other fractures were found. Infant Child was discharged to Mother and Father on February 18, 2010.

{3} On February 25, 2010, Mother brought Infant Child back to the hospital, reporting that Infant Child had been ill the previous night. During Infant Child's hospital stay, the hospital staff determined that Infant Child had suffered three seizures, and Infant Child was transferred to a different hospital. On March 3, 2010, the hospital performed an MRI and skeletal survey that revealed that Infant Child had two subdural hematomas, a right skull fracture, a fracture in one of the bones of the right forearm, and an injury to the right clavicle. Of the subdural hematomas, one appeared to be approximately two weeks old, and the other appeared to be less than one week old. Further examination revealed a right femur fracture, a right parietal skull fracture, and ischemic brain tissue damage. Based on Infant Child's extensive injuries, the Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD) filed an abuse/neglect petition pursuant to Section 32A–4–2, alleging that Mother and Father had abused and neglected Children.

{4} When speaking to CYFD, both Mother and Father denied having knowledge of what caused Infant Child's injuries. On various occasions, they blamed the injuries on Older Child (who was less than two years old at the time), on the hospital staff, and on an evil spirit residing in their household. At the hearing, both Mother and Father refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds.

{5} Dr. Gwen Lattimore testified as an expert in the evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment of children suspected of having been abused and/or neglected. She testified to Infant Child's various injuries and ultimately concluded that Infant Child was injured through non-accidental or abuse trauma occurring on at least two separate occasions and that the head trauma was the cause of Infant Child's seizures. Dr. Lattimore testified that the kinds of injuries observed on Infant Child were caused by adults and not by short falls or small children. She further testified that, while Infant Child's fractures were not readily apparent to the naked eye, injuries like those Infant Child received would have produced behaviors or reactions from Infant Child that her caretakers would have noticed, even if they could not tell specifically what the injuries were.

{6} CYFD called two other witnesses, Officer Jimmy Ramos of the New Mexico State Police Department, and Lynette Mose, a social worker assigned to the case. Officer Ramos testified that Mother had told him that she and Father were the primary caretakers for Children and that her mother, Children's grandmother, watched them on Wednesday evenings for a couple of hours while Mother and Father attended a college class. Officer Ramos further testified that Mother had said that Children's grandmother was the only person who was with Children when Mother and Father were not around. Ms. Mose testified that, in her investigation, she had interviewed Mother and Father, the grandmother, and a CYFD employee. She also reviewed various documents, including Dr. Lattimore's consultation report, the abuse and neglect petition, and an affidavit. Based on her investigation and her observations of the previous testimony, she believed that the continued care of Children by Father and Mother would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to Children.

{7} Before entering its findings, the district court noted that it had “no problem” finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother or Father caused the injuries, but it could not determine which parent specifically was the perpetrator. Later, in the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court found that Mother and Father were the “primary caretakers [for Children] between February 12, 2010[,] and March 2, 2010 [,]” and that Infant Child “suffered non-accidental trauma (physical abuse) by ... [Mother] and/or [Father].” The district court further found that Mother and Father “either physically abused [Infant Child], or the physical abuse of [Infant Child] was perpetrated by [one parent] and [the other] did not recognize and/or acknowledge ... the abuse and [therefore] is a threat to the safety of [Children].” Regarding Older Child, the court stated, “[t]he non-accidental trauma (physical abuse) of [Infant Child] by [Mother and/or Father] places [Older Child] at risk of suffering serious physical and emotional harm if placed back in the care of [Mother and/or Father].” The court further clarified that “if there is a non-abusing parent, [the non-abusing parent's] inaction resulted in an ‘abused child’ as defined in [Section] 32A–4–2(B).” The court adjudicated Children as abused, and these appeals followed.

DISCUSSIONThe Adjudication of Children as Abused

{8} Mother and Father ask us to interpret Section 32A–4–2(B)(1) and find that the statute requires a specific determination of which parent's actions or inactions caused Children to be put at risk. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. Morgan Keegan Mortg. Co. v. Candelaria, 1998–NMCA–008, ¶ 5, 124 N.M. 405, 951 P.2d 1066. “In interpreting statutes, we seek to give effect to the Legislature's intent, and in determining intent we look to the language used and consider the statute's history and background.” Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 121 N.M. 764, 768–69, 918 P.2d 350, 354–55 (1996).

{9} Mother and Father argue that the district court erred in adjudicating Children as abused without determining which parent actually caused the injuries suffered by Infant Child. To support their argument, Mother and Father each rely on this Court's interpretation of a previous version of the child abuse statute, Section 32A–4–2 (1993), as analyzed in State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Department v. Vincent L., 1998–NMCA–089, ¶¶ 8–12, 125 N.M. 452, 963 P.2d 529. In analyzing Mother's and Father's argument, we find it helpful to examine the historical background and amendments to the relevant portions of the child abuse statute.

{10} Prior to 1997, the child abuse statute provided the following definition for “abused child.”

“Abused child” means a child:

(1) who has suffered physical abuse, emotional abuse or psychological abuse inflicted by the child's parent, guardian or custodian;

(2) who has suffered sexual abuse or sexual exploitation inflicted by the child's parent, guardian or custodian;

(3) whose parent, guardian or custodian has knowingly, intentionally or negligently placed the child in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health; or

(4) whose parent, guardian or custodian has knowingly or intentionally tortured, cruelly confined or cruelly punished the child[.]

Section 32A–4–2(B) (1993).

{11} In our analysis of this version of the child abuse statute, we found that, prior to its amendment in 1997, the definition of “abused child” did not permit the children's court to adjudicate a child abused or neglected without assigning responsibility for the abuse or neglect to a parent, guardian, or custodian. Vincent L., 1998–NMCA–089, ¶ 1, 125 N.M. 452, 963 P.2d 529. The 1997 amendment added an additional paragraph, Section 32A–4–2(B)(1), to the definition that stated that an “abused child” is a child “who is at risk of suffering serious harm[.]” Section 32A–4–2(B)(1) (1997). This Court recognized that the amended language allowed a court to adjudicate a child as abused without determining who was the abuser. See Vincent L., 1998–NMCA–089, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 452, 963 P.2d 529. In 1999, the Legislature amended Section 32A–4–2(B)(1) to its current version, which now reads that an “abused child” is a child “who is at risk...