State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Scott C.

• Decision Date: 03 September 2015
• Docket Number: 34,221,34,220,33,891.
• Citation: 365 P.3d 27
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner–Appellant, v. SCOTT C., Respondent–Appellee, and David H., Respondent, In The Matter of Bryce H., Child. State of New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Department, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Scott C., Respondent–Appellee, and Karen S. and Scott S., Respondents, In the Matter of Ryan S., Child. Tierra Blanca Ranch High Country Youth Program, and Scott Chandler, individually, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. State of New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

365 P.3d 27

STATE of New Mexico ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.SCOTT C., Respondent–Appellee,andDavid H., Respondent,In The Matter of Bryce H., Child.

State of New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Department, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.Scott C., Respondent–Appellee,andKaren S. and Scott S., Respondents,In the Matter of Ryan S., Child.

Tierra Blanca Ranch High Country Youth Program, and Scott Chandler, individually, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.State of New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department, Defendant–Appellee.

34,220

34,221

33,891.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Sept. 3, 2015.

Certiorari Denied, Jan. 5, 2016, No. S-1-SC-35561.

Timothy Flynn–O'Brien, Albuquerque, NM, New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department, Jennifer Saavedra, General Counsel, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant/Appellee Children, Youth and Families Department.

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., R. Nelson Franse, Henry M. Bohnhoff, Glenn A. Beard, Matthew M. Beck, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee/Appellant Scott Chandler and Appellant Tierra Blanca Ranch High Country Youth Program.

OPINION

VANZI, Judge.

{1} This appeal arises from litigation related to the alleged abuse and neglect of children at the Tierra Blanca Ranch (the Ranch), a facility operated by Scott Chandler for "troubled and at-risk teenagers." In late 2013, the Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD) investigated reports of abuse and neglect at the Ranch, ultimately initiating nine separate abuse and neglect cases against Chandler. When CYFD learned that the children were no longer in Chandler's custody, it filed notices of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 10–145(A)(1)(a) NMRA, terminating proceedings without prejudice against Chandler in several of the nine cases. CYFD and Chandler then agreed on the record to amend some or all of the dismissals to read "with" as opposed to "without" prejudice. The events that followed are the subject of this consolidated appeal.

{2} On appeal from a declaratory judgment/writ action in Tierra Blanca Ranch High Country Youth Program v. Children, Youth & Families Department, No. D–0721–CV–2013–00107, Chandler challenges, on res judicata (claim preclusion) grounds, CYFD's authority to conduct a Child Protective Services investigation and issue "investigative decisions" against him after agreeing to dismiss him from the abuse and neglect proceedings with prejudice. On appeal from In re Bryce H., No. D–0721–JQ–2013–06, and In re Ryan S., No. D–0721–JQ–2013–10, CYFD challenges the underlying issue of the district court's jurisdiction to reopen and dismiss with prejudice abuse and neglect cases involving two of the nine children. For the reasons discussed in this Opinion, we affirm the district court's order in Tierra Blanca Ranch and reverse the court's orders in In re Bryce H. and In re Ryan S.

BACKGROUND

{3} On September 22, 2013, a fatal rollover involving a Ranch employee and three Ranch youth was reported to CYFD. CYFD and the state police jointly interviewed eleven children, who described prevalent physical and emotional torment at the Ranch, including shackling, forced labor, and the taunting and beating of children by other children and Ranch staff. On October 9, 2013, CYFD filed nine petitions alleging abuse and neglect of children at the Ranch and naming as respondents Chandler and the childrens' parents. Since the children were still believed to be in Chandler's custody when the petitions were filed, CYFD also filed affidavits for ex-parte custody orders with each petition. See NMSA 1978, § 32A–4–16(A) (1993) ("At the time a petition is filed or any time thereafter, the ... court may issue an ex-parte custody order upon a sworn written statement of facts showing probable cause exists to believe that the child is abused or neglected and that custody ... is necessary."). The nine petitions, involving similar (if not identical) allegations, were inexplicably assigned to three separate judges, but all ex-parte motions were consistently granted, and legal custody of the children was temporarily awarded to CYFD pending hearings in each case. By statute, the hearings are preliminary matters, separate from the adjudication of abuse and neglect, and are designed only "to determine if the child should remain in ... [CYFD's] custody pending adjudication." NMSA 1978, § 32A–4–18(A) (2014).

{4} Prior to the first custody hearing—Charlie L. —which was scheduled for the morning of October 15, all children were either returned to their parents or placed with CYFD. According to counsel for CYFD, the fact that the children were then "safe and away from the alleged perpetrator" prompted it to prepare notices for the clerk, voluntarily dismissing Chandler without prejudice from the abuse and neglect proceedings pursuant to Rule 10–145(A)(1)(a). Counsel for CYFD specifically believed that "Chandler no longer presented any immediate danger and there was no reason to proceed to a custody hearing or adjudicatory hearing as to him." Thus, a little over an hour before the custody hearing in Charlie L., CYFD filed its notices of voluntary dismissal of Chandler in several of the nine cases, including In re Bryce H. and In re Ryan S.

{5} Nevertheless, counsel for Chandler attended the Charlie L. hearing "to oppose CYFD's actions against Chandler in all nine proceedings, including the findings in the Ex Parte Custody Orders." Since the hearing was sequestered, CYFD tried to exclude Chandler as a non-party, a discussion ensued, and the court afforded Chandler the opportunity to object to the Rule 10–145(A)(1)(a) notices dismissing him, including the notices that had already been filed with the clerk. In response to Chandler's objection, CYFD agreed on the record that it would dismiss Chandler with prejudice from In re Charlie L., and from at least two other cases before the same judge. The court then ruled that the corresponding ex-parte custody orders would be dissolved as to Chandler, and Chandler's attorney left the sequestered custody hearing, which then went forth as scheduled with respect to Charlie L.'s parents, who remained as respondents. Chandler later submitted proposed orders for CYFD's approval, reflecting dismissals with prejudice in all nine cases. CYFD ultimately approved the proposed orders in seven cases, leaving only the orders in In re Bryce H. and In re Ryan S. unapproved.

{6} Meanwhile, by December 5, 2013, CYFD had concluded a Child Protective Services investigation, which, as will be discussed below, is an internal administrative reporting and documentation process, designed in part to "assess [the] safety of children who are the subjects of reports of alleged abuse or neglect." 8.10.3.8(A) NMAC. CYFD reached "investigative decisions" substantiating findings that Chandler abused and/or neglected all nine children. In Tierra Blanca Ranch, Chandler filed a motion in the district court requesting a declaration that the investigative decisions were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion since the children's court had already dismissed "the same investigations and allegations" with prejudice pursuant to CYFD's agreement at the October 15 hearing.

{7} CYFD responded to Chandler's claim preclusion argument by refusing to approve the proposed orders to dismiss the cases involving Bryce H. and Ryan S. with prejudice. Since CYFD had already dismissed the In re Bryce H. and In re Ryan S. cases (without prejudice) in their entirety—meaning that the parents were no longer respondents either—Chandler moved to reopen the cases for the limited purpose of effectuating CYFD's October 15 agreement to change the dismissals to "with prejudice." CYFD opposed the court's jurisdiction to reopen the cases, arguing that the notices of dismissal immediately "terminate [d] the case without any order by the court" and divested the court of its jurisdiction to take any further action. The court ultimately found that it was "wrong for CYFD to make the aforesaid agreement and then not adhere to it." It reopened the proceedings in In re Bryce H. and In re Ryan S. and dismissed Chandler with prejudice in both cases. Although all nine cases had been ostensibly dismissed with prejudice, the court in Tierra Blanca Ranch declined to apply the doctrine of claim preclusion to CYFD's substantiation investigations. Appeals of all three cases followed. We consolidated the cases and now affirm in part and reverse in part.

DISCUSSION

{8} Chandler argues that claim preclusion bars CYFD from administratively substantiating and documenting allegations of abuse and neglect against him after he was dismissed with prejudice from proceedings in all nine cases in the children's court. Chandler's argument necessarily encompasses two contentions: first, that CYFD's substantiation investigations constitute "claims" that could have been brought in children's court in the first place; and second, that the underlying dismissals with prejudice in two of the cases—In re Bryce H. and In re Ryan S. —were appropriately granted over CYFD's objection. We hold that claim preclusion does not apply to any of the substantiation investigations, and we further clarify that the district court was without jurisdiction when it dismissed Chandler from In re Bryce H. and In re Ryan S. with prejudice.

A. Claim Preclusion

{9} Whether the elements of claim preclusion are satisfied is a legal question, which we review de novo. Moffat v. Branch, 2005–NMCA–103, ¶ 10, 138 N.M. 224, 118 P.3d 732. To the extent our analysis requires us to construe the Children's Code and its implementing regulations, we look to the statutory text as the primary indicator of legislative intent. Bishop v. Evangelical Good Samaritan Soc'y, 2009–NMSC–036, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 473, 212 P.3d 361. We also interpret each section of the Children's Code "so as to correlate as faultlessly as possible with all other sections, in order that the ends sought to be accomplished by the [L]egislature shall not...