State ex rel. City of Madison v. Indus. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 05 April 1932
• Parties: STATE EX REL. CITY OF MADISON v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

207 Wis. 652

242 N.W. 321

STATE EX REL. CITY OF MADISON

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

April 5, 1932.

This is an original action brought by leave of this court to compel the Industrial Commission to determine what portion, if any, of the claim of the city of Madison heretofore filed with it under section 2 (2) of chapter 29 of the Laws of the Special Session of the 1931 Legislature (hereinafter referred to as “chap. 29”), represents the equivalent of outdoor poor relief, and to certify such amount to the state treasurer with directions to pay 25 per cent. thereof to the city of Madison.

Peremptory writ of mandamus granted.

The 1931 Legislature convened in special session in November, 1931, enacted chap. 29, the construction of which is necessary to a determination of this controversy. So much of said chapter as requires present consideration is as follows:

“Section 1. Emergency Relief Appropriation. There is appropriated from the general fund for emergency relief purposes the entire receipts from the emergency tax on incomes and the emergency licensing of chain stores provided for in this act, less the amounts appropriated for administration, such amounts to be allotted, distributed, expended and paid as provided in sections 2 and 3.

Sec. 2. Allotment and Distribution of Emergency Relief Appropriation. The appropriation made in section 1 of this act is allotted and shall be distributed, expended and paid as follows:

(1) Upon the taking effect of this act, there shall be paid, upon certification of the industrial commission, to the several counties administering outdoor poor relief under the county system and to the several cities, towns and villages administering outdoor poor relief under the local system, one dollar per inhabitant as shown in the 1930 census.

(2) On presentation of satisfactory proofs to the industrial commission of their expenditures for outdoor poor relief in the calendar year 1931, there shall be paid to counties, cities, towns and villages administering outdoor poor relief, twenty-five per cent of their expenditures for outdoor poor relief in 1931. The term ‘outdoor poor relief’ as used in this act shall include so much of the labor costs of public works undertaken to provide employment for the unemployed as the industrial commission finds represented the equivalent of outdoor poor relief. If, at the time when payments hereunder are to be made, the industrial commission is in doubt as to any item claimed by any county, city, town or village to have been expended for outdoor poor relief, it may certify a partial payment based upon the items which are not in doubt and subsequently determine the additional amount, if any, to which such county, city, town or village is entitled. All claims hereunder shall be filed with the industrial commission prior to April 1, 1932, unless the commission shall, for good cause shown, grant an extension of the time for filing such claims.”

In evident pursuance of said chapter the city of Madison presented to the Industrial Commission its claim for 25 per cent. of its expenditures made in 1931 for outdoor poor relief, as therein defined, together with certain proofs in support thereof. From the petition and claim presented it appears that the city of Madison was not administering poor relief during 1931 under the local system as provided by chap. 49, Stats., but under the county system as provided therein; that notwithstanding it was operating under the county system during the year 1931, it appropriated and paid over to the Madison Public Welfare Association, under the authority conferred upon it by the provisions of section 66.04 (6) of the statutes, the sum of $11,000, and also during said year further undertook, on a rather large scale, to relieve unemployment by making and creating public work in order to provide employment for those unemployed persons who otherwise would have received poor relief through the Madison Public Welfare Association or through Dane county; that the public work so undertaken would not have been undertaken or performed during said year except for the purpose of providing employment for the unemployed; and that the expenditures for labor made by it as aforesaid aggregated the sum of $287,215.58.

The commission found from the proofs submitted that a portion of the expenditures made by the city of Madison represented outdoor poor relief, as defined by section 2 (2), chap. 29, but concluded that since the county board of Dane county had abolished all distinction between county poor and town, village, and city poor in such county, and had caused the expense of maintaining the poor of said county to be borne by the county, the city of Madison was not entitled to any allotment or payment under said chap. 29. The commission so construed section 2 (2) as to include only counties “administering outdoor poor relief under the county system,” and “cities, towns and villages administering outdoor poor relief under the local system”; in other words, only such counties, cities, towns, and villages upon which rested the legal obligation under the laws of this state to render outdoor poor relief. This construction of chap. 29 necessarily resulted in a denial in toto of the claim of the city of Madison.

Theodore G. Lewis, City Atty., of Madison, Robert Cunningham, City Atty., of Janesville, O. S. Loomis, City Atty., of Mauston, and L. McPherson, City Atty., of Superior, for petitioner.

John W. Reynolds, Atty. Gen., and Mortimer Levitan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

John M. Niven, City Atty., of Milwaukee, amicus curiæ.

NELSON, J.

The claim of the city of Madison was made pursuant to the provisions of chap. 29, and its validity in whole or in part depends upon the proper construction to be given to said chapter.

The city of Madison contends that while section 2 (1) unmistakably limits the allotment or distribution thereunder to counties administering outdoor poor relief under the county system and to cities, towns, and villages administering outdoor poor relief under the local system, section 2 (2) contains no such limitation; that the language “there shall be paid to counties and cities, towns and villages administering outdoor poor relief” is plain and unambiguous and amply broad to include a city which in 1931 actually rendered outdoor poor relief, as defined by said section, although within a county administering outdoor poor relief under the county system; that it was the duty of the Industrial Commission to consider its claim on the merits, give consideration to its proofs, determine the amount of the allotment or distribution to which it was entitled, and certify the amount thereof to the state treasurer, with directions to pay to it 25 per cent. of the amount found.

The Industrial Commission, on the other hand, contends that section 2 (1) is plain and unambiguous and designates the governmental units to which allotments or distributions may be made; that the governmental units mentioned and described in section 2 (1) are the only governmental units which may legally receive allotments under the act; that section 2 (2) must be read as though the language “under the county system” and “under the local system,” found in section 2 (1), were specifically repeated therein following the words “administering outdoor poor relief”; that the omission of the clauses “under the county system” and “under the local system” from section 2 (2) may be explained on the theory that the Legislature sought to affect an economy of words, and to avoid unnecessary repetition; that since the primary purpose of the act was to provide relief to the unemployed, and since poor relief was theretofore administered only by counties under the county system or by cities, towns, and villages under the local system, and since the legal obligation to render poor relief rested only upon either counties or cities, towns, and villages, the act should be construed to apply only to such units as were legally obligated to render outdoor poor relief in 1931 and which will be similarly obligated to administer outdoor poor relief during 1932; and that the Legislature could not have intended that an allotment or distribution of any part of the fund should be made to a municipality not specifically obligated by law to use such allotment for outdoor poor relief purposes.

Though numerous contentions are made, the question for decision may be narrowed down to this simple question: Does subsection 2 of section 2, chap. 29, authorize an allotment or payment of money to a municipality situated in a county which in 1931 administered outdoor poor...