State ex rel. City of Superior v. Donald

Decision Date13 June 1916
Citation158 N.W. 317,163 Wis. 626
PartiesSTATE EX REL. CITY OF SUPERIOR v. DONALD, SECRETARY OF STATE.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Original mandamus proceeding by the State of Wisconsin, on the relation of the City of Superior, against John S. Donald, as Secretary of State. Peremptory writ of mandamus issued.W. Stanley Smith, City Atty., of Ashland, Clifton Williams, City Atty., and Garfield S. Canright, Asst. City Atty., both of Milwaukee, and H. V. Gard, City Atty., and T. L. McIntosh, both of Superior (Crownhart & Wylie, of Madison, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

W. C. Owen, Atty. Gen., and Winfield W. Gilman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

WINSLOW, C. J.

This is an action of mandamus brought originally in this court to compel the secretary of state to audit certain claims made by the city of Superior under the provisions of chapter 407, Session Laws of 1915 (sections 51.08, 51.29, 51.30, Statutes Wisconsin 1915). The defendant moves to quash the alternative writ.

The question presented is as to the constitutionality of the act named. The act provides, in substance, that after valuing the property of a railroad company as a whole the state tax commission shall make a separate valuation of “any docks, piers, wharves or grain elevators used in transferring freight or passengers between cars and vessels” which have been included in the value of the railroad property as a whole, and that the taxes paid by the company which are derived from or apportionable to such separately valued property on the basis of the separate valuation aforesaid shall be distributed to the towns, villages, and cities, respectively, in which such property is located.

The city of Superior in this action is attempting to enforce this law and compel the auditing officer of the state to audit its claims for those sums received by the state resulting from the taxation of railroads terminating at Superior which are apportionable to the dock, elevator, and wharf property located in that city and constituting the means of transfer of freight and passengers from railroad to ship, and vice versa. These claims are resisted on the ground that the law is unconstitutional and void for the following reasons: (1) It appropriates money of the state for a local purpose and not a state-wide public purpose; (2) it violates section 1 of article 8 of the state Constitution, requiring the rule of taxation to be uniform; (3) it violates subdivision 6 of article 4 of the Constitution prohibiting the enactment of special laws for the assessment and collection of taxes; (4) it violates section 5of article 8 of the Constitution, providing for the levy of an annual state tax sufficient to defray the estimated expenses of the state for the year. These contentions will be taken up in their order.

[1] I. The first objection may be quickly disposed of by the self-evident proposition that, if this legislation is otherwise valid--i. e., if there is no constitutional objection of any other nature which stands in the way--then these funds are not in any true sense state funds, but simply funds belonging to the city of Superior which have been collected by the state as a matter of convenience in the administration of the tax laws, and are temporarily held by the state treasurer as custodian only for the city, and are to be turned over to the owner upon proper demand. We pass therefore to the consideration of the other objections.

[2] II. It is quite impossible for us to perceive in what way it can be argued that this legislation violates the rule of uniformity in taxation of property. This rule was placed in the Constitution for the protection of the taxpayer so that there may be no discrimination in property taxation. There is none here. The law does not change in the least the taxpayer's burden. He pays exactly the same tribute whether his whole tax contribution remains in the state treasury or whether part of it goes to the city treasury. He has not been taxed at one rate on a part of his property and at a higher rate upon another part as was the case prior to the passage of this law. M., St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Douglas County, 159 Wis. 408, 150 N. W. 422.

[3] III. It is equally difficult for us to see how this law can be in any sense called a law for the assessment or collection of a tax. It does not become effective for any substantial purpose until after...

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7 cases
  • Buse v. Smith
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • November 30, 1976
    ...The processes of assessment and collection remain the same in operation and in effect as before.' State ex rel. Superior v. Donald, 163 Wis. 626, 628, 629, 158 N.W. 317, 318 (1916).3 State ex rel. New Richmond v. Davidson, 114 Wis. 563, 578, 90 N.W. 1067 (1902); State ex rel. Garrett v. Fro......
  • Columbia County v. Board of Trustees of Wisconsin Retirement Fund
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1962
    ...of taxes within the meaning of this constitutional limitation. Whitefish Bay v. Milwaukee County, supra; State ex rel. City of Superior v. Donald (1916), 163 Wis. 626, 158 N.W. 317. Furthermore, we have concluded that Ch. 459 is a public law. This constitutional limitation is expressly limi......
  • City of Marshfield v. Towns of Cameron, etc.
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1964
    ...violation of due process since the apportionment of taxes was within the province of the legislature. See State ex rel. City of Superior v. Donald (1916), 163 Wis. 626, 158 N.W. 317. Municipal corporations, being creatures of the state, are not permitted to censor or supervise the activitie......
  • Vill. of Whitefish Bay v. Milwaukee Cnty.
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • February 9, 1937
    ...did not affect uniformity of county government. Rock County v. City of Edgerton (1895) 90 Wis. 288, 63 N.W. 291;State ex rel. Superior v. Donald (1916) 163 Wis. 626, 158 N.W. 317;State ex rel. Joint School Dist. v. Becker (1927) 194 Wis. 464, 215 N.W. 902. [2] Second. The contention that ch......
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