State ex rel. Codding v. Eby

• Decision Date: 18 April 1945
• Docket Number: 28081.
• Citation: 60 N.E.2d 527,223 Ind. 302
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CODDING v. EBY, Judge.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

60 N.E.2d 527

223 Ind. 302

STATE ex rel. CODDING v. EBY, Judge.

No. 28081.

Supreme Court of Indiana

April 18, 1945

Craig & Craig, of Evansville, for petitioner.

McDonald & McDonald and Sanford Trippet, all of Princeton, for respondent.

RICHMAN Judge.

Relatrix was found to be insane and committed to the Evansville State Hospital in a proceeding in the Gibson Circuit Court, of which respondent was then, and is now, the Judge. The steps in such a proceeding are prescribed by Chap. 69, Acts of 1927, as amended in 1931 and 1933 found in §§ 22-1201 to 22-1228, inclusive, Burns' 1933, Baldwin's 1934 Secs. 4293 to 4320, incl. A guardianship followed this adjudication and is still pending in said court. Whether there was a separate adjudication of unsoundness of mind pursuant to § 8-201 et seq., Burns' 1933, Baldwin's 1934, Sec. 3459 et seq. does not appear. A month after her commitment she was released and six months later discharged by the superintendent who certified, not under oath, that in his opinion she had 'sufficiently recovered to be released.' The certificate was received and filed for record by the Clerk of the Gibson Circuit Court. Relatrix requested in vain that respondent pursuant to § 22-1218 Burns' 1933, Baldwin's 1934, Sec. 4310, enter an order finding her sane. She here insists that the entry of such an order is a ministerial act which can be mandated.

The section reads as follows: 'Any patient may be discharged from any hospital for insane, by the superintendent thereof when sufficiently recovered or upon restoration to mental health. Incurable and harmless patients shall be discharged whenever it is necessary to make room for recent cases. All dangerous patients shall be retained in the hospital. Whenever any patient is discharged by the superintendent of any hospital for insane for the reason that such patient is sufficiently recovered to be released or has been restored to mental health, it shall be the duty of the superintendent of such hospital to send a verified certificate to the court by which such patient was committed, stating the name of the patient, the date on which such patient was committed to such hospital, his address at the time of commitment, the date of the discharge of such patient, the person to whom discharged, if any, and the fact that, in the opinion of the superintendent, such patient is sufficiently recovered to be released, or has been restored to mental health. Upon receipt of such statement, the court shall thereupon enter an order finding such person sane.'

As originally enacted in 1927 the section contained only the first three sentences. In 1933 the last two were added. The General Assembly of 1945 has made further amendment, not yet effective, eliminating the italicized phrase. Respondent questions the sufficiency of the 1933 amendment as adding subject matter not within the title either of the original or amendatory act but, since constitutional questions will not be considered unless necessary to a decision, we express no opinion thereon.

It is clear that the order required by the last sentence of the section is not judicial. There has been no judicial inquiry resulting in a finding of sanity and the statute requires none at the time the order is to be entered. While it is to be made by a judge it is not judicial but ministerial. But not all ministerial acts may be mandated.

In the instant case the certificate contains as the sole reason for discharge the italicized clause. Relatrix says that it is synonymous with the alternative ground 'has been restored to mental health.' But a patient may be harmless though incurably insane in which case he may be released 'to make room for recent cases.' From this certificate respondent may properly infer, in the absence of information to the contrary, that relatrix belongs to such a class. In fact, the failure of the certificate to show that she 'has been restored to mental health' warrants an inference that the opinion of the superintendent is to the contrary. In the pleadings before us relatrix makes allegations to the effect that she...