State, ex rel. Coffin v. Superior Court of Marion County
| Decision Date | 27 October 1925 |
| Docket Number | 24,882 |
| Citation | 149 N.E. 174,196 Ind. 614 |
| Parties | State, ex rel. Coffin v. Superior Court of Marion County et al |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
1. EQUITY.---Court of equity has no jurisdiction of matters that are purely political.---A court of equity has no jurisdiction to try disputed questions concerning rights that are purely political, nor to undertake the protection of such rights by issuing restraining orders and injunctions. p. 618.
2. EQUITY.---Member of political party denied his rights therein or unreasonably hampered in their exercise cannot appeal to court of equity for redress.---A member of a political party who is denied his rights therein, or is unreasonably hampered in their exercise, must look to some other source than a court of equity for redress. p. 618.
3. COURTS.---Jurisdiction of circuit and superior courts to grant injunctions and restraining orders stated.---The Constitution of Indiana gives circuit and superior courts only such jurisdiction in the matter of granting injunctions and restraining orders "as may be prescribed by law," and the statutes give them only such jurisdiction in those matters as courts of chancery had at common law with a few exceptions. p. 625.
4 PROHIBITION.---Supreme Court will issue writ of prohibition restraining circuit or superior court from acting outside its equitable jurisdiction, although it is court of law and equity. -A writ of prohibition will be issued by the Supreme Court to restrain a circuit or superior court from acting outside of its equitable jurisdiction by issuing an injunction to control matters purely political notwithstanding the fact that such court is a court of law as well as a court of equity. p. 625.
5 INJUNCTION.---While legal and equitable actions are blended in this state, the equitable jurisdiction of the courts to grant injunctions is same as before adoption of code unless changed by statute.---While legal and equitable actions are blended in form in this state, the principles remain the same, and a trial judge, sitting as a chancellor, has no authority to interfere by injunction where, previous to the adoption of the code, he could not do so, unless empowered by statute. p. 625.
6. INJUNCTION.---Superior court without jurisdiction to issue restraining order regulating and controlling the acts of presiding officer and members of political party convention met for a distinctively political purpose.-A superior court was without jurisdiction to grant an injunction or restraining order regulating and controlling the acts which should or should not be done by the presiding officer and members of a convention of the representatives of a political party met for a distinctively political purpose. p. 628.
7. PROHIBITION.---Supreme Court will issue writ of prohibition against superior court forbidding issuance of order restraining political party convention from doing specified acts which are purely political.---Supreme Court will issue writ of prohibition against a superior court forbidding it from issuing an order restraining the chairman and members of a political party convention from doing certain specified acts at said convention when met for a distinctively political purpose. p. 628.
Original action in Supreme Court seeking writ of prohibition against the Marion Superior Court and others.
Writ of prohibition made absolute.
Ira M. Holmes, Arthur R. Robinson, Frank A. Symmes and Garth B. Melson, for petitioner.
Roemler, Carter & Rust, Emsley W. Johnson, William Bosson, James M. Ogden and Fesler, Elam & Young, for respondents.
The principal question for consideration and decision is whether or not the equity jurisdiction of a circuit or superior court, under the Constitution and laws of the State of Indiana, extends to granting a restraining order or injunction forbidding the chairman of a local organization of a political party, who is authorized to preside at a meeting of representatives of the party for the purpose of reorganizing the "city committee" of such party, to exclude certain persons from taking part in the meeting as committeemen of their respective precincts, and forbidding him to put anybody else in the places of such persons as the committeemen and representatives of said precincts, and further commanding him to admit those persons, as representing their respective precincts, to participate in the said organization meeting and in all other meetings of the "city committee" of the party, and to recognize them as such in all meetings that the party might hold. Incidentally, the question is also presented whether or not, if the respondent court was without jurisdiction as to these matters, a proper case is presented for issuing a writ of prohibition to control its action with respect thereto.
The relator filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition, alleging, in substance, that the time for holding a meeting of the committeemen representing precincts within the city of Indianapolis for the purpose of choosing a city chairman and effecting a reorganization of the city committee of the Republican party of that city was fixed for Saturday afternoon, January 17, 1925, at one o'clock, and that, by order of the Republican State Committee, the relator was selected to open the meeting and preside until a city chairman should be chosen; that at the primary election in May, 1924, certain persons had been returned as elected to the positions of precinct committeemen for their respective precincts lying wholly or partly within the city of Indianapolis, and had acted as such until after the general election in November, 1924; that the Republican State Central Committee had adopted certain rules (recited in the complaint) declaring certain acts to be "sufficient cause for the removal of any officer or any member of any party committee," and providing for appeals from "any ruling by a subordinate committee or chairman which affects * * * the right of any person to hold any place in the party organization," with an ultimate appeal to the state chairman, "a decision of whom shall be final and binding"; that, alleging the existence of causes within said rules, relator had caused twenty-four of the persons so acting to be removed from their positions as precinct committeemen "by action of the Republican county committee, acting through relator as its chairman," and thereafter, said committee, acting through him, appointed successors as precinct committeemen to succeed them; that the county committee had unanimously adopted a rule declaring that relator, as county chairman, should and did have full authority to remove any and all precinct committeemen for cause, and to fill the places of all such committeemen who should refuse to carry out proper instructions and orders of the county chairman; that no appeal was taken from such removal and filling of the places of said committeemen; that on the day before the day fixed for said organization meeting, the persons so removed as committeemen by relator filed in Room 2 of the Superior court of Marion county, Indiana, their complaint against relator asking that he be enjoined from attempting to exclude them from acting as precinct committeemen at the organization meeting and elsewhere, and from putting others in their places; but that, the next day, before the hour fixed for holding said organization meeting, the said action was dismissed, and the same parties filed a suit in Room 3 of said superior court, the judge of which thereupon issued a restraining order, without notice, forbidding relator to interfere with the plaintiffs therein as precinct committeemen in the exercise of their right to vote at said meeting for the organization of the city committee and at other meetings which might be called by it, or to attempt in any way to put others in their places; that notwithstanding the meeting was to be held at one o'clock that afternoon, said judge fixed January 24, 1925, at 9:30 in the morning, as the date for a hearing on the petition for a temporary injunction, and the restraining order so issued without notice was directed to remain in force "until the notice of hearing on plaintiff's petition can be given and a hearing had thereon, and until the further order of the court"; that, on the same day, this relator, as defendant therein, prepared his motion to dissolve said restraining order, and not finding the judge of Room 3 at his court or in the court-house at that hour, presented the motion to another judge of said superior court, who ordered that the motion be sustained, and, at fifteen minutes before one o'clock, entered an order that the restraining order "be and the same is hereby dissolved"; that said petitioners for the restraining order prayed an appeal, but two days later, on Monday, they withdrew such request, and the judge of Room 3 then made an orderbook minute in his docket that ; that thereafter relator filed a demurrer to the complaint on which said restraining order had been obtained, pointing out that the superior court had no jurisdiction to try or determine the matter, but the judge overruled said demurrer and ruled relator to answer on a named date; and that, unless prohibited, he would try the cause and make the temporary order permanent, on a specified date, two or three days after the time of filing the petition asking for a writ of prohibition. And that such order, if made permanent, would interfere with the relator in the performance of his duties as chairman of the local committee of his party in certain particulars specified.
The Supreme Court issued a temporary...
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