State ex rel. De Concini v. Sullivan, 5058
Decision Date | 10 January 1948 |
Docket Number | 5058 |
Citation | 66 Ariz. 348,188 P.2d 592 |
Parties | STATE ex rel. DE CONCINI, Attorney General, v. SULLIVAN |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Quo warranto proceedings, on the relation of Evo De Concini Attorney General of the State of Arizona, against John L Sullivan, respondent, for a judgment excluding the respondent from the office of Attorney General.
Judgment rendered excluding respondent from office of Attorney General.
Cunningham Carson, Messinger & Carson, of Phoenix, for plaintiff.
John L. Sullivan, of Phoenix, in pro. per., for defendant.
Stanford, C. J., and La Prade and Udall, JJ., concur.
This is an original action in quo warranto filed pursuant to article 6, section 4 of the State Constitution and section 28-301, A. C. A. 1939, in the name of the State of Arizona upon the relation of Evo De Concini claiming to be the Attorney General of the State against John L. Sullivan who is alleged to be usurping, intruding into, unlawfully holding, and pretending to exercise the office of Attorney General. A citation was issued by this court directed to respondent Sullivan to answer by what warrant he claimed to exercise the office of Attorney General.
The pleadings do not present any substantial dispute as to the facts, for, while there are denials in the answer, they relate to the legal effect of facts either admitted or not specifically denied. The petition alleges in substance: (1) That on December 13, 1947, following a trial and verdicts of guilty by a jury on November 22, 1947, the respondent and then Attorney General of the State of Arizona was by the Superior Court of Graham County, Arizona, adjudged guilty on two counts of an information charging him with the crime of conspiracy to violate the gambling laws of the State of Arizona, specifically section 43-1101, and sentenced to imprisonment in the Arizona State Prison; (2) that the Governor of the State, the Honorable Sidney P. Osborn, upon being notified of the judgment of conviction advised respondent in writing that he, as Governor, considered that a vacancy had been created in the office of Attorney General by the judgment of conviction, and that he had appointed Evo De Concini to the office; (3) that the relator upon being notified of his appointment duly qualified for the office by filing the oath and bond required by law; (4) that thereafter respondent intruded himself into the office and unlawfully usurped, held, and exercised the office of Attorney General; (5) that because of many actions pending in the courts of the State wherein the Attorney General is a party, and because of the necessity that the rights of the State and the people thereof be protected, it is essential that respondent be ousted from office, and requests this court to assume original jurisdiction.
At the time of passing of judgment of conviction respondent was the duly elected, qualified, and acting Attorney General of the State of Arizona, and whose term would not expire until the first Monday in January, 1949. It is a matter of cognizable record that subsequent to the judgment of conviction a certificate of probable cause for appeal was granted, which was followed by notice of appeal to the Supreme Court, thereby execution of the judgment was stayed. Respondent admits that he makes claim to retain and hold the office of Attorney General, but denies that said claim is usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding said office. Respondent also challenges the applicability of the writ of quo warranto to the fact situation prevailing, and alleges that he can be removed from office only by recall or impeachment as provided in the Constitution. The impeachment provisions appear as article 8, part 2, sections 1 and 2, Arizona Constitution, and provide as follows:
It is his contention that these provisions constitute the exclusive remedy for creating a vacancy in the office of Governor and other State and judicial offices, including the office of Attorney General.
It is the position of the relator that by provisions of section 12-404, A. C. A. 1939, a vacancy was created in the office of Attorney General by the conviction of respondent of offenses involving a violation of his official duties as Attorney General, which vacancy the Governor was under the duty and empowered to fill by the provisions of article 5, section 8, of the Constitution, reading as follows:
Sec. 12-404, supra, is the legislative provision defining vacancies. It reads:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The action of quo warranto is authorized by section 28-301 which reads as follows:
This statute contemplates two types of action: the first is brought in the public interest by the Attorney General to exclude one who is not entitled to the office from exercising it; the second is brought by a claimant in his private interest wherein he must show by his complaint who is entitled to the office. The judgment then determines his claim and grants damages for the usurpation. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Moore, 49 Ariz. 51, 64 P.2d 809. The action in the instant case was not brought by the relator in his private capacity to determine his right to the office but rather in the public interest to exclude the respondent.
Our right to take original jurisdiction has not been questioned nor could it be, for article 6, section 4 of the Constitution expressly confers it. The reasons that actuated this court to accept jurisdiction in the case of Sullivan v. Moore, supra, are equally present here. The public business demands a prompt judicial inquiry and a final determination of the actions of the respondent in allegedly unlawfully usurping, holding, and exercising so vital an office as that of Attorney General.
We are directly presented with this question: Is that portion of section 12-404 which provides that a vacancy shall be deemed to exist in an office when the holder thereof is convicted of a felony, or of any offense involving a violation of his official duties, unconstitutional as in violation of sections 1 and 2, part 2, article 8 of the Constitution? The offenses for which respondent was convicted are punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison or by fine. Section 43-109 provides:
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...of either offense automatically causes a vacancy in the office. In re Obergfell, 239 N.Y. 48, 145 N.E. 323; State ex rel. De Concini v. Sullivan, 66 Ariz. 348, 188 P.2d 592; State ex rel. Hunter v. Jurgensen, 135 Neb. 136, 280 N.W. 886. Any other construction would do violence to plain, une......
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...Supreme Court of Arizona dealt with the precise problem presented in this case in an analogous case. In State ex rel. DeConcini v. Sullivan, 66 Ariz. 348, 188 P.2d 592 (Sup.Ct. 1948), the Attorney General of the state was found guilty of a criminal offense and sentenced to imprisonment. The......
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