State ex rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Industrial Com'n of Ohio

Decision Date24 July 1985
Docket NumberNo. 84-1201,84-1201
Citation480 N.E.2d 807,18 Ohio St.3d 281,18 OBR 333
Parties, 18 O.B.R. 333 The STATE, ex rel. CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO et al., Appellees.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Hanlon, Duff & Paleudis and John G. Paleudis, St. Clairsville, for appellant.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Douglas M. Kennedy, Columbus, for appellee Industrial Com.

Larrimer & Larrimer and Craig Aalyson, Columbus, for appellee Paul Bobak.

PER CURIAM.

The initial question presented for review centers upon the commission's jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52, and whether appellant possessed a right of appeal pursuant to R.C. 4123.519 from the commission's decision to retain jurisdiction over the claim, the existence of which would necessarily preclude the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

R.C. 4123.52 provides, in part:

"The jurisdiction of the industrial commission over each case shall be continuing, and the commission may make such modification or change with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is justified. No such modification or change nor any finding or award in respect of any claim shall be made with respect to disability, compensation, dependency, or benefits, after six years from the date of injury in the absence of the payment of compensation for total disability under section 4123.56 * * * or wages in lieu of compensation in a manner so as to satisfy the requirements of section 4123.84 * * * except in cases where compensation has been paid under section 4123.56, 4123.57, or 4123.58 * * * then ten years from the date of the last payment of compensation or from the date of death * * *. This section does not affect the right of a claimant to compensation occurring subsequent to the filing of any such application, provided such application is filed within the applicable time limit as provided in this section." (Emphasis added.)

That portion of R.C. 4123.52 set forth above imposes two critical limitation periods. If a claimant has, since the date of the injury, received temporary, partial or permanent total disability compensation under R.C. 4123.56, 4123.57 or 4123.58, respectively, or has received wages in lieu of compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.84, then the commission may consider an application for additional compensation as long as the application is submitted within ten years of the last payment of such compensation. The parties concede that Bobak did not receive any of the aforementioned compensation within ten years of the date of the injury which occurred on July 28, 1972. The failure to obtain such compensation, however, did not preclude the commission from considering Bobak's application under R.C. 4123.52, if it could be determined that an application for compensation was submitted within six years of the date of the injury.

On August 8, 1983, the commission determined that Bobak's June 11, 1978 letter constituted an application for compensation and, therefore, R.C. 4123.52 did not operate to bar the claimant from seeking additional workers' compensation benefits. It is from this determination that appellant initiated the within original action in the court of appeals. As cogently recognized by the court below, a determination that a claim is, or is not, barred by R.C. 4123.52 constitutes a decision as to a claimant's right to participate in the State Insurance Fund and, consequently, is appealable pursuant to R.C. 4123.519. Valentino v. Keller (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 173, 224 N.E.2d 748 .

The issue presented in Valentino concerned the ten-year limitation period prescribed under R.C. 4123.52, and whether the claimant had received medical treatment within ten years from the date of the industrial injury so as to vest the commission with jurisdiction to reinstate his claim. 1 The claimant's application was denied by both the Administrator and the Canton Regional Board of Review. Thereafter, an appeal was taken to the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County pursuant to R.C. 4123.519. At trial, the court sustained a motion by the employer to the effect that the commission's order was a decision as to the extent of disability and, hence, not appealable under R.C. 4123.519. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, and after further review this court affirmed the court of appeals, stating:

"The right of appeal is set forth in Section 4123.519, Revised Code, as follows:

" 'The claimant * * * [or the employer] may appeal a decision of the Industrial Commission in any injury case, other than a decision as to the extent of disability, to the Court of Common Pleas of the county in which the injury was inflicted * * *.' (Emphasis added.)

"The question of whether Valentino is entitled to have his claim reinstated turns upon a determination of the date upon which he last received treatment from the company doctor.

"That is not a decision as to the extent of disability. Therefore, under the above statutory language [R.C. 4123.519], Valentino is entitled to an appeal from the decision of the Industrial Commission to the Court of Common Pleas [to test the commission's jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52].

" * * *

"In this case the decision upon appeal would be that Valentino has a right or does not have a right 'to continue to participate in the fund.'

"This question is a jurisdictional one [and is therefore appealable pursuant to R.C. 4123.519].

" * * *

"The Industrial Commission has the...

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37 cases
  • State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Stover
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • July 15, 1987
    ...limitation periods are contained within the first full paragraph of R.C. 4123.52. State, ex rel. Consolidation Coal Co., v. Indus. Comm. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 281, 283, 18 OBR 333, 334, 480 N.E.2d 807, 809. The first limitation period requires that an application for disability, compensatio......
  • Felty v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • December 16, 1992
    ...is not barred by the limitations period prescribed by R.C. 4123.52 is appealable. State ex rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 281, 18 OBR 333, 480 N.E.2d 807. These cases illustrate the rule that an appeal to the common pleas court is limited to one decision: ......
  • State ex rel. Dailey v. Indus. Comm'n
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • June 25, 2019
    ...ex rel. Alhamarshah v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 142 Ohio St.3d 524, 2015-Ohio-1357, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel. Consolidation Coal. Co. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 18 Ohio St.3d 281, 284 (1985) (citation omitted). For the following reasons, we conclude there is an adequate remedy at law for Mr. Da......
  • State ex rel. Evans v. Indus. Comm.
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • July 22, 1992
    ...some decisions clearly determine an employee's right to participate in the fund. See, e.g., State ex rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 281, 18 OBR 333, 480 N.E.2d 807 (a decision that the Industrial Commission has continuing jurisdiction over a claim because ......
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