State Ex Rel. Constanzo v. Kindelberger

• Citation: 106 S.E. 434
• Decision Date: 08 March 1921
• Docket Number: (No. 4281.)
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CONSTANZO. v. KINDELBERGER et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

106 S.E. 434

STATE ex rel. CONSTANZO.
v.
KINDELBERGER et al.

(No. 4281.)

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

March 8, 1921.

[106 S.E. 434](Syllabus by the Court.)

Application for writ of prohibition by the State, on the relation of Frank Constanzo against John W. Kindelberger, Justice, and others. Writ awarded.

J. M. Ritz, Thos. B. Foulk, and George A. Blackford, all of Wheeling, for relator.

E. T. England, Atty. Gen., Charles Ritchie, Asst. Atty. Gen., Carl G. Bachmann and Austin V. Wood, both of Wheeling, for respondents.

LIVELY, J. Kindelberger, a justice of the peace of Ohio county, on February 12, 1921, issued a warrant for Constanzo, charging him with operating and driving upon the county roads of that county and upon the streets of the city of Wheeling a motor vehicle, the weight of which including the load was more than 600 pounds per inch width of tire, the total width of the four tires being included in computing the weight thereof. At the trial his counsel moved to quash the complaint and warrant, which motion being overruled, defendant refused to plead. The justice entered the plea of not guilty, for him, heard the evidence, found defendant guilty, fined him $100 and sentenced him to 10 days in jail at hard labor. Defendant gave bond, and appealed to the criminal court of Ohio county, where the case is now pending, and immediately applied to this court for, and obtained, this rule in prohibition against Hon. A. H. Robinson, judge of the criminal court, to show cause why he should not be prohibited from hearing or trying the case.

Constanzo asserts that the warrant does not charge him with the commission of an offense against the laws of this state; that he has committed no offense; and that the justice and criminal court are without jurisdiction for that reason.

The statute under which this warrant was issued, and on which the prosecution is predicated, is section 126 of chapter 66, Acts 1917 (Code Supp. 1918, c. 43, § 126 [sec. 1940— 126]), the pertinent portion of which reads:

"No vehicle in excess of ninety inches in width shall be operated upon the highways of this state * * » nor shall any vehicle, including load, exceeding thirty thousand pounds in weight, or on which the weight of the load is more than six hundred pounds per inch width of tire, the total width of the four tires being included in computing the weight thereof, be operated upon the highways of this state unless by special permit from one of the authorities hereinbefore designated, and then only upon highways specially constructed for heavy traffic."

The state asserts that it was the intention of the Legislature in this act to protect the roads and streets from destruction, and that no more than 600 pounds per inch width of tire, including weight of car and load, should be permitted; and that the section quoted should be construed to read:

"Nor shall any vehicle, including load, exceeding 30, 000 lbs. in weight * * * or more than 600 lbs. per inch width of tire, the total width of the four tires being included in computing the weight thereof. * * * "

The main reason confidently relied upon by the state for discharging the rule is that prohibition is not the proper remedy. The uses and purposes of prohibition and the class of cases in which the writ will issue have been under discussion so often and so recently in this court and the holdings are so well settled that' it would serve no useful purpose to review the cases or reiterate the principles enunciated. In all cases, when the inferior court has not jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy, the writ will lie. This is the very language of the statute, and is but declaratory of the common law. Now what is the rule for determining jurisdiction? Does this warrant...