State ex rel. Conway v. Versluis
| Decision Date | 22 December 1941 |
| Docket Number | Civil 4413 |
| Citation | 120 P.2d 410,58 Ariz. 368 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel. Joe Conway, Attorney General, Appellant, v. PAUL H. VERSLUIS and ELLEN H. VERSLUIS, His Wife, Appellees |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. Howard C. Speakman, Judge. Judgment reversed.
Mr. Joe Conway, Attorney General, and Mr. Albert M. Garcia, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellant.
Messrs Woolf & Shute, for Appellees.
This is an action by the State of Arizona against Paul H. Versluis and Ellen H. Versluis, his wife, called defendants, and various other parties, asking for a personal judgment against one Lucy Wedgworth on a promissory note executed by her and her deceased husband John W. Wedgworth in favor of the state and for the foreclosure of a mortgage given by them on certain farm lands for the purpose of securing payment of the note above referred to. All the parties, except the Versluises, defaulted. The latter appeared and set up various defenses to the action, which we shall consider at the proper time and place. Judgment was rendered in favor of defendants, and from such judgment the state has appealed.
The facts may be stated as follows: On January 31, 1919, John W and Lucy Wedgworth borrowed $1,500 of certain of the permanent funds of the state created by section 28 of the Enabling Act and the Constitution of Arizona, and to secure said loan gave to the state the note and mortgage aforesaid. The loan was approved by the state treasurer, the secretary of state and the governor. Interest was paid on said note up to July 1, 1932, and $100 was paid on the principal. In the latter part of 1936, defendants learned from the state treasurer that the said note and mortgage was long since due and unpaid, and believing that the state had abandoned its interest in the mortgaged property, purchased from Lucy Wedgworth and the surviving children of herself and her deceased husband all their interest in said premises. Thereafter defendants went into possession of the land and improved the same by the expenditure of large sums of money thereon. In 1938 the county treasurer offered the land in question for sale for the delinquent taxes due thereon for the years 1933 to 1937, and defendants purchased it at such sale, the usual treasurer's certificate of purchase being issued to them. Thereafter this suit was brought.
Defendants' first contention is that the note and mortgage in question were void because sections 108 to 113 of chapter 5 of the acts of the Second Special Session of the Second Legislature are unconstitutional, and the mortgage sought to be foreclosed herein is, therefore, void. This requires some examination of the law applicable to the handling of the permanent funds of the state.
In 1910 Congress passed a law providing for the admission of Arizona to the Union, commonly referred to as the Enabling Act. Amongthe provisions thereof was one granting to the new state a large amount of the public lands therein, owned by the United States, the amounts and purposes of the grant being set forth in sections 24 and 25 of the Act. Some of these purposes implied the eventual disposal of the lands and the expenditure of the capital proceeds; others clearly stated that the proceeds were to be held as a permanent fund and the income only used. It was further provided by section 28 of the Act as follows:
The Constitution of Arizona, following the Enabling Act, provided in article 10, sections 1, 2 and 7, that these lands and the proceeds thereof were accepted and held in trust to be disposed of only as provided in the Enabling Act and the Constitution for the purposes set forth therein, and copied verbatim that portion of the Enabling Act above quoted.
At first there was no special legislation to carry into effect these provisions of the Constitution, if they were not self-executing, but in 1915 the governor called a special session of the Legislature to consider various matters, among these being the following:
(Call for 2d Special Session, 2d Legislature.)
At the Special Session the Legislature adopted chapter 5, the title of which set forth the contents thereof, so far as material for the purpose of this case, as follows:
"To provide a code for the systematic administration, care and protection of the state lands and vesting the necessary powers therefor in a department, to be known as the State Land Department, and creating the office of Commissioner of State Lands to carry out the provisions hereof;... to provide for the establishment of special funds for the several purposes for which lands were granted to the State of Arizona by the Enabling Act or otherwise; and for the disposition of the receipts of such lands;..."
Sections 108 to 113, inclusive, of the chapter, which follows the establishment of the various permanent funds in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution and the Enabling Act above referred to, are entitled "Investment Of Funds" and read, so far as material to this case, as follows:
It is these sections which defendants contend are unconstitutional, their reasons for this contention being (a) that none of these sections are properly embraced or included in the call of the governor for the Second Special Session, and are, therefore, void under article 4, part 2, section 3 of the Constitution, which reads, so far as material, as follows:
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...to payment of the Notes. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 619 F.Supp. 1351, 1363 (W.D.Okla.1985); State ex rel. Conway v. Versluis, 58 Ariz. 368, 379, 120 P.2d 410, 415 (1941); Schneider v. Thompson, 58 F.2d 94, 99 (8th Cir.1932); Union Gold-Mining Co. of Colorado v. Rocky Mountain Nat'l B......
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...BRBs’ language reflects a "proper connection" to the budget as understood by an outside reader. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Conway v. Versluis , 58 Ariz. 368, 377, 120 P.2d 410 (1941) ; In re Lewkowitz , 70 Ariz. 325, 329, 220 P.2d 229 (1950). Thus, manageable standards exist to resolve the q......
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